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Beginning from the 1990s when the ‘New Public Management’ was introduced in the public 
sector, many countries around the world embraced this new way of working, especially in the 
developed countries. This adoption kept public sector services in economies like the United 
Kingdom (UK) under a tremendous pressure to become more efficient in  the delivery of 
effective services. This phenomenon was named - ‘Value for Money’ initiative within the UK 
public sector. 
In order to achieve these goals, the public sector has been inundated with several reform 
regimes, thereby adopting management techniques and tools, which are arguably similar to 
that being used in the private sector. The National Health Service (NHS) was not left out of 
this wave. The NHS introduced the market system in the 1990s, in which the providers and 
purchasers of health services were segregated, giving them the opportunity to negotiate price 
of services with each other.  
The wave of reforms have since not stopped; by 2004, Foundation Trust (FT) status was 
introduced in the NHS, where the government chose to devolve accountability for health 
service to the local communities. The purpose of the devolution is to allow NHS hospitals to 
become locally accountable to their communities. The conferment of a new status on the 
NHS organisations is expected to set them loose from the government’s apron, granting them 
financial freedom,  where they can keep surpluses  generated for reinvestment  in  services,   ii 
make investment decisions without deferring to the government and have a better control of 
the organisation.  
This research has six major objectives. First, it seeks to understand the entirety of Foundation 
Trust Status in the NHS, second, to outline the role of accounting as the controlling tool in 
the organisational setting, third, is to identify the string of local accountability within and 
outside  the  FT  organisation,  fourth,  is  to  establish  the  effect  of  the  structural  change 
witnessed within organisation types, fifth, is to locate the FT change within the general form 
of  the  New  Public  Management  (NPM),  thereby  evidencing  the  study  as  an  empirical 
learning and finally evaluating the effectiveness of the FT reform within the organisations 
being studied. 
The  study  adopted  an  interpretive  perspective,  gathering  data  through  interviews, 
documentary  analysis  and  researcher’s  observation.  The  study  later  adopted  the  thematic 
synthesis strategy in analysing the data. It is a multi-case study research, which involved 
three (3) NHS Trusts in the UK. The first organisation is a non-FT hospital, undergoing the 
process  of becoming a  Foundation Trust,  the second and third operates  as  fully licensed 
Foundation Trust hospitals. 
This paper reflected on institutional theory as a tool, to understand the FT status in the NHS. 
In particular, we identified the forces that exerted pressure on the NHS organisations, the 
place of accounting as a tool in the process, how these organisations responded to innovation 
uptake. Data analysis unveiled organisation’s struggle for compliance through legitimacy for 
power  and  resource,  which  became  the  central  phenomenon  of  this  study.  The  NHS 
organisations were found to be resolute in their choice to implement the FT reform, in spite 
of the inherent complexity of the process on top of their day to day operational challenges.  
The  struggle  for  compliance  resulted  in  a  mixed  result,  initiating  an  active  pursuit  of 
efficiency especially in the early adopter and then a negative influence on the late adopter 
organisation as actors engaged in a number of creative activities as they seek legitimacy. The 
result from this thematic study proposed that organisations adopt and implement accounting 
changes  for  the  purpose  of  achieving  legitimacy  and  promoting  efficiency,  as  well  as 
advancing  self-interests.  The  effect  of  each  choice  was  found  relative  to  organisational 
motive for the adoption of the change, either for efficiency or legitimacy. 
This paper contributes to the theoretical understanding and relevance of institutional theory, 
particularly the New Institutional Sociology (NIS) in the NHS. Thus, providing a framework   iii 
for  legitimacy,  this  further  illuminates  possible  explanations  for  the  interrelationships 
between  organisation’s  adoption  and  the  implementation  of  an  accounting  change  in 
organisations, with the attendance of loose coupling. In addition, it contributes to the practical 
understanding of the FT change amongst practitioners in the NHS, an understanding, which 
helps grasp the importance of the change within the context of today’s society, as driven by 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.0  Background to the Research 
There was a huge outcry and convincing justifications for the revamp of the National Health 
Service (NHS) in England following the completion of the Comprehensive Spending Review 
in 2000. The review indicated the need for a bigger investment in the NHS, which had an 
annual growth of about 3% per annum in real terms prior to the review. The investment 
meant that the next seven years witnessed a growth of about 7% per annum in real terms 
under  the  Labour  government;  the  period  also  witnessed  the  implementation  of  several 
reforms,  as  was  detailed  in  the  ‘NHS  Plan’,  (Department  of  Health,  2000),  a  document 
released in 2000. The introduction of the NHS Foundation Trust (FT) reform was one of the 
reform  programmes  highlighted  in  the  ‘NHS  Plan’.  The  essence  of  the  reform  was  to 
empower the trusts in a number of ways. First is to allow them a greater measure of financial 
freedom, second, is to devolve control of the organisation to the trust and lastly is to create 
local  accountability,  whereby  the  trust  becomes  accountable  to  their  local  communities 
(Monitor, 2009; DoH, 2004). 
The  Foundation  Trust  reform  is  notably  a  colossal  change  in  the  NHS,  because  of  its 
influence in moving the NHS Accountability obligation away from the government to the 
local  communities. This  reform  presents  a  gateway to  all NHS provider organisations  in 
England to undergo a mandatory assessment process, which results in a change of status for 
successful  organisations.  Successful  organisations  will  undergo  a  name  change,  with  the 
words ‘Foundation Trust’ added to their name. The change in name attract benefits, such as 
financial  freedom,  organisational  control  and  change  in  accountability  function,  thereby 
creating a new reporting line for the organisation.  
Prior  to  achieving  the  name  change,  the  FT  assessment  framework  must  examine  the 
financial and  governance  risk configuration of  the NHS organisation,  through the use of 
strategic  management  accounting  techniques  and  accounting  ratios  to  determine  the 
organisation’s stamina and the quality of its management in the long term. Only successful 
organisations are awarded the FT status. 
The Foundation Trusts are a new type of NHS trust in England, created to devolve decision-
making from central government’s control to the trusts and their local communities, so that   2 
the FTs are more responsive to the needs and wishes of their local people. The introduction of 
NHS FT represents a profound change in the history of the NHS and the way in which 
hospital services are managed and provided (DoH, 2006). It follows, therefore, that the role 
of accounting in this setting and the accountability shift connotes a critical feature in the new 
organisational form. 
This research focussed on the implementation of FT reform in the NHS from the stand point 
of institutional theory, which suggests that organisations are influenced by, and can influence, 
the  society  in  which  they  operate  (Meyer  and  Rowan,  1977;  Meyer  and  Scott,  1992; 
DiMaggio  and  Powell,  1983,  1991).  The  central  object  was  to  observe  this  influencing 
interplay between the FT reform and the organisations involved in the change process. 
On a greater scale, it has been noted, especially in contemporary societies that many public 
sector entities are currently undergoing significant reforms, not to achieve greater economic 
efficiency, but for the purpose of legitimising themselves to different forms of institutional 
pressure or influence (Lapsley, 1999; Hoque et al., 2004). If this milieu prevails, it follows, 
therefore, that the series of reforms adopted in public sector organisations are not entirely 
driven by economic reasons; rather they are forms of ‘window dressing’ (Lapsley, 1999), 
which in itself is an engagement in activities leading to no concrete benefit or change (Meyer 
and  Rowan, 1977). Moreover recent  reviews  of New Public Management (NPM) related 
programmes  have  concluded  that  the  introduction  of  performance  systems,  managerial 
innovations  and  process  reorganisations  have  failed  to  meet  the  expected  performance 
improvements (Lapsley, 2009). 
The choice of this area of research was based on the high profile interest generated by the 
Foundation Trust reform in the NHS. The government’s rhetoric at the introduction of the 
reform highlighted that Foundation Trusts (often referred to as “Foundation Hospitals”) are at 
the cutting edge of the government’s commitment to the decentralization of public services 
and the creation of a patient-led NHS (DoH, 2006).  
The general advice when it comes to organisational reform and its implementation is that of 
caution, because the overall outcome of the change may result in an increase in cost without 
achieving the expected goal for which it was embarked upon in the first place (Guthrie et al., 
1999, Olson et al., 2001; Tomkin, 1987). It is also imperative that changes or reforms are 
implemented within the most appropriate climate in an organisation’s life (Tomkins, 1987),   3 
hence, the justification for this study, which evaluates and create a better understanding of the 
FT change. 
The introduction of FT reform in 2003/4 financial year coincided with a period when the 
global NHS was in the middle of an all time financial crisis, which was vastly becoming 
endemic, as several trusts were operating at a  deficit financially. The Department of Health, 
in its report affirmed that-  
‘There  is  a  good  evidence  that  difficulties  in  internal  financial  management  and 
control have contributed to an increasing number of trusts with sizeable deficits, and 
some  evidence  that  these  difficulties  have  been  aggravated  by  rapid  change  and 
organisational turbulence in the NHS. ..’(DoH, 2007:86) 
The government, as an honest broker to NHS organisations was expected to act in the most 
appropriate way to ensure that resources were moved around within the system to support the 
recovery  of  individual  trusts  in  financial  deficit,  and  several  reform  programmes  were 
implemented within the NHS to bail a number of ailing trusts out of their financial difficulty. 
In recent times, the relationship between the increase in government spending and size of the 
deficit declared amongst NHS organisations, and their increasing complexity is becoming a 
major  challenge  to  the  government  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Several  governments  in  the 
United Kingdom, dating back to the 1980s have introduced a number of reforms to improve 
the financial and governance structure of the NHS. The most recent of these reforms is the 
introduction of the FT status, which like every other reform promises to deliver an improved 
NHS service, while devolving freedom and control to individual NHS organisations. 
The  Foundation  Trust  concept  was  introduced  as  a  not-for-profit  business,  enjoying  the 
benefit  of  self-control  rather  than  Central  government’s  control.  However  FTs  remain 
accountable to their local communities and a new regulator called Monitor. This means that 
while FTs form a part of the NHS, the Secretary of State has no control over them. This role 
passed on to Monitor. Monitor was established in January 2004 as the Independent Regulator 
of  NHS  FTs,  in  accordance  with  the  Health  and  Social  Care  (Community  Health  and 
Standards) Act 2003. The provisions of this Act, which relate to Monitor and NHS FTs have 
now been consolidated in the National Health Service Act 2006. 
As part of its regulatory mandate, Monitor has statutory powers to authorize NHS trusts, to 
become FTs, oversee compliance of FTs with their terms of authorization (akin to a ‘licence’ 
to operate) and to intervene in the event of significant non-compliance with the terms of   4 
authorization or any other statutory obligations. The first FT was authorized in 2004; the 
government initially offered the opportunity to all NHS trusts to apply for Foundation status 
by 2008, and this deadline has now been extended to March 2014. 
FTs are expected to maintain the ethos of the NHS by providing free care in the United 
Kingdom, based on need and not ability to pay. An organisation’s attainment of a Foundation 
status relieved the central government of all control and power over the trust. In addition to 
the concession of the regulatory power to  Monitor, the accountability power passes to  a 
Board of Governors comprising people elected from and by the membership base. They have 
members  drawn  from  patients,  the  public  and  staff  and  on  the  grounds  of  attaining  a 
Foundation status; the hospitals were assured of the following freedoms - 
  Freedom from Whitehall control and performance management by Strategic Health 
Authorities (As would be explained in Chapter five – 5.1.3) 
  Freedom to access capital on the basis of affordability rather than the current system 
of centrally controlled allocations 
  Freedom to invest surpluses in developing new services for its local community 
  Freedom of local flexibility to tailor new governance arrangements to the individual 
circumstances of their community 
Over the course of FT implementation in the UK, a number of structural changes have been 
made, including the creation of a new body called the Care and Quality Commission (CQC) 
to take charge of the clinical regulation of FTs. The CQC was created after the dissolution 
and  absorption  of  the  role  of  the  Health  Care  Commission  (HCC),  which  was  interalia 
responsible for the performance management of NHS organisations. The Care and Quality 
Commission (CQC) took over the role and extended beyond the function of the HCC as the 
CQC is also responsible for performance management and quality assurance of the remnant 
NHS trusts, who are still under the star rating regime. 
The other crucial body that remains relevant to the FT agenda is the Audit Commission (AC). 
The Audit Commission is an independent government watchdog responsible for ensuring that 
public money is spent economically, efficiently and effectively, to achieve high-quality local 
and national services for the public. The Audit Commission formed part of the control regime 
inherited  by  FT  hospitals,  the  AC  remains  responsible  for  inspection,  validation  and   5 
certification of financial reporting presented by FTs to the public. FTs, however, have a right 
to appoint their own auditors if they so desire. 
The FT reform is characterised with an almost irreversible position for the government, who 
has relinquished its control of the NHS  trust – The acute, community and mental health 
hospitals  to  the  local  population  under  the  regulatory  control  of  Monitor,  hence,  the 
importance  of  this  study  aimed  at  understanding  ‘how  the  adoption  of  FT  status  has 
influenced the organisation’s strategic direction’. Therefore the general research question, to 
which this study aims to provide an answer, is summed up as – How did the implementation 
of  the  FT  status  (Accounting  and  Structural  Changes)  influenced  or  shaped  the  NHS 
organisation? 
From the above general question, the following four questions were formulated -  
1.  What is FT status all about? 
2.  Why would any organisation seek the adoption of FT status? 
3.  How has the pressure to adopt FT status influenced the organisations? 
4.  How did NHS organisations respond to the pressure and the benefit it offers? 
1.1  Research Objective 
The  aim  of  this  research  is  to  understand  the  FT  status  and  how  the  change  in  status 
influenced the NHS organisations as they go through the adoption of the FT reform, with a 
view to assessing the aggregate effect of the new status on organisational behaviour. Prima 
facie this is a wide area of research, which must be reduced to a manageable size. Therefore, 
the research focussed on the adoption and the implementation of FT status within the NHS; 
this includes specific issues, which control and influence the functioning of FTs.  
The FT phenomenon is a new framework in the NHS. Therefore, there are only a handful of 
empirical studies on the subject. This highlights the importance of this research, particularly 
with regard to the use of accounting as a tool to control organisations, and to reorganize their 
system of Governance, to foster local accountability to their communities. This structure is 
similar to the type found in the private sector (Hood, 1995; Larbi, 1999; Ballantine et.al 
2008). The adoption of FT streamlines the financial management and governance structure in 
organisations, by realigning them to the Monitor template of financial management, which is 
rooted in risk analysis and a risk rating system (Monitor, 2004), this is intrinsically linked to 
financial ratios in accounting.    6 
The various adoption requirements specified in the FT framework were designed to influence 
the  organisation’s  core  finance  and  governance  structure  (Monitor,  2004).  Hence,  the 
majority of the reform elements were mainly visible in the intra-organisational functions. 
This research relied on the experiences of staff within the organisations, in addition to various 
literature and documents, to identify and analyse the effects of FT adoption. 
The overall research objective was to create a better understanding of the FT reform, by 
following through the process of implementation and identifying the relevance of each phase 
of the change process. This was achieved through a first-hand interaction with the change 
process  itself  by  researcher’s  observation  and  an  intensive  discussion  with  the  actors 
undergoing  the  change  in  the  organisations.  This  study  was  undertaken  with  a  view  to 
illuminate the FT reform, while providing an institutional explanation of the consequence of 
FT status on the NHS.  
It must also be noted, that the implementation of the FT reform in itself is not a full adoption 
of the change, as full adoption is only achieved when the change is internalised (Kustova and 
Roth, 2002). The process of internalisation is reached only when the social actors fully accept 
the  change.  It  takes  time  to  reach  that  stage,  thus  this  research  relied  on  studying  the 
behavioural pattern of the FT organisations following their decision to adopt FT, thereby 
changing the strategic direction of the organisation over a period of time.  
A  fundamental  part  of  the  rationale  given  by  the  politicians  for  the  FT  system  was  to 
stimulate  local  accountability  within  the  NHS.  Accountability  in  the  public  sector  was 
arguably  linked  to  the  introduction  of  New  Public  Management  (NPM)  (Mulgan,  2003; 
Dubnick, 2005). NPM reforms have been revealed over the years as a complex phenomenon, 
which was evidenced by various empirical studies showing mixed results (McGill, 2001; Van 
Nispen and Posseth, 2009). For this reason, this study built a solid foundation for itself from 
various literatures rooted in NPM, in the absence of much in terms of related studies on the 
FT phenomenon itself.  
In pursuing the research objective, a thorough assessment of how the measures introduced by 
the FT regime created a new system was undertaken and the effects of this system (which 
albeit was as a result of the FT status) on the entire organisation investigated in each of the 
case studies. Notably, the FT reform cast an almost irreversible position for the government, 
who has relinquished its control of the NHS trusts namely the Acute, Community, Mental   7 
Health hospitals and Ambulance trusts to Monitor for regulation and the local communities as 
repositories of the accountability power.  
1.2  Relevance of the Research 
The uptake of Foundation Trust status in England has steadily been on the increase since the 
first set of FT organisations were licensed in March 2004. The government’s rhetoric about 
FT introduction revolves around the facilitation of NHS trusts’ autonomy in England and to 
establish  their accountability to  the  community they serve.  It  is  fair to state that the  FT 
phenomenon failed to catch much attention of researchers, especially those focussing on the 
financial and organisational imprint of FT on the NHS. This is not a surprise given that FT 
status is a relatively new concept in the sector. The few references on the subject of FT were 
usually restricted to professional literature in practitioners’ journal and policy documents. 
The paucity of theoretical and empirical work within the global NHS is tangible enough 
(Chua & Preston, 1994) let alone a new concept such as the FT status. This study, therefore, 
is intended to initiate a discussion around the FT phenomenon, while advancing and widening 
the subject area within the accounting research field.   
This study is particularly relevant to the entire NHS network and indeed the academic circle, 
to create an understanding of the FT licensure process,  following the scandal at the Mid 
Staffordshire  NHS  Foundation  Trust,  a  licensed  FT  organisation,  which  attracted  a  wide 
publicity in the media, as well as among the local population. This incident raised a grave 
concerns about  the  competence  of personnel  and the clinical  safety of  this  hospital.  The 
unprecedented level  of  mortality and the  appalling  standard of care provided at  the Mid 
Staffordshire FT, resulted in an urgent enquiry into the hospital’s affairs by the Healthcare 
Commission (HCC). The outcome of the HCC led investigation published a highly critical 
report in March 2009. Two other reviews were commissioned by the Department of Health 
after  the  HCC  report.  The  reports  from  the  concluding  investigation  into  the  Mid 
Staffordshire case known as the ‘Francis report’, gave rise to a further widespread public 
concern and a loss of confidence in the trust, its services and management and by implication, 
the entire FT system. 
This  study  opens  up  the  FT  phenomenon  by  elaborating  on  the  process  involved  in  the 
implementation of the FT reform. It also offered a theoretical base by using the institutional 
theory, as a tool to explain the reform, in the light of how organisations react to the adoption 
of  this  innovation.  A  number  of  studies  have  used  this  theory  to  explain  the  prevailing   8 
cultures in organisations in several contexts, such as  in performance management (Modell, 
2001; Brignal and Modell, 2000), studying the effect of a major initiative and legislation in 
the  public  sector  –  (Hoque,  2005),  exploring  stability  and  change  relationships  in  a 
management accounting change – (Siti-Nabiha and Scarpen, 2005), changes in accounting 
information  in  an  electricity  company  –  (Tsamenyi  et  al.,  2006),  emerging  accounting 
practices from interactions of social actors – (Goddard, 2004), and downsizing strategies in a 
Norweigian firm (Dahl and Nesheim, 1998).   
The investigation of events within the FT context adds to the body of knowledge within the 
public sector accounting research in particular, by responding to the various calls for further 
studies into unexplored social settings such as the healthcare sector (Broadbent, 1999) and the 
need to contribute concrete examples of public sector reform mechanisms and accountability 
changes (Young and Oakes, 2009). The results from this study contributed in a number of 
ways to institutional theory, accounting research and also to prevailing organisational practice 
within the healthcare sector. 
The first contribution is notably the trimming of the existing gap in the specific societal need 
for applied accounting research in the field of health care, which has recently been an issue in 
academe.  This  relates  to  the  possible  crisis  in  the  relevance  of  accounting  research.  In 
response, this  study  is  basis to  justify the relevance of accounting and also  calls  for the 
development of more applied research projects in healthcare, to engage beyond the technical 
aspects of management accounting systems, with emphasis on the social and organisational 
implications (Hopwood, 2008, 2009; Baldvinsdottir et al., 2010; van Helden and Northcott, 
2010). This study is differentiated from previous researches in the FT context by improving 
on the basis of measurement adopted in some of the earlier studies such as (Marini et al., 
2007),  which  used  performance  indices,  such  as  the  trusts’  Retained  Surplus  and  the 
Reference Cost Index (RCI) to assess the effectiveness of FTs in the NHS. While the use of 
these measures contributed to accounting research on a technical level, the previous study 
failed to espouse accounting beyond the technical economic rationality stance. This thesis 
however argues that accounting is more than a technical and rationalist tool, but a formal 
basis for economic action and for making useful business decisions. The essence is to steer 
discussions  in  accounting  research  beyond  the  technical  into  the  social  and  institutional 
context. 
Secondly, there was a clear gap in the literature on the relationship between accounting rules, 
its complexity and the institutionalisation of the rules, this study established a connection   9 
between  the  FT  innovation  uptake  to  its  point  of  institutionalisation,  by  identifying  the 
intervening events between the two periods, through which an attempt was made to theorise 
the phenomenon of organisational struggle in a change process. It explained why and how 
organisations struggle in the adoption of new rule. It elaborated why the implementation of a 
complex  rule  provoked  instrumental  aspect  (Lukka,  2007)  of  legitimacy  in  some 
organisations, while others exhibited the ceremonial values (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983) 
or both instrumental and ceremonial aspects.  The presentation of these tendencies in this 
multi case study, models an empirical example in accounting, which other studies may build 
on. 
Thirdly, unlike the other relevant studies found on the subject of FT reform, this study offers 
a better and broader scope in terms of methodology as a qualitative study. It also adopted a 
more robust and holistic process, by observing a life case of FT adoption. Most notable of the 
previous studies include (Marini et al., 2008), which used a quantitative approach, to access 
the effect of the new financial freedom enjoyed by the newly created FT organisations. The 
study elaborated on the impact of FT status on organisation’s financial management when 
compared to its non FTs counterpart. Secondly, there was another study, which argued that 
FT  organisations  are  reluctant  to  exercise  their  authorisation  autonomy  and  their  lack  of 
understanding on the effectiveness of the FT governance system (Exworthy et al., 2011). 
Lastly, there was the examination of the effect of FT policy on hospital performance, using 
measures such as financial management, quality of care and staff satisfaction as a yardstick to 
measure the effectiveness of the reform (Verzulli et al., 2011).  
The scope of this study was set to offer a better understanding of the FT reform, by focussing 
on the social context of FT organisations, through the use of a qualitative approach, which is 
a richer mode of studying actors within their organisational context. By using this approach, 
it expounded on the concept of power and legitimacy in an organisational setting, drawing 
out valuable strategies adopted in the process of implementing a change in an organisation. 
Several other contributions were made to organisational practice in the healthcare sector, 
firstly, to steer the minds of the regulators and managers within the NHS into the sphere of 
understanding the behavioural aspect of the organisations, which is a key determinant of the 
outcome of any reform, as they roll out reforms and implement the programmes within the 
sector.    Secondly,  the  study  contributed  to  practice  within  the  organisations  through  the 
development  of  concepts,  describing  and  analysing  the  emerging  Foundation  Trust 
environment as a separate entity from the global accountability focus within the NHS. Lastly,   10 
this study also identified that the early adopter of the FT status had an efficiency motive, 
which was dissimilar to the late adopter, it also highlighted that the uptake of an innovation in 
any organisation is intrinsically linked to the organisation’s strategic motive. 
1.3  The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter One  
This  chapter  sets  out  the  general  framework  of  the  study.  This  comprised  of  a  brief 
introduction into the basis of the FT discussion. It unveiled the genesis of the FT reform as an 
aspiration of the government to foster local accountability, promote organisational freedom 
and devolve control to the local organisation. It also gave a  general brief of institutional 
theory and how this concept applies to the study of FT reform. In addition, the chapter gave 
an overview of the research context, relevance of the study, a brief explanation of the study. 
The contributions made by this study were also briefly highlighted at a high level. Finally, the 
chapter explains the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter Two 
Chapter Two presents a review of the accounting and governance literatures in order to get a 
good  grounding  of  accounting  and  accountability  concepts,  thereby  bringing  together  a 
number of concepts and reforms introduced in the public sector, dating back to the 1990s. 
The  root  reform  that  influenced  the  FT  agenda  was  traced  to  New  Public  Management 
(NPM),  from  which  accounting,  management  and  accountability  changes  evolved.  The 
general overview of NPM in this chapter involved a rigorous review, in order to put terms 
and meanings in perspective and to fuse their relevance to the study. The rigorous review of 
the literature created a better understanding of the use of complex terms that were of varied 
use in accounting (Lee and Johnson, 1973). This chapter reviewed the concepts of NPM and 
New Public Financial Management (NPFM), with emphasis on their relevance to National 
Health Service reforms (Hood, 1995; Olson et al., 1998)   
Chapter Three 
Chapter  three  discussed  the  study’s  theoretical  framework.  It  gave  a  deeper  synopsis  of 
institutional theory. The major distinguishing contribution of institutional theory is often seen 
in  the  identification  of  causal  mechanisms  in  the  run  up  to  an  organisational  change 
(Dimmagio, 1988), thereby identifying the roles played by actors in the common interest of 
all parties. The chapter elaborated on the understanding that organisations are embedded in   11 
both their own institutional environment, which usually consists of the structure, systems and 
practices established in the past (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and in their external institutional 
environment,  a  context  shared  by  several  organisations  (Granovetter,  1985).  Within  the 
model of the research question, the chapter provided the justification for using this theory as a 
tool  for  a  better  understanding  of  the  FT  implementation.  It  also  highlights  the  various 
relationships between the theory and the NHS organisations in question, while reviewing 
other empirical studies that have used the same theory. Further elaboration of the theory was 
made in chapter eight of this research, where the findings were allocated places within the 
extant literature. 
Chapter Four 
This chapter explained the research methodology and research methods used in this study. It 
discussed the underlying research design with emphasis on the interpretive paradigm (Chua, 
1986), which gave a good ground for the understanding of the cultural, political, social, and 
economic  context  of  the  FT  implementation.  The  methodology  used  for  this  study  was 
discussed and bench-marked against similar studies that adopted the same methodology in 
this chapter. This provided a better and more effective way of accessing knowledge, given the 
nature of the phenomenon. Chapter four indeed sets out the basis for choosing the interpretive 
approach and the use of a template analysis/thematic synthesis strategy as data analysis tool 
for  the  FT  study.  It  also  explains  the  methods  of  data  collection,  such  as  documentary 
analysis, interviews and researcher’s observation. Further, it describes the data types and how 
the data was analysed using the NVIVO software. Finally, the chapter addresses the validity 
and reliability strategies used in this study (Gill and Johnson, 2006).  
Chapter Five 
Chapter five described the position of the NHS within the government's framework in the 
United  Kingdom  (UK).  Firstly,  it  provided  an  overview  of  the  UK  and  its  government 
system,  followed  by  the  linkage  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Health  to  the  various 
departments that forms part of the NHS, namely the Department of Health (DoH) and the 
Strategic Health Authority (SHA), now known as the Trust Developmental Authority (TDA). 
The chapter describes their role in the governance and control of NHS organisations, and the 
delegated power they possess through the Secretary of State vis-a-vis their accountability to 
Parliament. The chapter also elaborated on the governance structure within the secondary 
care setting of the NHS, and eventually linked that to the main subject of this research - the   12 
Foundation Trusts. A brief overview of the formation of the Foundation Hospitals’ structure 
and their processes was also highlighted in this chapter. 
Chapters Six 
Chapter Six described the initial free coding process using template analysis (Crabtree and 
Miller, 1999). This involved the derivation of several codes from the analysis of interview 
transcripts,  documents  and  observational  notes.  Free  codes  were  obtained  as  a  result  of 
breaking  down,  examining,  comparing,  conceptualizing,  and  categorizing  the  data.  This 
chapter finally described the seventeen themes, which evolved from the data analysis. These 
main  categories  reflected  the  thinking  of  the  individuals  working  within  the  NHS 
organisations, a product of grouping the 376 open codes obtained through the first phase of 
the data analysis. Some of the main categories emerged directly from the open coding; some 
were  further  contextualised  from  the  observations,  while  others  were  products  of  further 
conceptualization  of  the  open  categories.  The  chapter  also  described  the  emerging 
connections and relationships between the categories. The output of data analysis from this 
section presented the first order construct of the research.  
Chapters Seven 
Chapter Seven described the final phase of the coding process, from which the second order 
construct was derived, thereby producing the focal code, followed by the other codes, which 
were extracted from the thematic analysis.  The other core codes were related directly or 
indirectly to the focal code. The final analytical process included the derivation of the themes 
and sub themes, which originated from the thematic analysis. This chapter described the final 
abstraction of the first construct, which consists of seventeen codes, processed into nine core 
codes.  This  reflected  the  participants’  perceptions  of  FT  adoption  and  the  nature  of  the 
various  interactions  that  pervaded  the  process,  to  present  a  full  depiction  of  the 
interrelationships  between  the  organisations  and  their  regulators  at  various  levels.  This 
chapter further identified the use of accounting in the FT reform as a major tool that directed 
the organisations into complying with the regulator's mandate. It implies that this occurs as a 
result of the coercive pressure associated with the way organisations perceived their role and 
place within the community they serve in the bigger accountability and governance agenda, 
and their self-interest in the benefits offered under the FT regime.  
Chapter Seven also presented the central phenomenon of “Struggling for Compliance” as the 
focal code of the thematic synthesis. It described the social process by which organisational   13 
actors pursued the requirement to comply with the regulator's mandate for the adoption of FT 
status, despite the difficulties encountered.  The chapter analysed the nature of regulator’s 
action, the reaction of the organisations and the eventual outcome of the influence.  
Chapter Eight 
Chapter Eight bears a further elaboration of the findings from the thematic synthesis under 
the lens of institutional theory, especially as addressed in New Institutional Sociology (NIS). 
This chapter interpreted the results from the thematic synthesis within the NIS concept and 
based on the findings from other NIS studies. The aim was to test the relevance of NIS to the 
study of Struggle for Compliance within the NHS. The study showed that the organisational 
actors within the NHS were propelled to achieve FT status by adopting and implementing a 
prescribed  accounting  and  regulatory  framework,  notwithstanding  the  difficulties  that 
accompanies it. This explains the legitimacy-efficiency intertwine (Modell, 2001). The NIS 
addresses the relevant key issues, which were explained in this chapter.  
It  was  also  recognised  in  this  chapter  that  previous  empirical  budgeting  studies  have 
employed NIS as a base for their arguments (Collier, 2001; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 
Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Seal, 2003). This chapter further unveiled the proposition that early 
adoption  of  FT  reform  reflected  an  organisational  motive  that  was  primarily  rooted  in 
efficiency and legitimacy with secondary signs of self-interest. In contrast, the late adopter 
showed an adoption aim, which lacked an efficiency motive, but rooted in the actors’ self-
interest. 
Chapter Nine 
Chapter Nine presents the main contributions of this research in line with existing literature, 
presenting the conclusions of the study and highlighting areas of interest for future research.   14 
Chapter Two 
Accountability and Financial Management 
2.0  Introduction 
This chapter is a review of accountability and governance in the public sector. The review 
covers the definition of accountability and governance and its sources. The purpose of this 
review  was  to  generate  a  broader  base  for  the  understanding  of  accountability  and 
governance.  A major area that could not be overlooked is  the New Public Management 
(NPM) and New Public Financial Management (NPFM) discourse, which are both prominent 
and significant in public sector reform. This chapter also discusses the implications of NPM 
for accounting, accountability and governance in the public sector as a whole. It goes on to 
discuss  the relevance of NPM to  FT  organisations  as  public sector entities. The rhetoric 
behind the introduction of FT is actually based on creating better accountability within the 
NHS.  Therefore,  it  became  necessary  to  understand  the  concept  of  accountability  and 
governance in the public sector prior to the introduction of FT status. This awareness will 
create better understanding, shape the comprehension of the future effect and outlook of FT 
organisations. 
2.1  Concept of Accountability  
Accountability has a traceable past into the ancient civilisation of Mesopotamia and ancient 
Egypt  (Carmona  and  Ezzamel,  2007).  This  historic  era  contributed  to  the  history  of 
accounting,  which  spans  over  many  topical  subjects,  such  as  the  work  on  state  projects, 
manufacturing and workshops, taxation, temples, private estates, the household, semi-barter 
exchange, and the cult of the dead. In the more recent decade, accounting has been defined as 
“the provision of information about the financial position, performance and adaptability of an 
enterprise, which is useful to a wide range of potential users, in making economic decisions 
(Ezzamel  et  al.,  2004:147).  In  operational  terms,  this  includes  all  types  of  financial 
information and budgets, as well as the wider, non-financial, performance measures. It is fair 
to emphasise that accounting shares a common platform with accountability principles. 
Accountability is observable within varying socio-political and economic contexts, ranging 
from the predominantly state-controlled economy of ancient Egypt to the largely private trade 
economy of Mesopotamia. The origin of ‘accountability’ has been linked with the emergence 
of royal legal traditions in England. This predates the rise of the modern bureaucratic state 
(Dubnick, 2005:10). The term ‘accountability’ was arguably infrequently used outside the   15 
sphere of financial accounting (Mulgan, 2003). The first spread of its wider use came with 
the New Public Management (NPM) reform, which started in the 1980s. The responsibility 
side of the accountability concept also became popular, emphasising that accountability is 
about  being  responsible  (Mulgan,  2003:9).  The  concept  later  gained  ground  as  an 
independent concept, to the extent of over shadowing the concept of responsibility in both 
importance and scope (Mulgan, 2000:558). Taking responsibility for an action is generally 
perceived as an integral part of accountability, rather than vice-versa (Dubnick, 2005: 6). 
With a closer look at the term ‘Accountability’, researchers soon discovered that it could be 
construed to mean different things to different people (Mulgan, 2000:555; Pollitt, 2003:89). 
In essence accountability was a term that connotes several meanings; this was described as its 
‘chameleon-like’ nature, (i.e. taking up meanings from the context in which it is operating at 
a particular time and from the perspective of the players in the accountability relationship at 
the time).  Its nature influenced the way the term has been put to use, loosely, in most cases, 
to refer to a way of good governance, efficiency, responsibility, transparency and integrity 
(Mulgan, 2000:555).   
In an emphatic manner, Mulgan draws attention to what was denoted as the “core sense” 
accountability, derived from previous research into the topic. In this light, accountability was 
defined as a ‘process of being called to account by some Authority, for one’s actions’, or a 
process of ‘giving an account’ (Mulgan, 2000: 555; Dubnick, 2005: 6). This core definition 
of accountability was characterised by ‘externality, social interaction and exchange and rights 
of authority’ (Mulgan,  2000: 555). Externality referred to an external ‘account-holder’ to 
whom an account was given by an ‘accountor’ (Mulgan, 2000: 555; Mulgan, 2003: 10). In 
this  sense,  accountability  also  involved  social  interaction  and  exchange,  in  terms  of 
rectification and sanctions (Mulgan, 2000: 555). The account-holder also has the right or 
authority over the accountor, thus implying rights to demand answers and impose sanctions. 
In  its  basic  traditional  view,  accountability  incorporated  “the  giving  and  demanding  of 
reasons for conduct” (Roberts and Scapen, 1985: 447). Accountability was first of all based 
on a formalized relationship that stipulates the rights, authorities and available sanctions of 
the accountee (Broadbent et al 1996: 269; Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000: 54).  This seemingly 
implied  that  accountability  was  concerned  with  an  expectation  of  giving  and  demanding 
reasons for conduct, so that any person in a position of authority was expected to explain and 
take  responsibility  for  their  actions  or  inactions  (Parker  and  Gould,  1999:116).  
Accountability, thus, requires an actor with a duty to render an account and a second actor   16 
with  the  authorization  to  judge  and,  sometimes,  impose  sanctions  where  necessary.  This 
proves that accountability refers to answerability to someone for appropriate conduct and 
expected performance. (Bovens, 2008:4) 
An example of one of the most successful operationalisation of the term accountability was 
its description as a process of engaging with, and being responsive to, stakeholders, taking 
into consideration their needs and views in decision making and providing explanation as to 
why these needs or views were or were not taken on board (Blagescu et al., 2005:11). In this 
definition, accountability was viewed less as a mechanism of control, but more of a process 
of learning. This was sharply at variance with other authors that viewed accountability as a 
tool for responsiveness and control, which is more common within the public sector (Koppell 
2005; Mulgan, 2000). The Public Sector is characterised by the establishment of institutional 
mechanisms  of  accountability,  such  as  constitution,  legislation  and  regulations  that  are 
opened to public control (Mulgan, 2000). It is imminent that accountability study does not 
simply rest  on the behaviour of the actor, but also  in  the way in  which the institutional 
arrangement reflects it, and this is very crucial in determining whether actors can be held 
accountable for their actions or not.  
Accountability  has  also  been  construed  as  a  social  “mechanism”,  which  displays  an 
institutional relation or arrangement in which an actor could be held to account by a forum 
(Day and Klein, 1987; Mulgan 2003; Bovens, 2007). This also reflects the act of controlling 
individual’s  actions.  Control  by  its  nature  is  not  totally  implicated  in  the  features  of 
accountability,  as  the  literature  argues  that  the  notion  of  control  differs  slightly  from 
accountability, since the process of calling someone to account is retrospective by nature, 
whereas control could be proactive (Harlow, 2002:10). Accountability and control refers to 
the same phenomenon depicting authority over those who are being governed. 
In order to portray accountability as a social relation, there must be the participation of actors, 
and the existence of a practice, where there is an ‘accountor’ who provides information about 
his  conduct to  a forum known as  the ‘accountee’. There should also  be explanation and 
justification of conduct, and not propaganda, or the provision of information or instructions to 
the general public. The explanation should be directed at a specific accountee and not be 
given  at  random.  The  accountor  must  be  dutifully  obliged  to  come  forward,  rather  than 
possessing  the  liberty  to  irresponsibly  present  an  indecent  account.  There  must  be  the 
possibility for debate, defence and judgement by the accountee, and an optional imposition of   17 
(informal)  sanctions  or  rewards,  rather  than  a  monologue  without  engagement.  (Bovens, 
2005:5) 
The relationship portrayed in accountability connotes being open to stakeholders, engaging 
them in an on-going dialogue and also creating a learning process in the interaction (Blagescu 
et al., 2005:11). Stewart (1984) argued that for such relationship to exist the accountee must 
be capable of holding the accountor to account, and that the type of accountability must be 
expressly specified. This was further extended by (Boven, 2007) where accountability was 
defined not only as a relationship between an actor and a forum, with the actor having an 
obligation to explain and present a reason for his action or inaction, but also giving the forum 
the  power  to  ask  questions  and  pass  judgement,  with  the  actor  even  liable  to  face 
consequences.  This  presupposes  the  possibility  of  sanction  in  the  mechanism  of 
accountability. This view was also agreed upon in (Mulgan, 2003:9).  
Stewart (1984) led the discussion about types of accountability; this is referred to as the 
‘Stewart ladder’ of accountability, which includes –  
  Accountability for probity and legality - This variant was concerned with whether 
funds are used in an authorized manner; the objective being to avoid illegality.  
  Process accountability, which was about ensuring that detailed procedures in relation 
to activities for which accounts were given are undertaken.  
  Performance  accountability,  which  measured  the  achievement  of  specific  standard 
against the outcomes of the activities for which an account is rendered.  
  Programme accountability, which measured the achievement of goals and objectives.  
  Policy  accountability,  which  judged  the  appropriateness  of  policies,  goals  and 
objectives. 
Bovens (2005) discussed the importance of public accountability, where he noted five major 
reasons why accountability must be encouraged, firstly, was the impact on the institutional 
arrangement  (that  is,  relationship)  created  through  accountability  in  the  public  sector,  it 
enabled  every  authorised  public  manager  to  act  as  agents,  to  account  for  the  patch  of 
responsibility  delegated  to  them.  Secondly,  public  accountability  helped  to  enhance  the 
integrity of governance, which was a good safeguard against corruption, abuse of power and 
any  other  inappropriate  behaviour.  Thirdly,  it  helped  improve  performance,  as  through 
accountability and reproduction of norms and routine against specific standards, managers   18 
were able to improve on their performance against those standards. Fourthly, the previous 
three mentioned earlier helps to stimulate and maintain the legitimacy of government, and 
finally, this concept was specifically useful in a crisis periods, for instance in a failure or 
collapse  of  an  organisation,  the  accountability  process  helps  heal  the  wound  and  brings 
closure to the incident by answering the many troubling questions in people’s mind. 
2.1.1  New Public Management 
The public sector organisation’s identity is increasingly disappearing. The evidence of this 
was  noticeable  in  the  difficulty  encountered,  while  differentiating  between  accounting 
practices in public and private sector entities. The Cabinet Office white paper stated that the:  
"Distinctions  between  services  delivered  by  the  public  and  the  private  sector  are 
breaking down in many areas, opening up the way to new ideas, partnerships and 
opportunities for devising and delivering what the public wants”. (Cabinet Office, 
1999:9) 
It  was  common  to  define  public  sector  organisations  as  those  entities  that  were  heavily 
invested into by the government. This was to show that the public sector was that part of a 
nation’s economic activity, which was traditionally owned by the government (Broadbent and 
Guthrie, 1992).  
The evolving  indifference between the public  and private sector organisations  was  being 
achieved through the introduction of various reforms, re-engineering and restructuring ideas, 
which originated from the NPM and were implemented by governments globally, especially 
the developed countries. In the majority of the developing countries, economic crisis was 
identified as the most important drivers of ambitious reforms in the public sector since the 
early 1980s (World Bank, 1997:151). 
The major reasons for the introduction of NPM in the UK was the economic recession and 
tax revolts, following the 1974 and 1979 oil crisis in the country. This was a major catalyst 
that  pressurised  the  government  into  controlling  public  spending,  which  heralded  the 
introduction of privatisation in the public sector. In areas where it was impossible to fully 
privatise an entity, other steps were taken to keep them as public entities (Tomkins, 1987).  
The main aim of NPM was to introduce or stimulate the performance incentives, within those 
sections of the public service that were not privatized, and also to introduce the discipline that 
exist in a market driven environment (Moore et al., 1994:13).   19 
NPM techniques and practices mainly featured the private sector practices and standards that 
were increasingly being promoted as a global phenomenon (Larbi, 1999). The basis of NPM 
can be clustered in two main doctrines, according to Hood (1991, 1995). The first distinctive 
set focussed on the reduction or obliteration of the distinctions between the public and the 
private  sectors.  These  features  were  seen  in  the  privatization,  marketisation  and 
decentralisation of the organisations. NPM tenets dictated that the public sector organisations 
needed to adopt “proven” (Hood, 1995: 96) private sector-styles of management, where they 
would be more exposed to competition, better discipline in the use of resources (Economics), 
and a better focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of policy. The breaking down of public 
sector organisations into segmented divisions in accordance to the type of services they offer 
was also believed to be one of the elements of a change in focus. Other techniques introduced 
included  the  outsourcing  of  services,  Private  Finance  Initiatives,  local  accountability  or 
citizen participation, budgeting and accounting reforms, separation between service provision 
and  service  production,  one  stop  shops,  user  charges,  budget  cuts  and  strategic  planning 
(Pollitt, 2003; Gruening, 2001).  
The second distinctive set of features was directed at accountability. This reform redefined 
the focus of accountability with a view to replacing the traditional process of accountability 
with  a  more  result  oriented  practice.  This  type  of  accountability  feature  empowered  the 
managers, by authorising them with discretionary power and control to achieve the political 
goals in any manner they deemed fit. Within this framework, accountability was managed 
using explicit, measurable standards, and greater emphasis was put on output controls. This 
technique included performance audit evaluation (Pollitt et al., 1999), the introduction of a 
managerial culture, internal and external control reforms, empowerment and the introduction 
of quality systems (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Pollitt, 2003; Gruening, 2001). 
The design of NPM was channelled to garner a richer accounting information base, which, in 
turn,  should  increase  accountability.  There  was  a  move  to  accrual  accounting  from  cash 
accounting, as cash accounting merely focused on the budget and on legal compliance, rather 
than  on  managing  resources  in  an  effective  and  efficient  manner  (Pallot,  1998).  NPM 
promoted the use of accrual accounting, which provided information on assets and liabilities, 
thus allowing the politicians to know the full costs of outputs and to monitor the return on 
investment  and  financial  viability  of  projects.  It  must  be  noted  that  amongst  countries 
implementing NPM, the adoption was not a homogenous whole, but rather a ‘pick and choose 
from units of the reform elements, which sometimes overlapped. Currently the public sector   20 
is increasingly utilising accounting methodologies and tools, which hitherto were known only 
to the private sector. This is through the transition from cash-based accounting principles to a 
greater reliance on accruals-based accounting principles in public sector (Klumpies, 2001).  
This has resulted in the expansion of the accounting boundary beyond the traditional financial 
aspects, to encompass broader governance and accountability issues, such as the setting of 
performance standards, and the subsequent measurement of activity. In the same vein, many 
of the techniques promoted had their roots in the private sector, where they were developed, 
broader debate over the relevance of these techniques in the public sector and the necessary 
adaptation required to make them suitable for the non-profit environment are continuously 
being discussed (Mellet and Ryan, 2008). 
New  Public  Management  (NPM)  reform  shifted  the  emphasis  from  traditional  public 
administration  to  public  management.  Its  key  elements  were  the  various  forms  of 
decentralizing  management  within  the  public  services  (e.g.,  the  creation  of  autonomous 
agencies and the devolution of budgets and financial control), increasing use of markets and 
competition in the provision of public services (e.g., contracting out and other market-type 
mechanisms),  and  increasing  emphasis  on  performance,  outputs  and  customer  orientation 
(Larbi, 1999). 
NPM dominated the public sector, thereby creating a central role for accounting in general 
(Hood, 1995). Accounting occupied an integral position during the introduction of the NPM 
reform.  It  became  very  popular  amongst  organisations  throughout  the  implementation  of 
‘management’ reform (another way of referring to NPM). In the study of the implication of 
reforms in the public sector, NPM was found to increase attention on ‘Management’ rather 
than  the  administration  of  services;  the  reform  also  tilted  the  emphasis  of  public  sector 
organisations away from the traditional stewardship role of accounting to cost accounting 
(Jackson and Lapsley, 2003). The study also acknowledged that accounting played a crucial 
role  in  the  diffusion  of  NPM-reform.  Hood  (1995)  used  the  term  “accountingization”  to 
explain  the  superior  emphasis  on  cost  classification,  which  became  more  popular,  when 
compared to the initial process of cost pooling or aggregation. The implementation of NPM 
in the public sector introduced a number of new standards and practices, which included 
‘Value for Money’, ‘Performance management’, ‘Budgeting’ and ‘Costing’.  
Components of NPM were identified by a number of researchers, including Hood (1991, 
1995), Dunleavy  and Hood (1994), Ferlie et  al. (1996), Flynn (1993) and  Pollitt (1993). 
While Hood (1995:94) summarised the central focus of NPM to be shifting the emphasis   21 
from process accountability towards a greater element of accountability in terms of results. 
Dunleavy  and  Hood  (1994)  summed  it  up  as  moving  ‘down  group’  (de-emphasising 
differences between the private and public sector) and moving ‘down grid’ (from process to 
outcome requirements and accountability).  
Specifically for the UK, the broad change in ideology promoted through NPM meant that 
substantial areas of the public sector were privatised, traditional core public sector activities 
were  corporatized,  and  novel  funding  sources  through  private-public  partnerships  were 
initiated  (Howlett  and  Ryan,  2008).    A  survey  by  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-
operation  and  Development  concluded  that  new  management  techniques  and  practices 
involving market-type mechanisms associated with the private for-profit sector were being 
used to bring about changes in the management of public services in countries with widely 
varying governance, economic and institutional environments (OECD, 1993).  
Dunleavy and Hood (1994) argued that NPM involved a shift in the two basic design co-
ordinates of the public sector. Firstly, that the public sector became less distinctive from the 
private in terms of personnel, reward structures and methods of doing business. Secondly, 
that the extent of discretionary power over staff, contracts and money was limited by uniform 
and general rules of procedure.  
2.1.2  Performance Reporting and New Public Financial Management  
With the introduction of NPM, performance measurement gained ground in the UK public 
sector.  These  organisations  engaged  the  use  of  quantitative  approach  by  using  financial 
metrics to measure results and performance, which was an important benchmark under NPM. 
The use of Accountability for results adopted financial metrics, thereby giving prominence to 
accounting  techniques  and  tools,  which  were  hitherto  alien  to  the  public  sector  until  the 
implementation of NPM (Broadbent and Guthrie 1992). The adoption of these accounting 
techniques and tools in conjunction with NPM facilitated the recognition of ‘New Public 
Financial Management’ (NPFM) (Olson et al., 1998).  
Guthrie et al. (1999) emphasised the importance of financial management reform and the 
unique role it played in the NPM reform without which NPM would not be worthwhile. A 
totally different view of the New Public Financial Management (NPFM) was taken by Olson 
et  al.  (1998),  by  acknowledging  that  NPFM  reform  was  a  separate  unit  of  NPM.  They 
concluded that NPFM reform involved five major changes:  
  Changes in financial reporting systems;    22 
  Introduction of market oriented management systems;  
  Development of performance measurement techniques;  
  Decentralization or devolution of budgets; and  
  Changes in internal and external public sector audits.  
Guthrie et al. (1999) further acknowledged that NPFM reforms lacked the endorsement of 
any specific set of financial techniques, when managing public sector entities, but rather a 
change,  which  is  focused  on  improving  financial  awareness  in  decision-making.  NPM 
reforms were believed to have transformed the traditional role of accounting in the public 
sector  from  its  primary  focus  on  probity,  compliance,  and  control  to  that  of  efficient 
allocation of resources and accountability (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Hoque and Moll, 
2001). 
NPM and NPFM moved the focus of performance measurement beyond the inputs into the 
coverage of the outputs as well (Hood, 1995; Olson et al., 2001), such as the traditional 
performance evaluation, which looked at variance analysis (this describes the reasons, why a 
actual expenditure varied from the planned budget). The introduction of NPM required that 
targets  were  set,  with  efficiency  evaluated  after  comparing  targets  with  the  actual 
performance, with a focus on the output (Jansen 2008). This addressed the more explicit and 
measurable standards of performance (Hood 1995).  
The shift of focus from input to output for service provision in the public sector met with a 
number of criticisms from several authors (Lapsley, 1999; Olson et al., 2001). Olson et al. 
(2001) argued against the complexity that was inherent in the input-output relationships, as 
many of the activities related to human beings, whose lives and social contexts were only 
partially  formed,  or  were  addressed  by  the  intentions  of  actors  within  the  public  sector. 
Lapsley (1999) recognised the need to revisit the NPM model and its essentials, because of 
the challenges it posed to the understanding of what the input-output parameters were in 
complex services; the objective would be to emphasize quantity of output, which accentuates 
the primacy of accounting and points to irrationality, which may affect quality adversely. 
Guthrie et al. (1999) concluded that the introduction of the NPM reform was pushed mainly 
by  financial  management  techniques  and,  should  not  be  considered  to  be  a  tool  for  the 
enhancement of democratic governance. In another study, where the adoption of NPFM in a   23 
number of countries across the world was compared with an in-depth implementations study, 
Guthrie et al. (2005) in their introduction sounded a warning thus:  
‘Ironically,  governments  keep  approving  financial  management  reforms  but 
politicians  seemingly  keep  struggling  to  use  the  information  produced  by  such 
reforms. Technologies of measurement and monitoring may change, yet we appear to 
still end up with few agreed measures and assessments of public sector performance. 
There are even suggestions that the proliferation of performance data, coupled with a 
growing  cynicism  about  statistics  and  accounting,  is  such  that  it  is  becoming 
increasingly impossible to know what is going on in the public sector!’ (P18) 
Research into the implementation of FT status in the NHS sounds a chord with the above 
warning,  notably,  several  reforms  (such  as  the  FT  status)  are  being  rolled  out  by  the 
government frequently, without any mechanism of tracking the effects of these reforms, so 
much so, that the effect of the initiatives cannot be directly linked or reconciled with the 
changes emerging in the public sector organisations, thus justifying this study. 
2.1.3  Opinions on NPM 
The conflation of the multiple reforms witnessed in the public sector appeared to make the 
organisations lose their characteristics both in outlook and the range of services provided. 
Some researchers have indicated that public sector organisations are shrinking, but the most 
obvious  fact  is  the  increasing  difficulty  in  drawing  a  line  of  distinction  between  the 
characteristics  of  a  public  organisation,  when  compared  to  a  private  entity.  NPM  has 
remained a longstanding programme and it is still considered a foundation stone of the whole 
reform  process  (Hood,  1998;  Mathiasen,  1997).  The  multiple  reforms  introduced  by  the 
government  in  the  public  organisations  propelled  a  shift  in  focus  from  compliance  and 
control  towards  efficiency,  effectiveness  and  economics.  These  were  all  rooted  in  the 
introduction  of  commercial  business  practices  and  comparative  markets  (Broadbent  and 
Guthrie, 1992; Lapsley, 1993). 
The diffusion of NPM brought a new dimension to the accountability argument in the public 
sector, as it was continually being perceived as a threat, thereby breeding conflict between the 
entrepreneur’s desired autonomy and democratic accountability (Bellon-Goerl, 1992:131). It 
was also argued that the NPM reform of public sector accountability was most noticeable in 
the change from organisational procedures to performance management and the variation in 
the set of accounts to be reported, which was especially new to the public sector. This has   24 
resulted into calls for further theoretical and empirical investigation into this phenomenon. 
(Parker and Gould, 1999; Hood, 1995).  
In  a  different  study  (Williams,  2000),  the  adoption  of  NPM  was  highlighted  as  another 
neglect or blatant refusal to learn from the history, the study refuted the idea that the exhorted 
message of reinvention through the adoption of NPM was new, and argued that the theme 
about the private sector learning to work efficiently and effectively has been an age-long and 
regular  feature  throughout  the  twentieth  century.  Accounting  tools,  such  as  performance 
measurement, performance budgeting, privatization, engagement of the not-for-profit sector, 
long range budgeting, management by objectives and even the recognition of dysfunctional 
effects of too many rules, had purportedly existed long before the reinvention movement 
came on the scene. According to Williams (2000), the new branding of these, as advocated by 
the reinvention movement, was not a dramatic or a paradigm shift as represented in public 
administration (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Borins, 1995; Hood, 1995).  
In another study (Lynn, 2001), it was argued that NPM was too simplistic in its disapproval 
of  the  old  public  administration  system,  the  NPM’s  description  of  the  traditional  public 
administration as largely self-serving, divorced from the political systems, and acting on the 
basis of a scientific technocratism did not correspond to reality. The division between policy 
and administration was much more subtle. The study proposed that politics was primarily 
responsible  for  policy  formulation,  while  administration  was  primarily  responsible  for 
executing policy. It was noted that these responsibilities were not exclusive, similarly, the 
formation was inseparable from execution (Lynn, 2001).  
On the subject of simplicity, NPM’s high-handedness in wiping out bureaucracy in the public 
sector was also held to be too one-dimensional. The term ‘bureaucracy’ is a general term for 
a  wide  variety  of  organisational  forms,  including  specialist,  single-purpose  agencies  and 
boards that are not part of the central ministries. The emphasis placed by NPM on efficiency 
and effectiveness was argued to be nothing new (Ricucci, 2001). The admittance of Osborne 
and Gaebler (1993) gave credence that bureaucracies were originally intended to introduce 
efficiency and rational decision making into public administration. Therefore, bureaucracy 
has a clear and positive feature. Its central values are reliability, equity and anti-corruption. 
This was in support of the assertion by Pollitt (2003), which highlighted that bureaucracies 
were  not  monolithic.  They  work  according  to  predictable  rules,  based  on  public  law. 
Bureaucracies encourage loyalty and discourage opportunistic attitudes in civil servants (du 
Gay, 2000).     25 
Steane and Carroll (2000) commented on NPM’s assumption regarding the state, firstly, it 
perceived the state to be a creature of powerful, self-interested groups in society. Secondly, it 
regarded the state as  a  thriving public medium, with  a hierarchical  and essentially static 
mechanism,  which  should  leave  production  of  services  entirely  to  the  market.  This  was 
totally in conflict with the third perception, which argued that the state plays a role similar to 
an umpire, a dynamic regulatory state, vital for the operations of the global economy. The 
vision of a small state goes back to the early days of the NPM literature of the 1980’s, which 
shares  linkage  with  the neo-liberal  Thatcherism  and Reaganomics  (Gruening, 2001). The 
general assumption was that some governmental reforms were inspired by the ‘New Right-
Wing’ movement, with a hidden agenda aimed at rolling back the state (Pollitt, 1993; Evans 
et al., 1996). Hood (1995) refuted this idea by pointing out countries that were traditionally 
seen as leftist, notably Sweden, who had widely adopted the NPM-reforms in the 1980’s. On 
the other hand, countries, such as Turkey and Japan scored low on NPM emphasis, though 
their governments could be regarded as right wing. 
Some other studies investigated the reasons why organisations and states adopt a reform; one 
study suggested that the reason behind privatisation in the public sector was primarily for the 
facilitation  of  recovery  from,  or  aversion  of,  financial  difficulties,  induced  by  increased 
competition for revenue, inability to raise capital and complicated or inefficient purchasing 
and compensation systems (Legnini et al., 1999). Specifically for the NHS, the reason for 
reforms  was  ‘ostensibly  financial’  (O’Neal,  2000).  It  was  also  suggested  public  sector 
privatisation in the UK was expected to lead to a lower cost of production and better service 
quality to consumers (Parker, 1999). 
In the wake of the spread of reform programmes in the public sector, (Nestor and Mahboobi, 
1999) in an OECD research, argued that the general poor performance of public utilities and 
changing  views  on  the  role  of  the  state  in  the  economy,  meant  that  public  provision  of 
infrastructure became less popular in the OECD countries. Growing demand for more and 
better quality infrastructure services had increased the need for infrastructure investments at a 
time,  when  budgetary  constraints  had  limited  the  scope  for  government  funding.  This 
provided further impetus for the change in governments’ approach to such investments.  
Drawing from concern over the adoption of NPM, Lapsley (1999) argued for the need to 
revisit the tenet of NPM and its rudiments, given the problematic nature of identifying input-
output elements in complex services. This was expected to facilitate a clear definition  of   26 
quantities, which prioritise the primacy of accounting and also identify irrationalities, which 
may adversely affect quality. 
2.2.0  Empirical Research in Health Care Sector 
Alam and Lawrence (1993) studied the importance of accounting technologies and practices 
in a commercialised and economically-driven health sector of New Zealand. Reforms in New 
Zealand were found to be aimed at changing the culture of healthcare providers through new 
accounting methods. The introduction of a new system, with the purchaser and provider split 
was unable to bring the desired greater efficiency and flexibility. In addition, it was found to 
create a dichotomy between the social and business roles. Major problems were found within 
the new system, which related to a lack of proper product definition, as well as the quality 
and product prices.  
In another study, Lowe (2000) reviewed the implementation of an accounting concept in a 
large regional hospital - Health Waikato in New Zealand. The use of accounting techniques 
was found to be a central part of the process, through which change was made acceptable 
within an organisation. The implementation of a clinical budgeting system was found to be 
central to the constitution of the organisation. The project implementation influenced the 
organisational culture, work patterns and staff interrelationships. 
Glynn et al. (2008) also examined the progress made by General Practices (GP) that opted to 
become budget holders at the introduction of GP budget holding status in the UK. The study 
found that whilst the practices concentrated on developing financial budgets, very little effort 
was  being  put  into  developing  practice  budgets,  which  resulted  in  scanty  performance 
monitoring. 
Lega  and  Vendramini  (2008)  studied  the  roles,  benefits  and  drawbacks  of  planning, 
controlling and performance measurement systems in an Italian healthcare organisation. The 
study concluded that these accounting systems stimulated interaction between physicians and 
managers and it enabled them to discuss changes and the future direction of the organisation. 
The system was also responsible for the stimulation of greater accountability and the cost-
conscious culture witnessed in the organisation. On the other hand, the research found that 
the  abuse  of  systems,  partial  development  and  the  struggle  to  move  from  operating  to 
performance management were deeply affecting the organisation’s legitimacy. Normative, 
coercive  and  mimetic  isomorphism,  the  introduction  of  quasi-markets  and  an  interest  in   27 
improving clinical governance were identified as the reasons for the development of these 
systems.  
In a study (Agrizzi, 2003), which investigated the level of balance maintained in achieving 
performance indicators in an healthcare organisation, the study argued that the pressure to 
achieve the key indicators at the operational level overshadowed the organisation’s concern 
for the quality of care. In addition, performance indicators was perceived by organisational 
members as a non-relevant steering mechanism and a system of legitimised rules through 
procedures, which has proved superficial, as it is incapable of producing any alteration to the 
organisational interpretive schemes. 
Goddard  and  Powell  (1994)  examined  accountability  in  the  Public  Health  Service  sector 
under a multiple stakeholder, with a diverse stakeholder interest. They concluded that the 
involvement of different stakeholder groups in the design of an accountability system may 
lead to improvement in public accountability.  
2.2.1  Empirical Research in Government Departments 
DuPont-Morales  and  Harris  (1994)  argued  that  incorporating  planning  and  performance 
measurement into budgeting created a strong system of accountability. They also stated that 
the incorporation of organisation’s purpose, direction and impact, strengthened the bond of 
accountability between public agencies and tax-payers. 
Ter Bogt (2008), in a study of Dutch local authorities, revealed that the organisations showed 
low regard for the quality and value of information obtained from output, outcome budgets 
and  related  documents.  Most  respondents  expressing  their  experiential  opinion  were 
unimpressed with the quantitative performance measurement in output and outcome budgets. 
Organisational culture was also highlighted as a major driver for actors’ behaviour (Goddard, 
1999), the study argued that there was a relationship between budgets-related behaviour and 
culture. The study, which investigated the interrelationship  between culture and financial 
control systems in three local governments in the UK, found financial control systems to be 
both constitutive and reflective of the prevailing culture. The reflective feature was more 
obvious when professionalization became a central focus of the departmental cultures, while 
the constitutive attribute was noted, when a financial control system was used to change the 
culture.  
Ezzamel et al. (2007) examined how new accounting and budgeting practices emerged and 
unfolded in three devolved local government organisations in the UK. Budget was perceived   28 
as a ritual in the organisations and there were elements of isomorphism or convergence, most 
likely to have been of a normative nature. The study concluded that accounting and budgeting 
can become a highly ritualized and institutionalized practice, thus explaining the importance 
accorded them by all the devolved bodies.  
In  another  study,  Goddard  (2004)  investigated  the  relationship  between  accounting, 
accountability and governance in the UK and showed how budgetary practices contributed to 
accountability in local government. A budget system was found to be the most important 
process within the organisation to emphasize accountability. In this study, the annual budget 
cycle was the pre-eminent accounting practice used to achieve accountability in all cases. 
Goddard  (2005)  elaborated  on  the  extension  of  the  NPM  reforms  into  the  relationship 
between accounting, accountability and governance and found that budgeting practices made 
a more significant contribution to accountability than any NPM reform. 
The study undertaken by OECD (1997) argued that some OECD countries adopted the multi-
year budget system as a means of focusing on providing the financial stability needed to take 
a  longer  perspective  on  performance  objectives  (e.g.  Denmark,  Canada,  and  Sweden). 
However, this goal was found to be difficult in times of budgetary squeeze, where financial 
uncertainty made it difficult to commit resources over longer periods of time.  
2.2.2  Empirical Research in Other Sectors 
Dean (1986) researched into the adoption of zero based budgeting in developing countries. 
The  study  found  that  these  countries  faced  similar  challenges  to  their  counterparts  in 
developed countries. Highlighting problems encountered in the process, it was noted that the 
problems of reform implementation may not only be limited to the specific contexts of the 
country, but also to the technical nature of the reform itself. This study also argued against 
the makeshift transfer of accounting technology from the developed to developing countries, 
without proper consideration for the country’s context and the nature of the innovation, or the 
fact that the techniques may not work for them.  
Melkers and Willoughby (2005), with the aid of an interview based research design, sought 
the opinions of budget officers about performance-based budgeting implementation in their 
states. The implementation of the reform was found to be very slow. The study showed that 
more  users  were  confident  about  the  role  of  performance  information  in  the  budgeting 
process.  Legislative  and  executive  support  for  the  implementation  was  found  to  be  very 
critical. A number of benefits were highlighted, but not without experiencing some inherent   29 
problems,  especially  in  the  varying  perceptions  of  its  users  and  success  among  actors, 
particularly across branches of government.  
Goddard  and  Assad  (2006),  observed  the  important  role  of  accounting  in  navigating 
organisations’ legitimacy in Tanzanian Non-Governmental Organisations(NGOs). The study 
found that the organisations’ strategies for navigating legitimacy were generally based on 
building credibility and bargaining for change. 
Andrews (2004) investigated the reason behind the adoption of reforms in a few states in the 
United States of America, specifically the adoption of performance-based budgeting. The 
result proposed a three factor model for meaningful adoption, which was lacking in most 
governments, namely - a reform space, which was determined by the intersection of greater 
and appropriate authority, better acceptance, and higher ability. 
Broadbent and Laughlin  (1999) assessed the role of financial management in schools in the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand and concluded that the UK focuses on accountability 
based on individual performance of teachers and students while in New Zealand performance 
was based on the aggregation of the whole school. 
Sarker (2006) used secondary data to analyse the factors that contributed to the success and 
failure of NPM reforms in Singapore and Bangladesh. Success factors identified include a 
formal market economy, the rule of law, the mature level of the administrative infrastructure 
and state efficiency. 
2.3  Summary 
This  chapter  has  reviewed  the  literature  on  accounting  and  innovation,  especially  the 
introduction of reforms in the public sector, the introduction of New Public Management in 
the 1990s, which is now, recognised as the major change that transformed the public sectors 
around the world. This was also linked with the spate of reforms within the NHS from the 
1990s in the United Kingdom. The review also highlights the introduction of New Public 
Management  in  the  UK  public  sector  and  the  various  opinions  expressed  regarding  its 
implementation. A major limitation was noted in the study of reform in the NHS, given the 
number of reforms introduced in the sector, very little has been done to evaluate the effect of 
these changes and the influence of accounting practice on the organisation and its staff. The 
next chapter presents the chosen theoretical framework, arguing for an institutional theory as 
a theoretical lens for this study.   30 
Chapter Three 
Institutional Theory– A Theoretical Framework 
3.0  Introduction 
The chapter provides an account of institutional theory as a theoretical framework for this 
study, highlighting the nature and the various aspects of the theory. This is necessary to gain 
background  knowledge  of  the  theory  as  a  language  that  enables  researchers  to  explain 
organisational change. This chapter reviewed various accounting studies built on this theory, 
with a view to summarizing their contributions and relevance to this study. A part of this 
chapter explains the influence of institutional carriers on adoption intent, which reflects the 
theory  of  legitimisation.  The  theoretical  explanation  offered  in  the  New  Institutional 
Sociology (NIS) was particularly useful and suitable for exploring the FT phenomenon in the 
NHS. Furthermore the chapter unveiled organisational change experience being researched, 
with emphasis on the role of various stakeholders in the organisations, which includes the 
government, the regulators and NHS staff.  
3.1  Institutional Theory 
The adoption of change in organisations has maintained dominance in academic discussion 
over the years (Townley, 2002), especially in management accounting literature. Studies of 
management  accounting  changes  in  organisations  has  enjoyed  a  wide  coverage  over  the 
years, leading to the extension of institutional theory, which has covered different dimensions 
of institutions and their environment (Moll et al., 2006).  
Institutional theory as a theoretical framework suggests that organisations are influenced by, 
and can influence, the society in which they operate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and 
Scott,  1992;  DiMaggio  and  Powell,  1983,  1991).  Early  versions  of  institutional  theory 
emphasized the taken-for-granted character of institutional rules, myths, and beliefs as shared 
social reality, and the processes by which organisations tend to become instilled with value 
and social meaning (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Selznick,1957). 
This  theory  has  also  been  defined  in  diverse  ways,  with  substantial  variations  amongst 
approaches (Scott 1987); through which it was explained or described. Therefore, it is in 
order to assume that institutional theory takes different shapes and forms, putting forward 
different bases of order and compliance, varying mechanism and logics, diverse empirical 
indicators and alternative rationales for establishing legitimacy claims (Scott, 2004:9). This   31 
theory is primarily relevant to organisational settings; its views regarding organisations assist 
researchers to gain a full grasp of the concept. The theory identifies players or actors in the 
make-up of an  organisational  environment  and the role being played by  each  individual. 
DiMaggio  and Powell (1983) explained that there are two primary institutional  actors in 
contemporary society, namely the state and various professions. Within the state category, it 
is likely that there are private representatives, such as fund granting bodies, originating not 
only from the public sector, but the private sector also. In the same vein, other actors within 
the  institutional  environment  could  be  employees  of  an  organisation.  This  includes  the 
managers, their subordinates, customers, board of directors, among others. Actors are also 
described as stakeholders within organisational settings in some literatures. 
By extending this concept to the subject of this research, within the NHS social setting, the 
actors  or  stakeholders  in  the  NHS  could  be  classified  to  include  the  government,  which 
controls the NHS through the office of the Secretary of State. This office is responsible for 
the  Department  of  Health,  a  government  agency  responsible  for  the  management  and 
regulation of health services in the United Kingdom, and then the Strategic Health Authority 
(SHA), which is another government body responsible for governing the operation of health 
service organisations in the local regions, it was recently replaced by a new body called the t 
Trust Development Authority (TDA) in March 2013. Other participants or actors are the 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), which has now been replaced by a new body known as the 
Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) in March 2013, the CCG is the budget-holder for the 
commissioning of health care services in its local population, and the Secondary care outlets, 
which includes the Acute Trusts, Community Trusts, Mental Health Trusts and Ambulance 
Trusts.  The  secondary  care  units  are  usually  referred  to  as  ‘the  hospitals’,  they  are  the 
provider arm of the NHS, primarily responsible for the delivery of health care services to the 
public  based  on  a  contract  established  with  the  CCGs.  The  roles  and  structure  of  these 
organisations are further elaborated in Chapter 5. 
3.1.1  Organisations and Institution 
The words ‘organisation’ and ‘institution’ are used interchangeably, on a day to day basis, 
purporting that both words refer to or mean the same thing. They were differentiated by 
Esman and Bruhns (1965:12) who explained that ‘an organisation is primarily a technical 
instrument, a means to reach certain objectives, but never an end in itself. Institutions, on the   32 
other  hand,  has  the  inherent  capacity  to  shape  the  cognitive  processes  of  individuals 
associated with them (Douglas, 1986: 46, 53).  
Institutional  analysis  is  concerned  with  purposes  and  values,  which  extend  beyond  the 
immediate task at hand’. The dictionary of sociology (1998) defined organisations as the 
outcome of motivated people attempting to resolve their own problems. Organisations are 
socially constructed by the individual actions of members, possessing habituated expectations 
of each other. It also debates whether it is appropriate to refer to organisations as institutions 
that pursue organisational goals. 
A  formal  institution  is  characterised  by  laws  and  rules,  designed  to  structure  human 
interaction. An informal institution features unwritten norms, traditions, codes of conduct and 
values  that  shape  human  behaviours  and  actions.  Some  institutions  are  known  to  be 
deliberately  created,  while  others  evolve  on  their  own  as  a  result  of  human  interaction 
(Esman and Bruhns, 1965:12). An Institution can also be defined as: ‘a way of thought or 
action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the 
customs of a people’ (Hamilton, 1932: 84). Scott (1995:33) asserted that ‘institutions’ are 
social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. 
From the above, institutional theory can be explained  as a rule-like, social fact, and the 
quality of an organised pattern of action (exterior) and embedded in formal structures, such as 
formal  aspects  of  organisations  that  are  not  tied  to  particular  actors  or  situations  (non-
personal/objective) Zucker (1987:444-445).   
3.1.2  Developments in Institutional Theory 
The use of institutional theory in this research necessitates tracking the development of the 
theory over the years, in order to understand how it has evolved in social science, particularly 
its  implication  for  this  study,  which  involved  understanding  the  role  of  actors  in  an 
organisational  change,  within  their  social  environment.  The  development  of  institutional 
theory in diverse disciplines has progressed rapidly in recent years, mainly in disciplines such 
as economics, political science and sociology. Three main branches of institutional theory 
were identified on the basis of discipline; they are institutional theory in economics, political 
science,  and  sociology  (Scott,  2001).    There  are  several  accounting  studies  that  used 
institutional theory as a lens to investigate accounting phenomenon (Dillard et al., 2004). In 
general, accounting research from the institutional theory perspective is informed by the old   33 
institutional  economics  (OIE),  new  institutional  economics  (NIE),  and  new  institutional 
sociology (NIS) theories (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
The (OIE) researchers’ primary concern was to analyse the role of prevailing institutions in 
change  processes,  and  to  study  the  reproduction  or  change  in  institutions  over  time. 
Institutions, defined as the combination of habits and routines forms an essential part of the 
social  context  in  OIE.  The  habits  and  routines  refer  to  ways  of  thinking  and  doing  that 
becomes regular over time, while habits are features of individuals, routines comprise regular 
ways of thinking at the level of both the individual and group (Robeiro and Scarpen, 2006). 
The OIE perspective is useful in the analysis of the complexity inherent in change dynamics 
at the micro level of an organisation, as it explains conflict and the struggle for power. 
The recurrent re-enactment of habits and routines over time can lead to institutionalisation, 
which is a gradual, and in some sense a “natural”, process through which specific patterns of 
thought  and  action  become  widespread  and  taken-for-granted  (Burns  and  Scapens,  2000; 
Scapens, 2006). These routines tend to become unquestionable and meshed into the generic 
structural properties of the organisation 
The  main  concern  of  neo-OIE  research  in  management  accounting  is  to  understand  the 
processes through which management accounting rules and routines become institutionalised 
within an organisation. In other words, it describes how management accounting practices are 
shaped  by  the  “taken-for-granted  assumptions,  which  inform  and  shape  the  actions  of 
individual actors” (Burns and Scapens, 2000:8).  
The  NIE  is  more  concerned  with  the  various  processes  through  which  management 
accounting rules and routines becomes institutionalized within an organizational setting, and 
it also highlights on how management accounting practices are shaped by taken for granted 
assumptions, that in turn influences and shape the actions of individual actors. 
The NIS focuses on the pressure exerted on organisations to make them become isomorphic, 
whereby they begin to  conform to a set of institutionalised beliefs (Scott, 1987). This is 
particularly useful when studying the “macro” level organisational fields. It is a powerful 
theory for explaining the adoption of innovations by “institutionalised” organisations (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). NIS suggests that institutionalisation occurs 
in  the  course  of  human  interaction  (Meyer  and  Rowan,  1977).  Thus  the  study  of 
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social structures that either constrain or enable action (Philips et al., 2004; Dillard et al., 
2004). 
The NIS advocates a move beyond the traditional concept that an organisation is perceived as 
a  technical  flow  or  merely  a  production  system  (Scott  and  Meyer,  1991),  and  it  gave 
consideration to its institutional environment. NIS holds the belief that Organisations do not 
exist  in  a  vacuum,  but  within  an  organisational  field,  which  includes  its  key  suppliers, 
competition, regulatory and political system and so on (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The 
collective  beliefs  amongst  these  units  are  objectified,  to  bring  about  the  ‘Social  Reality’ 
surrounding the organisation (Greenwood et al., 2002). 
Generally, researchers using the NIS described institutions as patterns of social behaviour and 
actions, which are continuously created through self-regulating mechanisms (Philips et al., 
2004). An institution, by this definition, affects the way of thinking and actions of a group of 
people by shaping them to conform to certain standards (Burns and Scapens, 2000).  They 
control  the  people  by  setting  up  predefined  patterns  of  conduct  and  generally  manifest 
themselves in actions and behaviours of considerable numbers of people (Scott, 2001). When 
certain behaviours, actions, or routines unfolds in an organisation, for instance, adopting a 
specific budgeting system, and that adoption becomes the unquestionable way to performing 
a task in the environment, then that innovation is said to have become institutionalised (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000).  An institutionalised structure is a structure that has become taken for 
granted by members in a social group as an efficacious and cognitive pattern of the actors 
(Scott, 2001). 
Studying  the  role  of  FT  reform  in  the  NHS  presupposes  a  change  in  the  prevailing 
institutional structure that was hitherto dominant in the organisation. The FT regime is a 
change  that  cuts  across  the  organisation  and  may  also  cut  through  the  norms,  rules  and 
routines that were in existence in the NHS. This is one of the main reasons why institutional 
theory was found appropriate for this study, to help to understand the effect of the change on 
the organisation both at the micro and macro levels. While the macro level refers to the 
management level of the organisation (government and trust board) generally responsible for 
the strategic steering of the change, the micro level refers to the senior, middle and junior 
members of staff that are generally responsible for the implementation of the change as they 
are involved in the day to day affairs of the organisation.   35 
NIS  is  primarily  concerned  with  interactions  between  organisational  structures,  practices, 
behaviours, and the wider social environment in which organisations operate (Hussein and 
Hoque, 2002). NIS theory knows little or nothing about intra-organisational change, as this 
was affirmed by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) referring to the lack of details on how the process 
of  institutionalisation  occurs  inside  an  organisation.  A  greater  strength  of  the  NIS  is  its 
attempt to show the interplay between the institutional and technical environments (Hoque 
and Hopper, 2002; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Modell, 2000), it reveals that many elements or 
forms  of  formal  organisational  structures,  practices,  and  characteristics  arise  as  a 
consequence of the social expectations of appropriate practices (Bealing et al., 1996).  
This  research  benefited  from  the  NIS  perspective,  which  posits  that  organisations  are 
motivated to interact with their environment in ways perceived as appropriate by the various 
stakeholders for the purpose of survival and the maintenance of legitimacy (Dillard et al., 
2004).  NIS  is  particularly  relevant  for  analysing  organisations  that  are  confronted  with 
uncertainties, and as a result, compete for political and institutional legitimacy and market 
position (Tsamenyi et al., 2006). It must also be recognised that behaviours and practices in 
organisations both at micro and macro levels are shaped by ‘coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphic processes’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:147). 
This research focussed on institutional analysis as informed by NIS, where it uncovered the 
nature of the change – the adoption of FT status. This is primarily an action, which originated 
from  environmental  influence,  in  this  case  the  government  in  the  United  Kingdom,  who 
introduced the concept and stipulated that it must be adopted by all NHS secondary care 
organisations; the second level unveiled the effect of this adoption from the perspective of 
staff working within the organisation, judging from their experience as they implemented the 
change. The concept of organisations and institutions was further illustrated by using the 
work of Zucker (1983), which analysed the levels of institution in organisational analysis and 
also set the basis for this study. 
3.1.3  Zucker’s Adolescence of Institutional Theory (1983) 
It was mentioned earlier that institutions exist at different levels, purporting that it is possible 
to analyse the process of institutionalisation using the lens of institutional theory either at an 
organisational  or  at  interpersonal/individual  level.  Zucker’s  study  attempted  to  explain 
institutionalisation under the two different headings viz:  
(a) The Organisation as an institution - Internal or Micro level analysis   36 
(b) The Environment as an institution. – External or Macro level analysis 
While the organisational perspective portrays institutionalisation as a process that builds up a 
prevailing social element from within an organisation, the environmental perspective leans 
towards  the  reproduction  or  copying  of  social  elements  from  other  sources,  which  are 
external to the organisation. When adopted, those copied elements become the norms that 
prevail in the organisational setting. This shows that institutional theory has both external and 
internal relational perspectives. 
The table below was used by Zucker (1987:444) to explain the attributes of an organisation as 
an  institution.  It  is  important  to  note  that  when  an  organisation  is  considered  to  be  an 
institution, the idea or focus of such organisation are either created organically by the actors, 
or created by copying other organisations through internal processes, or built through the 
assistance/support  of similar  organisations.  Institutional  forms  (rules, norms, routines  and 
social orders) are generated internally by a group of actors through the process of reciprocal 
typification, which in turn creates stability and efficiency in the organisation. 
 
Table 1- Institutional Theories of Organisation - Zucker (1987:444) 
The table also shows the characteristics of the environment as an institution. In this instance 
the organisation is in a position, where it reacts to pressures generated from forces external to 
it, therefore, being shaped by the rule like pressures imposed on it.  The basic attribute of this 
feature includes reproduction or copying of other organisations; the locus is usually outside 
the  organisation  and  the  source  of  influence  could  be  the  state  (Regulative  Pressure)  or 
professional bodies (Normative Pressure) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The outcome of this 
pressure may lead to the organisation’s decoupling from its technical core and becoming 
inefficient.  It is clear that Zucker’s model identified the theoretical divergence in the study of   37 
institutional  theory,  which  could  be  arranged  into  the  internal  and  external  processes  or 
pressures exerted on organisations. 
3.2  Reflecting Institutional Theory on FT Setting 
The major reason given by the UK government for the introduction of FT status in the NHS 
was to create value, and raise an effective and efficient organisation within the healthcare 
sector.  The  change  was  to  be  facilitated  by  an  array  of  management  control  tools  being 
introduced in the NHS in quick succession, at about the same time. This is all part of the 
schedule  of  changes  highlighted  in  the  ‘NHS  Plan’  white  paper  (The  NHS  Plan,  2000). 
Included in this NHS plan document was the introduction of Payment by Results (PBR), 
which was a new tariff system that presented the healthcare sector with a new currency of 
operation.  In  the  same  way  as  the  FT  reform,  PBR  involved  a  long  process  of 
implementation, which is still on-going. Another major change that was introduced in the 
NHS at about the same time was the ‘Patients Choice’ agenda, which allowed patients in the 
NHS to choose their preferred General Practice or hospital, for the delivery of their required 
health  care  needs.  The  government’s  rhetoric  behind  these  reforms  was  to  create  value, 
thereby expanding its ‘Value for Money’ programme in the UK public sector.  
Creation of value was highlighted as one of the relevant features or attributes defined by the 
institutional  theory  framework  (Selnick,  1957).    This  portrays  the  NHS  as  a  technical 
instrument designed as a means to a defined goal. The goal of the NHS as an organisation 
was to provide a comprehensive healthcare service at no cost to the citizens of the United 
Kingdom. Within the NHS structure is a multiple network of professionals and agencies, all 
working together to achieve that aim. Researchers adopting institutional theory argues that 
management  accounting  practises  assumes  a  form  that  is  usually  influenced  by  the 
complexities  of  multiple  constructions,  namely  its  environment  and  the  expectation  they 
convey’ (Baxter and Chua, 2003:100).  
The concept of FT status became widespread within the NHS as trusts went through the 
gateway to achieve FT authorisation. Given the organisations’ mass drive towards attaining 
FT status, the FT concept gained its shared reality and basis of interaction within the NHS. 
This is often referred to as a social order, as evidenced in the work of Berger and Luckmann 
(1967:54) where the central question was - ‘What is the nature and origin of social order? 
Social order is known to be birthed as a result of human activity, which is based on shared 
social reality and is a product of human social interaction, which includes individual actions   38 
that are interpreted by others. Such interpretation is agreed unconsciously from interactions, 
which over time are assigned meaning by the individual and others (Scott, 1987:495). A new 
perspective was offered to this type of interaction, referred to as ‘Reciprocal Typications’ 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967:54).  
Within  this  shared  reality,  a  process  of  institutionalisation  thus  evolves  over  time,  when 
several  NHS  organisations  began  to  put  themselves  forward  for  FT  authorisation.  This 
process  involves  three  phases-  firstly,  the  process  of  taking  action  by  individual 
(externalisation);  secondly,  the  process  of  interpreting  the  actions  as  having  an  external 
reality from themselves (objectivisation), and finally the objectivated world is internalised by 
individuals (internalisation). Institutionalisation was deemed to be the ‘fusing’ of institutional 
structure  and  behaviour  (Scott,1995:18).  Kustova  and  Roth  (2002)  asserted  that  active 
adoption of any institutional logic is only achieved, when the implementation (in behaviour 
and action) and internalisation (when employees view the new logic as valuable and commit 
themselves to  the practice) are completely  fused together. Therefore, it is  possible to  go 
through the routine of implementation without internalisation, which results in a phenomenon 
known as loose coupling or decoupling, whereby the change is not fully engaged within the 
processes of the organisation. In this instance, the technical core of the organisation remains 
just as it was prior to the adoption of the change. This could be the case, where the new 
practice is only adopted on a ceremonial basis (Kustova and Roth, 2002).  
The focus of this study amongst others was to reconcile the role played by each layer of 
staffing  structure,  namely  the  management,  clinicians  and  administrators  within  the 
organisation in the course of FT adoption. This elaborates the reasons behind organisational 
reactions to the various institutional pressures exerted on it to become a Foundation Trust 
organisation.  As  more  trusts  became  licensed  to  become  FT,  the  reform  became  more 
established, whereby more trusts within the NHS worked arduously towards obtaining the FT 
badge, by presenting themselves as efficient organisations in order to gain the approval of the 
regulators and the public.  
3.3  Theory of Legitimacy and Efficiency 
Organisations  within the NHS must  continue to present themselves  as  efficient and well 
managed  entities  in  order  to  achieve  FT  status.  Institutional  theory  recognises  that 
organisations do not exist in a vacuum (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Rather, they relate and 
operate  in  a  system  that  is  interlinked  and  interdependent.  Therefore,  at  a  global  level,   39 
organisations are controlled and made accountable not only to the government, but also to 
other institutional forces such as the professional bodies and the public, which they serve 
(Meyer, Scott, and Strang, 1987; Scott, 1987; Scott and Meyer, 1987).  
In general, organisations compete for resources and customers; in addition they also compete 
for political power and legitimacy in order to obtain social and economic rewards (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1992). For organisations to achieve these goals, they often 
seek legitimacy. Legitimacy by definition is ‘a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system  of  norms,  values,  beliefs  and  definitions  (Suchman,  1995:574).  The  shaping  of 
legitimacy and performance of any organisation is primarily determined by the organisation’s 
institutional environment.  
An Organisation’s choices are often limited by various institutional pressures, as seen in the 
NHS, where trusts are required mandatorily (without a choice) to sign up for the FT status. In 
similar circumstances, organisations with no option generally respond to external demands 
with an aim to ensure their survival, especially when they operated within an interconnected 
environment (Powell, 1988). 
In a number of instances, organisations have adopted an innovation for efficiency reason, this 
was found in situations where the organisation perceives the change is in alliance with its 
global objective and supports the organisational direction for competitive edge (Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983). 
There are different sides to institutional theory, which starts  from the study of taken for 
granted assumptions within an organisation, which in itself is simply an internal phase of an 
institution. This was the basis of the work carried out by Burns and Scarpen (2000), where 
they adopted the Old Institutional Economics Framework (OIE). Other studies have since 
expanded this theory (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983; Ansari and Euske, 1987; Mezias, 1990 
and Covaleski et al., 1993). The other side to this is the externally induced pressures, as 
explained within the New Institutional Sociology (NIS) approach. NIS explains the effect of 
external pressure on organisational change as organisations seek external legitimacy. Neo-
institutionalism  posits  a  more  realistic  concept  of  isomorphism,  which  is  defined  as  a 
response  to  strategic  processes,  a  process  resulting  from  the  interrelations  between  the 
institutional context and the organisation. (Fernández-Alles and Valle-Cabrera, 2006). This is   40 
particularly similar to the context within the FT reform, hence, the overriding relevance of the 
NIS in this study. 
Institutional  theory  posits  that  the  primary  determinant  of  organisational  structure  is  the 
pressure exerted by external and internal constituencies on the organisation to conform to a 
set of expectations, in order to gain legitimacy, and so secure access to vital resources and 
long-term survival (Brignall and Modell, 2000:288). A major contribution by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) explained that organisational conformity to norms stemmed at three different 
levels, namely - Normative, Coercive and Mimetic processes. The resultant effect of these 
factors could lead to isomorphic attributes in organisations, which results in similar traits and 
performance in organisations within the organisational field. 
Within  the  framework  of  legitimacy,  it  is  viewed  that  the  social  becomes  mythical  and 
implicitly dysfunctional in strict task performance terms, while the technical remains real and 
rational (Meyer and Rowan, 1977:356-57). The reason behind an organisation’s quest to obey 
rules under pressure is located in the resultant effect of their conformity to the collective 
normative orders, which often increases  their flow of resources  and enhances  ‘long time 
survival prospects’. It must be stressed, however, that survival chances do not determine the 
efficiency of the organisation, and it is also not plausible to assume that the organisation 
agrees with the rules or pressures exerted on it by external forces, merely because of its 
compliance. In some instances, the action of the organisation may be directed strictly to gain 
legitimacy, resources and acceptance. 
Overall, there are two sides to the argument. The first is to contend that there is a possibility 
of incongruence between the internal efficiency of an organisation and the external pressure 
exerted on that organisation. This presents a situation where an organisation is unable to 
maintain  technical  efficiency  in  the  face  of  a  conflicting  interest.  In  this  scenario,  the 
organisation submits or conforms to the institutional pressure, in order to seek legitimacy. 
This connotes yielding to external pressure and condition, which may have a detrimental 
effect on the organisation’s technical core, which could also lead to decoupling. The second 
side  of  the  argument  assumes  that  gaining  legitimacy  is  an  important  aspect  of  an 
organisation’s life, as it guarantees the firm’s survival, its access to resources and presents it 
with a better reputation.  
The maintenance of efficiency is an objective, which must co-exist with acquiring legitimacy 
within the management process. The responsibility is essentially the role of managers who   41 
are ultimately responsible to the stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Organisations often 
find  themselves  in  this  situation  and  must  decide  on  the  most  viable  option  for  their 
organisational context. 
Dimmaggio and Powell (1983) provided an explanation of the various processes that make 
organisations appear similar without necessarily making them more efficient. This is known 
as the mechanism of isomorphism, which has been extensively explained by a number of 
authors (Dimmagio and Powell, 1983; Rowan and Meyer, 1977; Scott 1995). Isomorphism is 
a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face a 
similar set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organisational action 
largely reflects a pattern of doing things that evolves over time and becomes legitimated 
within an organisation and its environment (Pfeffer, 1982). Isomorphism may be presented in 
a number of forms, namely the Competitive and the Institutional Isomorphism (Dimmaggio 
and Powell, 1983). The distinction between competitive and institutional isomorphism is that 
competitive isomorphism is built on efficiency, where there is only one option that is cheap 
and the most efficient way of performing a particular task. Institutional isomorphism, on the 
other hand, is based on rules, doctrines and beliefs, which an organisation must comply with 
in order to gain legitimacy. There is a general assumption within NIS that the resource supply 
exists at the same level between organisations, thus reducing competition and differentiation 
(Fernández-Alles  and  Valle-Cabrera,  2006).  This  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  resource  based 
theory, which assumes that there is a variation in resources available to organisations, thereby 
creating competition, which necessitates the need to seek legitimacy. Resource based theory 
thus creates a heterogeneous organisation, recognising the domination of one firm over the 
other.  This  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  principle  of  isomorphism,  which  is  rooted  in 
homogeneity. It is useful to recognise that neo-institutional theory incorporated the logic of 
resource-based  theory  by  introducing  the  principle  of  agency,  which  allows  managers  to 
control how well to adapt to institutional pressures. The ability to interpret accurately and 
adapt well to institutional pressure becomes a source of competitive advantage (Fernández-
Alles and Valle-Cabrera, 2006). 
Dimmagio and Powell (1983), discussed isomorphism in organisations on the assumption that 
organisations  tend  to  move  in  the  same  direction  in  response  to  the  pressure  exerted  by 
institutional forces. The focus here is on similar movement towards, and the maintenance of 
institutional norms through coercive, mimetic and normative processes. Institutional norms   42 
deal  with  appropriate  domains  of  operation,  principles  of  organising  and  criteria  of 
evaluation. (Hinning and Greenwood, 1988). 
Coercive Isomorphism usually stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy. 
It  takes  the  form  of  formal  and  informal  pressure  exerted  on  organisations  by  other 
institutions upon which they are dependent, and by the cultural expectations of the society 
within which organisations function (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:150). Such pressures may 
be felt as a force, persuasion, or an invitation to join in collusion. The rationale underlying 
these institutional influences is primarily a financial dependence.  In cases where alternative 
sources are either not readily available, or require an effort to locate it, the stronger party in 
the transaction can coerce the weaker party to adopt its practices so as to accommodate the 
stronger party’s needs.  In other words, organisations will become subject to the whims of 
resource suppliers. (Dimmagio and Powell, 1983:150)  
Coercive isomorphism was reflected in the adoption of FT Status within the NHS, where the 
status was introduced by the government and entrenched in a new Act of Parliament, setting 
up a new structure for the NHS. Thus the creation of the FT status fostered the government’s 
agenda of a patient-led health institution, which was backed up by an enabling constitution 
and a structure that was different to that of the traditional NHS secondary care setting. 
Mimetic isomorphism refers to an institutional force that drives an organisation to copy or 
model  itself  upon  another  organisation,  which  they  perceived  to  be  doing  well,  or  very 
successful in the field. This unveils an organisation’s desire to do what is accepted to be right 
or normal. Organisations tend to model themselves upon similar organisations in the field, 
which they perceive to be more legitimate or successful (Dimmagio and Powell, 1983:152).  
Normative  isomorphism  refers  to  institutional  pressure  from  professional  organisations, 
which expect members to comply with certain rules and regulations developed by their group. 
These laws and rules are embedded in their mode of operation. The rules form the central 
creed,  and  are  often  elaborated  through  professional  training,  conferences  and,  in  recent 
times, the compulsory professional development requirements. The NHS is an employer of a 
vast number of professionals, and each level of professional belongs to specific professional 
bodies,  such  as  the  nurses,  doctors,  accountants  and  so  on.  In  addition  to  these,  each 
professional  body  in  turn  has  its  own  regulatory  body,  aligned  to  certain  agendas.  Each 
organisation is embedded in both its own internal institutional environment, which consists of 
the structures, systems and practices established in the past (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and in   43 
an  external  institutional  environment,  which  is  the  context  it  shares  with  many  other 
organisations (Granovetter, 1985). 
The consequence of these institutional pressures is the creation of institutional rules (Hassan, 
2005:125). Organisations attempt to adopt these rules in order to obtain social legitimacy. 
However, Meyer and Rowan (1977:356) observed that organisations in search of external 
support and stability incorporate all sorts of incompatible structural elements, leading to a 
concern about efficiency.  It must be noted that the occurrence of any combination or all 
combinations  of  the  institutional  isomorphic  processes  does  not  guarantee  an  increase  in 
organisational internal efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:153). 
The introduction of FT status in the NHS was a major change to the system, though not the 
first of its type, but one with a far reaching effect in a very long chain of government reform 
programmes. Some studies have suggested that accounting reforms were sometimes adopted 
in organisations as a legitimating tool, rather than to create better practice, which would help 
with the organisation’s decision making process (Lapsley and Pallot, 2000; Modell, 2001; 
Ahmed and Scapens, 2003). A few other studies highlighted that there were major influences 
from the existing institutions, regarding the way and manner accounting information was 
used by  organisational  actors;  this  extends to  new accounting systems and techniques in 
organisations (Burns, 2000; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005).  Some researchers  also observed 
instances where accounting practices (the core business) may have been kept separate from 
other processes affected by the dictates of the institutional forces (Collier, 2001; Modell, 
2003; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). Several studies have also observed that institutional 
pressures  (coercive,  mimetic  and  normative)  contributed  to  the  development  and/or  the 
adoption of new accounting practices in  organisations (Lawton et al., 2000; Hussain and 
Hoque, 2002).  
Some  studies  also  showed  that  for  organisations  to  survive,  they  must  accommodate 
institutional expectations, even though these expectations may have little to do with the short 
term,  technical  notions  of  efficiency  or  performance  accomplishment  in  the  organisation 
(D’Aunno,  Sutton,  and  Price,  1991;  DiMaggio  and  Powell,  1991;  Scott,  1987).  Thus, 
institutional  theory  shows  how  organisations  behave  and  respond  not  only  to  market 
pressures, but also to institutional pressures (e.g., pressures from general social expectations 
and the actions of leading organisations).    44 
The newly introduced rules and routines could become institutionalised over time, especially 
where the rules were challenged by the existing institution (Burns and Scarpens, 2000). Scott 
(1995:18) explains that to institutionalise is to infuse beyond the technical requirement of the 
task at hand. This is often the character of organisations within an institutionalised structure; 
they  tend  to  adopt  forms  and  procedures  that  are  valued  in  their  social  and  cultural 
environment. They do this in order to achieve legitimacy and to secure the resources that are 
essential for their survival (Robeiro and Scarpen, 2006:96). The greater requirement is the 
role played by organisations in accepting an innovation or change. The process of changing 
an organisation is to a large extent controlled by the organisation’s micro activities, processes 
that  may  or  may  not  be  accepted  as  ‘institutions’  (Barley  and  Tolbert,  1997;  Burns  and 
Scarpens, 2000). In the case of FT adoption, it was not simply a case of applying for the FT 
status, the process involved applying for the status and in addition, complying with several 
hurdles within the monitor assessment framework to acquire legitimacy, which ultimately 
translates to the achievement of the FT status.  
3.4  Accounting studies informed by Institutional Theory  
Several  accounting  studies  have  contributed  tremendously  to  knowledge  in  the  various 
aspects  of  institutional  theory,  covering  areas  such  as  performance  measurement  in 
organisations,  in  public,  private  and  not-for-profit  sectors  (Hussain  and  Hoque,  2002; 
Brignall and Modell, 2000; Modell, 2001, 2003, 2005), changes in management accounting 
in organisations (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns, 2000; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005), and 
cost allocation processes and techniques (Carmona and Danoso, 2004; Ahmed and Scapens, 
2003; Carmona and Macias, 2001). Other issues investigated were budgeting in governmental 
organisations  and  schools  (Edwards  et  al.,  2000;  Collier,  2001;  Seal,  2003),  issues  of 
legislation,  regulations  and  the  role  of  accounting  in  organisations  (Bealing  et  al.,1996; 
Forgarty, 1996; Forgarty et al., 1997; Lapsley and Pallot, 2000; Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; 
Broadbent et al., 2004; Kurunmaki et al., 2003; Forgarty and Rogers, 2005), and  accounting 
and institutionalisation processes (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Dillard et al., 2004; Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005). It was also found relevant to studies relating to external auditing (Basu 
et al., 1999). 
It is fair to mention that one of the areas of institutional theory that lacks adequate attention 
and concentration in the literatures are institutionalisation processes (Dillard et al., 2004). 
Scott,  (2001),  confirms  that  this  is  one  of  the  major  limitations  of  institutional  theory 
literature in general. Within the last decade, only a few number of accounting researchers   45 
have  contributed  to  works  focussing  on  institutionalisation  processes  (Burns  and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Dillard et al., 2004; Modell, 2005).  Some of 
the  studies  on  institutionalization  elaborated  on  the  nature  and  variety  of  institutional 
processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977, 1988), and 
the  range  of  influence  that  these  processes  exert  on  the  structural  characteristics  of 
organisations  (Meyer,  Scott,  and  Strang,  1987;  Scott,  1987;  Scott  and Meyer,  1987)  and 
organisational changes (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). 
Similarly on the subject of Foundation Trust, there are only a few studies concentrating on 
this phenomenon; this includes a quantitative study that researched the extent to which FT 
hospitals took advantage of their greater independence and control for the benefit of their 
organisation (Marini et al., 2007). Also (Maltby, 2002), considered the change in governance 
structure within FT hospitals, while the unwillingness of FT organisations to utilise their 
authorisation autonomy was investigated (Exworthy at al., 2011) and the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of governance system within FT organisation (Goddard et al., 2011). None of 
the  previous  studies  used  the  institutional  theory  as  a  framework  or  focussed  on  the 
institutional effect and organisational response to the FT reform in any way. This current 
research  focuses  on  the  social  context  of  FT  organisations,  thereby  using  a  qualitative 
approach, which is found to be a richer mode for studying actors within an organisational 
context. 
3.5  Locating the Research Question in New Institutional Sociology  
From the aforementioned, there is a need for a theoretical assessment and an understanding of 
the institutional logic - FT status, and an evaluation of the pressures exerted on NHS trusts, 
with  a  view  to  understanding  how  the  directive  to  adopt  the  FT  reform  influenced  the 
organisation’s strategic direction and the coping mechanisms adopted through the process, if 
there are any. The NIS branch of the institutional theory was found to be an appropriate 
framework  to  explain  the  choices  and  behaviours  exhibited  by  organisations  under  the 
pressure to adopt FT status. The key research question for this study is - 
‘How has the adoption of FT status influenced Trust’s Strategic Direction in the NHS?’ 
The  use  of  NIS  as  a  lens  to  understand  the  implementation  of  FT  status  is  expected  to 
uncover the conduct of the organisations, its personnel and their reaction to an organisational 
change. This change is rooted in the organisation’s accounting and structural form and the 
source  of  influence  was  located  outside  of  the  organisation.  In  this  scenario,  stabilizing   46 
forces,  such  as  institutional  constraints,  co-exist  with  intentional  choices  to  produce 
organisational paradoxes (Brignall and Modell, 1999). For instance, the more regulators (or 
external organisational actors) try to innovate by introducing new accounting systems and 
tools, the less change might actually be produced, since their choices may be negated by 
influential actors with conflicting interests. Therefore, it is reasonable to pay attention not 
only to the regulator’s innovation but also to the institutional constraints presented in the 
process of creating the change.  
3.6  Accounting studies informed by New Institutional Sociology theory  
Several accounting research in the public and private sectors has used institutional theory as a 
lens to explore numerous themes, which include performance measurement in organisations, 
(Brignall and Modell, 2000; Lawton et al., 2000; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Modell, 2001, 
2003, 2005;), management accounting changes in organisations (Burns and Scapens, 2000; 
Burns,  2000;  Soin  et  al.,  2002;  Granlund,  2001;  Siti-Nabiha  and  Scapens,  2005),  and 
budgeting in governmental organisations and schools (Edwards et al., 2000; Collier, 2001; 
Seal, 2003).  
Results  from  some  of  the  earlier  studies  have  suggested  that  the  adoption  of  accounting 
changes by organisations has been strictly for the purpose of legitimating the organisation 
rather than facilitating efficiency in performance or informing the decision making process 
(Bealing et al., 1996; Forgarty, 1996; Forgarty et al., 1997; Lapsley and Pallot, 2000; Modell, 
2001Ahmed and Scapens, 2003; Kurunmaki et al., 2003; Carmona and Danoso, 2004). 
Other studies took the stand that existing institutions such as the form of rules and norms are 
the main determinants of an organisation’s direction of travel, which influences the manner 
accounting information is put to use by organisational actors. This was specifically observed 
in the introduction of new accounting systems and techniques in organisations (Burns, 2000; 
Granlund, 2001; Soin et al., 2002; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005). In an extension of the theory, a 
number of studies observed that accounting innovations may be ‘decoupled’ from the core 
operation of an organisation (Basu et al., 1999; Edwards et al., 2000; Collier, 2001; Modell, 
2003; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). In these studies, a common ground or similar pattern 
noted was the identification of the role played by institutional pressures (coercive, mimetic 
and  normative)  as  a  major  driver  in  the  advancement  of  and/or  the  adoption  of  new 
accounting practices in organisations (Seal, 1999; Lawton et al., 2000; Carpenter and Feroz, 
2001; Carmona and Macias, 2001; Hussain and Hoque, 2002).   47 
Most of the literatures identified above and other existing institutional theory literature have 
resoundingly given an indication that accounting inter-relates with various spheres of the 
environment, explaining that accounting practice influences and in return is influenced by 
regulatory, economic, political and social environments. This inter-relationship exists beyond 
the organisation’s internal environment; it extends further to its external circle.  
3.7  Summary 
This chapter provides a discussion on the theoretical framework used in this study. Presenting 
a general synopsis of institutional theory in view of the nature of the FT phenomenon, the 
chapter justifies the relevance of institutional theory for this research, it also indicates the 
major distinguishing contribution of institutional theory in earlier studies, as this is often seen 
in  the  identification  of  causal  mechanisms  in  the  run  up  to  an  organisational  change 
(Dimmagio, 1988); this chapter thus defined the actors and the role played by the actors in 
the common interest of all parties, in the adoption of the change. The next chapter presents 
the research methodology for this study, arguing for an interpretive approach, on the premise 
that the change in question revolves around people within an organisational context.   48 
Chapter Four 
Research Methodology 
4.0  Introduction 
This chapter presents how the case study research was undertaken. It starts by explaining the 
research  philosophy,  then  identifying  the  difference  between  research  methodology  and 
methods within the context of this study, enumerating the research problem, and strategies 
adopted to resolve issues surrounding the validity and reliability of the research. This chapter 
also highlights a number of research methodologies in social sciences and argues for the 
choice of the appropriate methodology found relevant to this study. It also emphasises how 
the data gathered was analysed using a thematic synthesis approach. Thematic analysis is a 
search for themes in data analysis; such themes are consequently presented as fundamental 
elements  that  are  critical  to  the  description  of  the  phenomenon  being  studied  (Daly, 
Kellehear, and Gliksman, 1997). 
4.1  Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy relates to knowledge development and the nature of such knowledge 
(Thornhill et al., 2007). Philosophy is described as a clear and deep seated thought, capable 
of putting a researcher’s thought and language into an analytic and linguistic understanding.  
Philosophy  is  a  necessity  for  a  researcher  when  faced  with  the  task  of  gaining  deeper 
understanding of concepts and events, and also in circumstances where it is important to ask 
questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’. 
There are a number of divergent opinions on research philosophy (Creswell, 2007; Lewis and 
Ritchie, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Mason, 2002; Thornhill, 2007). The fulcrum of the 
diversity is also the main feature that distinguishes the numerous paradigms that emerged 
from various research assumptions over time one from the other; no paradigm, however, can 
be rated as  superior  to  the other. Notwithstanding this,  they  all have a common goal  of 
contributing to knowledge. Laughlin 2007:274 commented that – 
‘‘…there are multiple research approaches not one, and no one approach can claim 
to discover the truth – not even spurious or even ‘properly conducted’ science – and 
that all understanding is inevitably partial’’ 
The primary goal of this research was to understand a human phenomenon in the form of the 
experience  and  perceptions  of  actors  through  the  course  of  FT  implementation  in  the   49 
organisation.  This  investigation  was  conducted  using  an  appropriate  research  paradigm. 
Paradigm is a representation of the way a researcher views the world. This is also in line with 
Patton’s definition of paradigm as a worldview, a way of thinking and making sense of the 
complexities of the real world (Patton, 1990). Paradigm was also defined as, “a basic set of 
beliefs that guide action. Paradigms deal with first principles, or ultimate belief. ‘They are 
human constructions’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).  
Importantly, paradigms must be seen as deeply embedded in the human socialisation process 
and capable of differentiating what is important, legitimate, and reasonable. Paradigms are 
also normative, telling the practitioner what to do without the necessity of long existential or 
epistemological  considerations.  There  are  five  basic  philosophical  assumptions  guiding 
qualitative  research  (Creswell,  2007:16-19).  These  are  ontology,  epistemology,  axiology, 
rhetoric  and  methodology.  In  order  to  gain  a  good  understanding  of  these  philosophical 
assumptions, this study reflected on the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), because of the 
explanatory power it possesses on the subject. 
4.1.1  Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework 
Burrell  and  Morgan  (1979)  expanded  the  research  horizon  by  drawing  the  researcher’s 
consciousness to the typology of paradigms for use in the study of social and organisational 
phenomenon. They made a clear assertion that any investigation of the social world is based 
on sets  of assumption;  including:  assumptions  about  the nature of social science, human 
nature and the nature of society.  
Assumptions on Nature of Social Science   
Assumption about the nature of social sciences connotes the ontological, epistemological, 
human nature and methodological assumptions. Ontological assumptions are concerned with 
the nature of the reality of the phenomenon under study. Ontology refers to the nature of the 
world around us, in particular that slice of reality, which the scientist chooses to address 
(Goles and Hirschheim, 2000). The social world raises a number of debates in relation to 
ontology and it is concerned with beliefs about what there is to know in the world (Lewis and 
Ritchie, 2006:13).  
Ontological assumptions in social science revolve around nominalism and realism. Realism 
suggests that social reality is external to individual consciousness, that is, it is a ‘given’, while 
nominalism is the direct opposite, and assumes that social reality is the product of individual   50 
consciousness  (Burrell  and  Morgan,  1979:4);  reality  is,  therefore,  a  socially  constructed 
interpretation of individuals. 
Epistemological assumption takes its cue from the ontological assumption. This assumption 
is concerned with the nature of knowledge. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that 
studies knowledge, it could also be referred to as the theory of knowledge, which concerns 
the principles, rules by which decisions are made, and how social phenomenon are known, 
and how knowledge can be demonstrated (Mason, 2002:13). There are different views on the 
nature of social reality that is ontology, leading to a division in perspective on the nature of 
knowledge about the social world. One of the aspects of the epistemological perspective is 
described as positivism.  
Positivism proposes an objective view of the social world, and emphasizes the importance of 
studying the ‘concrete relationships in an external social world, in search of an objective form 
of  knowledge’  (Morgan  and  Smircich,  1980:  493).  The  positivists  believe  that  only 
phenomena that are observable can be counted as knowledge; and such knowledge is derived 
deductively from scientific theories, which must be tested empirically (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000:24). The positivistic approach is predominant found in natural sciences (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979: 5), therefore, researchers in this line of study focus on empirical evidence and 
hypothesis  testing,  looking  for  fundamental  laws  and  causal  relationships  (Goles  and 
Hirschheim, 2000).  
The other aspect of the epistemological position is anti-positivism. This proposes a different 
view of social reality. It suggests that the social world is essentially subjective and can only 
be understood from the perspectives of the individuals who are involved in activities that are 
subjected to the investigation (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:5). Anti-positivism focuses on the 
relativity attribute of knowledge, which prescribes that researchers must consider meanings 
and  examine  the  fullness  of  the  situation  under  study  in  order  to  arrive  at  an  accurate 
conclusion. 
The above depicts the assumption about the nature of social science, the other assumption 
emphasised by Burrell and Morgan is the assumption relating to Human Nature. 
Assumptions on Human Nature   
Assumptions relating to human nature gave an insight into the relationship between human 
beings  and  their  environment.  This  is  also  viewed  from  two  perspectives,  which  are 
determinism and voluntarism. The former proposes that human beings are conditioned by   51 
their external environment, thus representing an objective view, indicating that human beings 
are a product of their environment, while the latter assumes a subjective perspective, which 
claims that human beings play a role in the creation of their environment, having a free will 
and autonomy or control over it (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 6).   
The  three  afore-mentioned  assumptions  (ontological,  epistemological  and  human  nature 
assumptions) have direct implications on methodological assumptions. The methodological 
perspective is divided into the ideographic and nomothetic approaches. Ideographic methods 
emphasise the need to understand subjective experiences, while nomothetic approach is the 
understanding and explanation of external objective reality (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:7). 
The  nomothetic  approach  involves  measuring  constructs,  quantitative  based  analysis  and 
hypothesis testing, so that the level of involvement of the researcher in the experience of the 
research is totally absent. The ideographic perspective believes in the first-hand experience 












Assumptions about the nature of society 
The assumption about the nature of society is concerned with whether society should be seen 





































Figure 1- Sociological Framework: (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:7)   52 
The Burrell and Morgan (1979) sociological framework, presents a vertical and horizontal 
perspective on the sociological framework. The structure is divided vertically (top-down) and 
horizontal (running from left to right). The vertical divide represents the nature of society, 
proposing that the society runs at extremes of regulation and radical change dimension. The 
horizontal continuum represents the nature of social sciences, indicating that social science 
involve  the  objective  and  subjective  dimensions.  Each  level  of  the  continuum  explains 
research  assumption  along  the  lines  of  the  ontology,  epistemology,  human  nature  and 
methodology view. The combined vertical-horizontal divisions composed of four different 
research  paradigms  for  the  social  sciences,  namely  the  functionalist,  the  interpretive,  the 
radical humanist, and the radical structuralist, as shown in the Figure one above. 
On the objectivistic side of the Burrell and Morgan (1979) four paradigm matrix, are the 
functionalist  and  radical  structuralist  paradigms.  The  functionalist  paradigm  proposes  an 
objectivistic view of a study phenomenon and assumes that society is orderly and cohesive, 
hence, it requires no change. This paradigm is also concerned with providing explanations of 
the status quo, social order, social integration, consensus, and rational choices (Goles and 
Hirschheim, 2000). This is illustrated by how individual relates or interact in a social system 
to form a whole unit. The radical structuralist paradigm takes an objectivistic perspective and 
assumes that society is characterized by structural differences and conflicts that  represent 
potential  for  a  radical  change.  It  emphasises  the  need  to  overcome  the  shortcomings  or 
limitations  observed  in  the  organisation  or  society.  Its  primary  focus  is  on  structure  and 
economic relationships. 
On the subjective side of the matrix are the interpretive and radical humanist paradigms. Both 
the interpretive and radical humanist approaches emphasize subjectivism, that is, they stress 
explanations  within  the  realm  of  individual  consciousness  and  subjective  experience  in 
research. The main difference between the two is that the former assumes that society is 
cohesive and need not be changed, whereas the latter seeks for change.  
The  Burrell  and  Morgan  (1979)  framework  suggests  that  these  paradigms  are  mutually 
exclusive, though the assumptions that distinguish the four approaches allow for the existence 
of variations within each paradigm.  
This framework has been criticised by several authors (Chua, 1986; Shultz and hatch, 1996), 
particularly with respect to the use of a strict, mutually exclusive dichotomy criteria. The first 
criticism  was  against  the  distinction  accorded  to  the  radical  humanist  and  the  radical   53 
structuralist paradigms without any clear justification, and second was the assumption that its 
implication of truth as a concept is relative. Notwithstanding these criticisms, Burrell and 
Morgan (1979), framework has been very helpful in focussing the mind of researchers to 
consider various research assumptions available in the study of any activity. 
4.1.2  Arguments for choosing the interpretive paradigm 
In the formulation of an approach for this research, considerations were given to the various 
choices  of  methodology,  through  a  better  understanding  of  each  research  paradigm  and 
comparison of one against the other, with a view to arrive at the most appropriate choice. 
Much reliance was placed on the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Laughlin (1995), 
the  first  helpful  assumption  was  the  advance  knowledge  that  interpretative  accounting 
research relies on the commonality of experience amongst the case subjects and that the use 
of multiple methods could build a trustworthy picture of the phenomenon being studied. The 
interpretive research paradigm attempts to describe, understand and interpret the meaning that 
human  actors  apply  to  symbols,  and  the  structures  of  the  setting  in  which  they  find 
themselves (Baker and Bettner, 1997). This is true of accounting, which is not a natural 
phenomenon and, therefore, can be changed or modified by those social actors relating to it 
(Ryan et al., 2002). The interpretive paradigm focussed on how numbers in accounting are 
used to interpret processes, actions and relationships within an accounting environment, with 
the aim of understanding the everyday situation and practices, which are subjective by nature. 
The assumptions of the mainstream or functionalist accounting research paradigm (See figure 
two below) is not deemed to be adequately useful for this research, as it assumes an objective 
social world and deterministic human behaviour, and, hence, employs a quantitative research 
approach (Ryan et al., 2002). Its main aim is to generalise and then predict a cause and effect 
relationships  in  research,  which  does  not  align  with  the  research  aim  of  this  study.  In 
accordance with Chua (1986: 611), the main assumptions of mainstream accounting research 
include the notions that reality is objective and external to the subject; human beings are also 
seen as passive objects, and also as rational actors who pursue their goal. The theory is seen 
as independent of the observations, which may be used in verification or falsification of the 
theory, and it also assumed that quantitative data allows for generalization.  
It follows, that only measurable and observable phenomena are considered as knowledge in 
this paradigm. This is sharply in contrast with the interpretive approach, which considers the 
context and commonality of experience of the case subjects. Thus interpretive understanding   54 
posits that people’s individual and collective thinking and actions have a meaning, which can 
be made intelligible (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell, and Alexander, 1995). The interpretive 
approach  has  an  overriding  aim  of  explaining  the  behaviours  of  people  in  terms  of  the 
meaning  they  attach  to  it.  Although  the  interpretive  research  paradigm  agrees  with  the 
positivist assumption that the goal of any research is to describe and explain reality without a 
value bias, it rejects the positivistic approach or viewpoint about the possibility of creating 












In interpretive research, action must be studied in  a wider frame.  It  has  a pre-conceived 
assumption that any interpretation of study is limited by the interpreter’s ability and their 
understanding of the phenomenon being studied, and therefore, it cannot be generalised as a 
representative reality. As a result, this research focused on the perceptions, opinions, and 
practices of individual organisations within their social contexts and assigned these views 
with an underpinning meaning. 
The interpretive approach was also compared with the critical accounting research approach, 
which offers a basis for social critique and/or promotes forms of radical change (Ryan et al., 
2002, 2007). The critical accounting approach is usually used to describe the role played by 
accounting  within  the  social  context  of  the  society.  It  assumes  that  accounting  is  a 
phenomenon  that  should  be  examined  by  taking  into  consideration  prevailing  social, 
economic and political conditions (Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1999).  
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Laughlin  (1999)  defines  critical  accounting  as:  “A  critical  understanding  of  the  role  of 
accounting process and practices and the accounting profession in the functioning of society 
and organisations with an intention to use that understanding to engage (where appropriate) 
in changing these processes, practices and the profession” (p.73) 
On the basis of similarity with the interpretive paradigm, critical accounting emphasizes the 
need to focus on the interpretations of actors’ actions and behaviours in the same way as the 
interpretive. However, it emphasizes less on the technicalities of accounting practices, whilst 
being  very  active  in  self-reflection  on  the  grounds  of  observation  to  offer  a  plausible 
explanation  (Hoque,  2002).  The  main  disagreement  between  the  Interpretive  and  Critical 
approaches is the willingness of a Critical researcher to take a declared position regarding the 
nature  and  purpose  of  the  research  and  its  political  and  societal  implications,  whereas 
interpretive research approach prescribes taking a ‘neutral ‘stance (Baker and Bettner, 1997). 
In the choice of a methodology, it is very important to focus on the best means for gaining 
knowledge about the world (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:157). Schultz (1962) identified the 
most  serious  question,  which  bothers  methodology  in  social  science,  the  question  is 
predicated on the possibility of a researcher to form an objective concepts and an objective 
verifiable  theory  of  subjective  meaning.  The  Interpretive  paradigm  with  its  array  of 
assumption  proffers  an  answer  to  this  dilemma  for  this  study,  hence,  the  choice  of  an 
interpretive approach for this study. 
4.1.3  Choice of a methodology 
As noted above, some writers have left the decision for the choice of a methodology to a 
matter of simple selection; others have taken a different view, this study proposes that the 
choice of methodology must be directly influenced by the research questions and research 
focus preferences (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Ryan et al., 2002; Laughlin, 2004). Hence, the 
choice of a research approach was not taken lightly in this study, as this choice has a towering 
influence on pivotal stages of the research process.  Baker and Bettner (1997) argued that it is 
important  for the  researcher’s perspective to  be made  clear in  order to make it easy for 
readers to understand and appreciate the context in which the research was approached. 
The choice of an interpretive perspective in this research was influenced by the nature of the 
phenomenon under investigation (Leonard-Barton, 1990), especially when viewed from the 
perspectives of the ontological, epistemological and axiological arguments. The fundamental 
belief of the interpretive approach lies in its ability to use causal language to describe the   56 
world. Within this argument, it was also noted that all fields of research have taken one 
position or the other about the nature of the world, either knowingly or unknowingly. In 
arriving at this choice, three main factors were considered. The first aspect was linked to the 
nature of the phenomenon under investigation. The interpretive paradigm has the potential to 
generate fresh understandings within the facets of a complex and multidimensional human 
system, such as those witnessed in this study. Suggestion from prior research also supported 
the  fact  that  concepts  of  accountability  are  quite  subjective,  and  applied  with  different 
meanings and interpretations (Sinclair, 1995; Edwards, 2002; Solomon and Solomon, 2004). 
Therefore, an interpretive assumption provided an appropriate research strategy for studying 
such a complex phenomenon as the FT status (Locke, 2001).  
The  second  element  was  linked  to  the  fact  that  several  empirical  accounting  studies  on 
accountability and governance in the public sector highlighted the importance of studying the 
phenomenon  in  practice,  strictly  from  the  perspectives  of  the  actors,  with  emphasis  on 
relativist  ontology.  This  enhances  knowledge  and  captures  the  context  of  investigation 
(Bourmistrov  and  Mellemvik,  2002;  Everett,  2003).  This  research  sought  to  understand 
practical knowledge, which is embedded in the world of meanings and diverse interaction. 
These  meanings  are  constructed  inter-subjectively  through  the  understanding  developed 
socially and experientially by the actors. Therefore, it was most appropriate to adopt the 
interpretive paradigm. 
Lastly, the researcher’s view was also based on this paradigm, which stresses the subjectivity 
of the research, referred to as the subjectivist epistemology. This highlights the impossibility 
of  separating  the  researcher  from  what  they  know  about  the  world  being  researched.  In 
conducting this research, the researcher was part of the phenomenon under investigation. In 
interpretive  accounting  research,  there  is  an  assumption  that  ‘social  reality  is  emergent, 
subjectively created and objectified through human interaction, and that the role of a theory is 
to explain human actions in a society, which is deemed to be stable, where any existing 
conflicts are being resolved through shared meanings’ (Chua, 1986: 615). 
The  interpretive  approach  in  itself  can  be  expressed  in  five  major  areas:  symbolic 
interactionism,  phenomenology,  realism,  hermeneutics  and  naturalistic  inquiry.  For  the 
purpose of this research the focus was on phenomenology. Phenomenology was chosen as the 
most suitable methodology for this research, because it asserts that any attempt to understand 
social reality must be rooted in the experience of the people influenced by that social reality. 
It  follows,  that  any  residual  knowledge  must  be  put  aside  in  favour  of  the  immediate   57 
experience of the actors under the influence in order to ascertain or develop new meanings 
from the FT event. 
4.2  Putting the Research Question into phenomenological research 
The  purpose  of  using  the  phenomenology  approach  in  this  study  was  to  develop  a  rich 
description of the subject. This required a clear definition of the object of analysis ahead of 
the research process, so as to benefit from the rich meaning drawn from the use of tools found 
in phenomenology on the research subject. The social structure in this study wholly relates to 
the  National  Health  Service  in  England,  which  is  characterised  by  a  centralised  control 
structure,  being  led  by  the  Secretary  of  State  and  other  regulatory  agencies,  namely  the 
Department  of  Health  (DOH),  Trust  Development  Authority  (TDA),  Care  Quality 
Commission  (CQC),  and  the  Audit  Commission.  At  the  service  delivery  end  were  the 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) as commissioners of healthcare services for their 
local population and the secondary care units, which comprised the Acute, Mental Health, 
Ambulance and Community trusts. The secondary care facet is responsible for the delivery of 
care;  where  they  deal  with  the  users  of  health  care  services  -  actual  customers.  The  FT 
phenomenon was a process triggered by certain events or conditions, which eventually result 
in the licensing or deferral of a trust to become a Foundation Hospital. The licensing itself, 
also called ‘authorisation’, was the main outcome of the whole process. 
 
Figure 3- Research Process Integration 
The use of phenomenology in research concentrates on lived experience, and this is very 
relevant in investigating an individual’s perceptions of events. However, the focal point of 
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phenomenology  is  with  pre-reflective  experiences  and  feelings  (the  core  or  essence  of  a 
phenomenon), and in this research the main focus was to identify the effect of FT status 
within the NHS, and to show the behavioural traits exhibited by organisations undergoing 
change. Therefore, the study delved into the process of FT implementation up to the point 
where the trust achieved authorisation. 
In alignment with the research methodology, the data analysis protocol was developed from 
phenomenological principles by following guidelines and processes that supported systematic 
analysis. It is generally accepted that the choice of data analysis method must be guided by 
the  methodological  stance  adopted  for  the  piece  of  research  and  its  underlying 
epistemological assumptions. On the other hand, the adoption of analytical methods is linked 
to specific methodologies, and therefore, how they are used differs from one to the other. In 
this study, the template analysis technique was used to interpret and create an understanding 
of the data.  
The  research  process  was  designed  around  the  actors  and  the  events  within  the  NHS 
organisations used in this study. These actors have taken part in the various aspects of FT 
reform implementation within their organisations and therefore are in a good position to give 
an account  of the process. The study relies  heavily on these  actors’ account  of their  FT 
experience. Through these account, a rich data is gathered, as a foundation for this study as 
depicted  in  Figure  three  above.  The  diagram  shows  the  connection  between  the  adopted 
theory, the methodology and, ultimately, the method used in this research. 
Through the process of abstraction, the research unravelled how the FT reform unfolded in 
the  organisations  by  searching  for  ‘underlying  logics’  and  ‘deeper  structures’  (Pettigrew, 
1990) that facilitated the change, by focusing on the multiple and interconnected levels of 
analysis and how they interacted between context and action. In this empirical work, the 
macro level analysis was linked to the micro level to explain change over time in terms of 
interaction between individual actions and structural differences (Edwards, 2000) with the 
use of institutional theory.  
In order to address the research questions raised in this study, the FT application process was 
divided into a number of segments, with the view to studying the pre-implementation period 
of the concept, along with the various documents from major stakeholders, taking particular 
notice of the language or rhetoric of the government and the staff unions, amongst others.   59 
This was tracked through various textual artefacts (Journals, memo, presentation and policy 
documents). 
The second part of this work examined the evidence of cases, where power was exercised to 
trigger  events  implied  in  the  FT  process.  This  involved  examining  the  experiences  from 
members  of  the  NHS  organisations.  The  purpose  of  this  approach  was  to  gain  an 
understanding of how participants engaged and mobilised themselves in the framework in 
order to facilitate the licensing of their organisation. More pronounced was the action of key 
individuals driving the process as agents of change, cutting through the social, cultural and 
structural contexts of the organisation to bring about a new phenomenon – a FT Hospital. 
Therefore, the study closely observed the shifts in understanding and meanings given by the 
members of the organisations and their associations with the new concept.  
Through the accumulation of this evidence, a logical test was applied to eliminate most of the 
items or powers activated, which were definitely not as a result of FT adoption. The residual 
data was then critically assessed for evidence of mechanisms that resulted directly from the 
action  of  the  FT  implementation  activities.  Evidence  gathered  included  memos,  training 
manuals, flyers, policy papers, board reports and presentations, in addition to the face to face 
interviews held with key staff. 
4.3  Research Design and Strategy 
The  research  plan  followed  a  logical  structure  from  the  outset;  this  was  to  protect  the 
researcher from the frequent pitfalls that accompany weak and unconvincing conclusions, and 
the risk of failing to answer the research questions (Yin, 2003). Research design is the logical 
sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial questions, and ultimately, to its 
conclusion (Yin, 2003:20). In their contribution, Lewis and Richie (2006:47) suggested that, 
research design composes of a clearly defined purpose, in which there is coherence between 
the research questions and the methods or approaches proposed to generate valid and reliable 
data. 
A clear layout of the research plan was defined at an early stage of the process, in order to 
ensure that an appropriate strategy was chosen for the study, ensuring that the method of 
gathering  data  is  well  informed  by  the  methodology  adopted.  The  concept  of  the 
methodological strategy was clearly distinguished from the method, even though a choice of 
method was part of the strategy. Method was generally defined as a component in a range of 
different methodological strategies - it is not a strategy in itself (Mason, 2002:30-32). To put   60 
it more succinctly, methodological strategy is the logic, which underpins the way to design a 
research project, ensuring that it gives appropriate answers to the  research questions, as well 
as the day-to-day decisions about most, if not all aspects of a study. The strategy of inquiry 
comprises a bundle of skills, assumptions, and practices that the researcher employs as he or 
she moves from the paradigm to the empirical world (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:22). The 
strategy of inquiry puts paradigms  of interpretation into motion.  However, (Yin,  2003:5) 
cautioned every researcher to be careful in the way they plan their research; even though each 
strategy has its distinctive characteristics, there are large overlaps amongst them. The goal is 
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In line with the interpretive epistemological position, this study adopted an intensive research 
strategy.  Sayer  (1992,  2000)  advocated  this  type  of  approach  when  seeking  to  generate 
deeper  meanings.  An  intensive  research  design  emphasises  causal  explanation  of  the 
production  of  particular  phenomenon  in  specific  cases.  An  intensive  case  investigation 
approach has been used in a number of complex organisational developments (Harrison and 
Easton, 2002).  
In this particular research, the case-study approach was chosen to explore the research in an 
in-depth manner, because the case study strategy has the potential of producing a richer and 
more meaningful data, it has a better insight into the phenomenon under study. Case research 
has been defined as a research method that involves investigating one or a small number of 
social entities or situations, about which data is collected using multiple sources of data and 
developing a holistic description through an iterative research process (Easton, 2009).  
The case study approach has a distinct advantage when a “how” or “why” question is being 
asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control 
(Yin,  2003:  9).  Eisenhardt  (1989:  548-9),  argues  that,  “case  studies  are  particularly  well 
suited to new research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate”. The primary reason 
for  the  suitability  of  a  case  study  approach  in  this  research  was  because  the  study  was 
undertaken  within  the  actor’s  social  context.  Case  study  research  is  known  to  be  fully 
compatible with the study of a phenomenon explored through one or more cases within a 
bounded system (i.e., a setting, a context) (Creswell, 2007:73) 
4.3.1  Exploratory Versus Explanatory Research 
There are different types of Case studies. Yin (2003) highlighted the differences among three 
specific  types  of  case  studies,  namely,  the  descriptive  case  studies,  the  explanatory  case 
studies and the exploratory case studies, The Descriptive case study portrays an accurate 
profile  of  persons,  events  or  situations  (Robson,  2002;  59).  The  explanatory  case  study 
establishes causal relationships  between variables.  Lastly, the exploratory case study is  a 
valuable means of investigating what is happening, to seek new insights, to ask questions and 
to  assess  the  phenomenon  in  a  new  way.  It  is  useful  for  clarifying  or  understanding  a 
problem, and it is also very flexible and adaptable to change (Robson, 2002:29), hence, it was 
found relevant as the starting point for this study. 
Exploratory research could be explained as the first step to understanding a phenomenon. It is 
conducted to provide a provisional understanding of a research problem, and should be used   62 
as an input for further research (Malhotra, 1999). On the other hand, Explanatory research 
aims to provide evidence of cause and effect relationships (Aaker et al., 2001). Typically, the 
researcher manipulates the independent variables of interest, while controlling the influence 
of other variables (Davis and Cosenza, 1993). This study aimed to start from an exploratory 
phase, to gain a provisional understanding, and then proceed to the explanatory stage, which 
became the extensive aspect of the research. 
The  exploratory  phase  of  this  research  covered  the  literature  review,  from  which  an 
understanding of accounting in the public sector was gained. The scope of the study was then 
refined  to  accounting  in  the  National  Health  Service,  which  further  dove-tailed  into  the 
changes witnessed through the various regimes in the NHS. At this phase, initial unstructured 
interviews were held with experienced members of the organisations, in order to assess this 
area of knowledge and the most relevant or implicated area for this research. The explanatory 
phase of this research resumed with the full engagement of the nominated NHS organisations, 
where interviews were conducted, documents gathered and meetings observed. 
4.3.2  Case Study Design 
Consideration whether to extend the study beyond a single case study was made at the early 
stage  of  this  research.  (Yin,  2003:19)  identifies  four  major  types  of  case  study  design, 
formulated into a 2x2 matrix. 
  Single case 
  Multiple case designs 
  Holistic 
  Embedded designs 
The multiple case study approach was found useful in this study to seek an understanding of 
the FT concept in three (3) NHS organisations. The nominated organisations differed from 
the other, in that the first organisation was a trust in the pipeline of FT authorisation. It was 
an organisation that was going through the Monitor’s assessment process to become an FT 
Hospital, while the other two were already licensed as FT hospitals. 55 members of staff 
across the three organisations were interviewed for this study. Notably, these organisations 
were classified as public sector organisations, there were subtle differences in the way they 
operated, especially in their financial and environmental contexts, this further described in 
4.3.4. The output from the use of multiple case studies is usually known to be compelling and   63 
robust to support the assertions produced from the study (Yin, 2003, Creswell, 2007). A 
multiple case study has also been referred to as a collective case study, when a researcher 
studies a number of cases jointly in order to understand a phenomenon, population, or general 
condition (Stake, 1995: 3-4).  
The choice of multiple cases in this research was to ensure the validity and generalizability of 
the results. This choice was tilted in the way of a multiple case study, firstly, because it is 
more likely to produce a direct replication of the event and also provide a better analytical 
conclusion, which is likely to be more convincing than those coming from a single case 
study. Secondly,  where a common conclusion is presented, the contexts of multiple case 
study  is  likely  to  differ  to  some  extent  from  single  case,  this  would  also  no  doubt 
immeasurably expand the external generalisability of the research findings. Lastly, multiple 
case studies often present contrasting situations that do not seek any direct replication (Yin, 
2003; 53). 
4.3.3  Sample Selection 
This  case  study  research  did  not  simply  follow  random  selection;  also  the  process  of 
identifying sampling entities was not taken for granted as some studies give less attention to 
this aspect (Sayer, 2000). A major consideration in this multiple study was to determine what 
was  considered  necessary  and  adequate  for  the  research  issues.  Given  the  irrelevance  of 
sampling logic, the typical criteria regarding sample size were not applicable. 
Most researchers have concluded that the sampling selection for case study research must be 
purposive (Creswell, 2007; Lewis and Richie, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Mason, 2002; 
Patton, 2000; Stake, 1995; Thornhill et al., 2007). Purposive sampling in qualitative research 
simply means that the inquirer’s motivation for selecting individuals and case sites for a study 
is  based  on  the  conviction  that  those  selections  are  relevant  and  resolutely  capable  of 
producing answers to the research problem, as well as the central phenomenon of the study 
(Creswell, 2007: 125).  
The logic and power of purposive sampling is in its ability to select information-rich cases for 
an in-depth  study (Denzin  and  Lincoln, 2000;  Patton, 2002:  230).  Information-rich cases 
represent those data from which the researcher can learn a great deal about issues of central 
importance  to  the  research’s  subject  of  inquiry.  Studying  information-rich  cases  gives 
superior  insights  and  in-depth  understanding  than  empirical  generalisations.  Purposeful   64 
sampling  in  this  study  focused  on  selecting  information-rich  cases  that  is  capable  of 
illuminating the questions under review.  
In order to achieve this selection, this study divided England into three geographical zones, 
from  where  three  organisations  (one  Non-FT  and  two  FT  hospitals)  were  nominated  to 
participate in the research. The choice of organisations selected was informed by a number of 
criteria. Firstly, was the geographical location of the hospitals, and this was designed to cover 
Northern England, London and Southern England. The second criteria, which is relevant to 
the FT hospital choice was that it must have operated as an FT organisation for a minimum of 
three years; this was only a logical assumption that within this period of operation, the FT 
change would have been embedded in the organisation’s form and also the interviewees from 
those organisations  would  have acquainted themselves with the changes in the hospital’s 
operation and process. 
In total, 55 people working within the chosen organisations were interviewed, drawn from 
both the medical and non-medical divisions, and representing all strata of staff, top, middle 
and bottom level staff (See the Table 2 below). The choice of sample gave preference to 
members  of  staff  that  were  responsible  for  the  FT  implementation  process  within  these 
organisations. It must be noted that most NHS organisations are structured in such a way that 
finance staff are represented in all the divisions of the hospital. Some organisations refers to 
these finance representatives as the Divisional Finance Managers, and this set of staff were 
particularly useful in reflecting the effect of FT on individual divisions. 
The choice of research method in this study was informed by the theoretical assumptions 
(assumption  about  the  nature  of  reality  or  the  ontology).  This  is  to  ensure  that  the 
methodological tool adopted was the most appropriate for investigating the FT phenomenon. 
Using a qualitative method was particularly useful for gathering data at different levels of 
sociological description. This study, being a qualitative research, easily related to the crux of 
the issues  at  a macro-societal  level, and the choice proved most advantageous,  given its 
potency  to  unveil  the  embedded  social  micro-processes,  which  sheds  light  on  and  better 
understanding of the research. 
4.3.4  Description of Case Study Organisations 
Before  discussing  the  research  methods  adopted,  it  may  be  useful  to  briefly  outline  key 
aspects of each case study organisation that participated in this study. The non-foundation 
trust (captioned as Non-FT ‘A’) is a large acute trust based in the northern part of England, in   65 
view of its location; it enjoys the monopoly of the market around its areas as a lone provider 
of the major care services required within the local health economy. The trust had undergone 
a series of change programmes to get through its financial challenges for a period of three 
years, with the intervention of its Strategic Health Authority from time to time. The trust has 
a huge financial commitment under a Private Finance Initiative scheme which is set to run for 
about 40 years. The board and staff of the trust had undergone a significant personnel shake 
up, which was still on-going at the time of this research; this included a re-organisation of 
divisions and reporting line management. The perception of staff to the FT innovation was 
quite passive and aloof.  
The foundation trust (Captioned as FT ‘B’) is a three star rated NHS trust prior to achieving 
the FT status. The trust was also part of the first wave organisations, licensed to become FT. 
The trust is located in central London with a very large area of operation. This organisation is 
a major operator in the NHS, whose board benefits from high-ranking practitioners in the 
sector. At the strategic level, senior managers (executive directors) and members of the non 
executive  board  are  influential  in  the  healthcare  system.  The  trust  had  developed  a 
sophisticated organizational structure based on a clinical staff led model, which support its 
strategy,  in  respect  to  pioneering  major  service  developments  of  renown  capacity  in  the 
healthcare sector. This organisation operates from recently built, high rise buildings within 
the  London  city.  Members  of  Staff  were  attracted  from  the  young,  professionals  and 
sophisticated  working  class.  The  working  environment  is  similar  to  that  of  high  profile 
private sector organisations, this includes the medical divisions.    
The third case study is another foundation trust (Captioned as FT ‘C’). The trust was part of 
the later wave of FTs licensed after about five years after the introduction of the FT reform. 
FT (C) operates from multiple locations in the South East of England. Organisational activity 
has been stable over the years; the trust operated a flat management structure which was 
changed after its authorisation to align with the Monitor organisational template. Members of 
the board and staff were generally forward looking and of a reasonable profile. Operating 
from multiple locations enabled the trust to spread its services to a wide area within south 
England. Achieving FT status for this organisation witnessed a number of organisational and 
business  re-engineering,  which  includes,  staff  redundancies,  merger  of  sites  and  new 
appointments at board level.   66 
4.3.5  Research Methods 
Interview  
One of the techniques adopted to obtain data was by a face-to-face interview method. This 
interview  method  was  found  to  be  an  effective  method  of  enquiry  as  it  facilitates  the 
derivation  of  knowledge  from  interviewees.  Three  types  of  interview  approaches  were 
considered.  Firstly  the  structured  interview,  which  is  a  purposeful  conversation  in  which 
prepared questions are asked and the other person answers those questions (Frey and Oishi, 
1995), they are not usually flexible, so the respondent is limited to a particular set of answers 
and perhaps forced to give an opinion. Secondly, the semi structured interview - where the 
interviewer guides the flow of the interview, highlighting the topic to be covered, in order to 
focus  the  respondent  on  the  process,  while  the  interviewer  focuses  on  the  respondent’s 
subjective experiences. Usually the researcher relies on a list of questions, which must be 
handy  to  the  researcher  at  the  interview  (Gubrium  and  Holstein,  2002).  Lastly,  is  the 
unstructured interview, which is basically an informal interview, without any structure to it. 
In  this  study,  the  unstructured  interview  was  particularly  useful  for  the  preliminary  data 
gathered earlier in this study to test what type of responses may be elicited by the question 
and other issues covered by it (Seidman, 1998). The list of questions asked in this study is 
shown in Appendix (I). This list was a guide to the interviewer and a few other questions 
were added to the list as the interview process progresses.  
In the main interview process, a semi structured interview was used for the gathering of the 
primary data. Successive interviews in the main study brought more themes to the research 
question pile, which were incorporated into subsequent interviews. At different points during 
the interview process, some themes reached a convincing saturation point, where respondents 
gave the same explanation of particular issues. As some other themes evolved, the interview 
became more focused in the later stages, as the interviewer was able to touch on particular 
issues that had been raised in preceding interviews (Dick, 1990). This method of interview 
was  found useful  for data analysis, and it also  help  the interviewer in  deciding when to 
terminate data collection by interview, usually after identifying the point of saturation. A 
saturation point is that stage where all participants gave the same answers to the questions 
and the interview was not producing any new answers.  
The researcher used each interview to gather the required information from respondents and 
also to explain the data results in the analysis (Carson et al., 2001; Nair and Riege, 1995).   67 
From the fifty five actors that were interviewed across the three organisations, the first batch 
of interviews had 42 participants, after which the questions arrived a saturation point.  
The interviews were analysed to produce the preliminary findings, after which the second 
batch  of  interview  was  undertaken  with  13  more  participants.  Field  notes  were  also 
completed immediately after each interview, to capture all the relevant aspects of the social 
process  (Babbie,  1989).  The  notes  made  in  the  field  journal  reported  observations  that 
included physical settings, interviewee’s reaction and body language, periods of extended 
silence,  and  sensitive  issues  that  were  discussed  without  being  taped.  Reflections  on  the 
outcomes of the interview were also recorded. 
The table below shows the list of staff interviewed in the entire process and their ranks in the 
three organisations – A, B and C. 
 
Table 2- Summary of Interviewees from various research sites 
Document Analysis 
Document  analysis  and  field  notes  of  impressions  were  collected  in  the  course  of  data 
gathering.  Document analysis involved a trawl through the various monthly and quarterly 
 
Interviewee’s Profile  Non   –  FT (A)  FT (B)  FT (C)  Total 
Chief Executive  1  1  1  3 
Dir of Finance  1  0  1  2 
Chief Nurse  1  1  1  3 
Dir Human Resources  1  1  1  3 
Medical Director  1  1  1  3 
Dir Strategy/Planning  1  0  0  1 
Dir of FT  1  0  0  1 
Clinical Dir  2  1  2  5 
Directorate Managers  2  1  3  6 
Div Finance Managers  4  1  4  9 
Dep Dir of Finance  3  1  1  5 
Treasury Manager  0  1  1  2 
Head of Creditor  1  0  0  1 
Financial Accountant  1  1  1  3 
Payment Officer  2  1  1  4 
Management Accountants  2  1  1  4 
Total Number of Interviews  24  12  19  55   68 
financial  reports  considered  by  the  board  executives  for  a  period  of  about  three  years. 
Documents  analysed  included  the  strategic  project  files  showing  various  management  of 
change programmes, public consultation documentation, where the public gave leave for the 
organisation to become a FT hospital and, finally, the various versions of the trust’s Long 
Term Financial Model (Four Versions) with  various  back up documents  such as  Outline 
Business Cases (OBC) for various services, including the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
project.  
Researcher’s Observation 
The researcher’s observation in the course of the fieldwork provided an understanding of 
participants’  context  and  their  interaction.  The  researcher  also  obtained  information  that 
could not be gathered through interviews or from the analysis of documents (Patton, 2002). In 
drafting up an observation strategy, four approaches were considered, including participant-
as-observer, complete participant, complete observer and observer-as-participant (Gill and 
Johnson, 2006). Because the researcher was part of the non-FT organisation for a period of 
20 months, the observer as participant strategy was found appropriate. This involved taking 
records as an active observer of the relevant activities, events, actions and behaviours, as well 
as taking note of the meanings of the observations from the perspectives of the participants 
(Patton,  2002).  Casual  interaction  with  members  of  staff  connoted  active  observation  in 
various  departments  of  the  organisations.  Formal  observations  were  also  made  through 
attendance of meetings.  
Formal observations in meetings provided useful and reliable information, often putting into 
context  the  environmental  attributes  of  that  particular  trust.  Most  of  the  meetings  were 
attended by other members of staff in the organisation, and the researcher simply appeared 
along  with  other participants  (McKinnon, 1988). All  important  issues,  events,  views and 
activities observed were recorded immediately after each meeting. The information gathered 
from observations was  used to review the interview questions, with a view to extracting 
deeper meanings from the participants, and these were also taken into account during the data 
analysis from the perspectives of the participants (Patton, 2002).  
In addition to the data from interviews, the use of memos was engaged during the interview. 
Memos are defined as “the researcher’s record of analysis, thoughts, interpretation, questions 
and directions for further data collection” (Strauss et al., 1998:110). Similarly, throughout the 
data coding, memos were made to sketch and note ideas, reflections, and concepts in parallel   69 
with  the  data  collection.  The  same  routine  was  repeated  during  the  free  coding  of  the 
interview transcripts. The reflection focused on the radical expressions, sharp differences in 
interpretation of action and formulation used by interviewees, which were later interpreted 
during the analysis. Using the memo data immersed in the relevant interview data created a 
clearer interviewee’s perspective. 
4.4  Data analysis 
A qualitative approach of data analysis was adopted using a template analysis method, which 
was similar to the Crabtree and Miller (1999) perspective, where templates were defined 
before commencing an in-depth analysis of the data , followed by a thematic synthesis, as 
informed  by  previous  studies  (Edwards  and  Titchen,  2003;  Titchen,  2000;  Titchen  and 
McIntyre,  1993).  This  method  allowed  for  systematic  identification  of  the  participants’ 
interpretations  and  constructs  (first  order  construct),  which  were  then  layered  with  the 
researchers understanding, which was called the second order construct.  
The synthesis of data was done in three stages, which overlapped in some respects. Using the 
free  code  functionality  in  Nvivo  9,  the  routine  started  with  a  line  by  line  extraction  of 
findings from the primary study, leading to the organisation of the ‘free’ codes into related 
classes to construct descriptive themes and then the development of analytical themes.  
4.4.1  Template Analysis 
The Template approach is tremendously useful for the analysis of textual data from most 
methodological and epistemological positions. ‘Template analysis’ refers to a specific way of 
thematically analysing qualitative data. The data type is usually interview transcripts; this 
may  also  be  generalised  to  a  wide  range  of  textual  data,  which  includes  diary  entries, 
electronic texts, e-mails or open-ended question responses on a written questionnaire (King, 
1998).  
The process of Template analysis involved the development of a coding "template", which 
summarises  themes  that  are  identified  by  a  researcher  as  relevant  to  the  data  set  under 
consideration (King, 2004). These themes were organised in a meaningful hierarchical coding 
structure  at  the  start,  which  resulted  in  identification  of  broad  themes,  which,  through 
successive coding and rearrangement into constructs, became narrow and more specific.   
Template analysis guidelines were made clearer in the work of Crabtree and Miller (1999), 
which suggests an overview of the five main steps of the ‘dance of interpretation’. The steps   70 
identified  in  the  analysis  process  are  describing,  organising,  connecting, 
corroborating/legitimating,  and  representing  the  account.  In  the  data  analysis  routine,  a 
template approach is often preceded by the identification of codes, which are devised a priori, 
whether  from  previous  studies  or  from  theoretical  perspectives.  These  a  priori  codes  are 
themes that are strongly expected to be relevant to the analysis. In the course of analysis, 
codes may be changed, deleted or modified, where they are found unsuitable or irrelevant to 
the research subject. The moment any of the a priori themes are defined, then the researcher 
must begin to read through the data, identifying areas of the data that appear to be relevant to 
the research subject.  
In  this  study,  an  a  priori  template  was  developed  from  the  combination  of  the  research 
question  and  Institutional  theory.  When  the  pre-defined  codes  were  identified,  the  actual 
transcription of the data resumed. In most of the interview transcripts, the first reading was 
usually to gain an understanding, while subsequent readings were to classify the data. In 
some  cases  transcripts  were  read  over  three  times,  as  the  researcher  matched  the  site 
observations and various interviewees’ remarks into a meaningful perspective. This type of 
data  analysis  is  described  as  a  microscopic  (sentence-by-sentence)  examination  of  each 
interview (Strauss et al., 1990).  
The data analysis process was simplified with the use of the Nvivo computer-aided data 
analysis tool. The software was used to store all interview transcripts in their verbatim form 
and when coded to the defined a priori codes; the application also held the data in its thematic 
form. The researcher had the opportunity to revisit each transcript linked to the codes to 
ensure that there was no systematic distortion to the interpretation of the interviews and that 
there were no deviations from the predefined theme. This check was repeated at the end of 
the first and second constructs of the analysis.  
4.4.2  Thematic synthesis 
Following the use of the template, there was continual interpretation of the research text and 
the FT phenomenon. This process is known as ‘Thematic Synthesis’. The process involves 
identification of themes through a process of “careful reading and re-reading of the data” 
(Rice and Ezzy, 1999: 258). Through the combing of data, pattern recognition was drawn 
within the data, which formed the basis of the emerging themes, which became the categories 
for analysis.   71 
The analysis of data involved the assignment of concepts and themes to the data gathered. A 
concept is defined as an “abstract representation of an event, object, or action/interaction that 
a researcher identifies as being significant in the data” (Strauss et al., 1998: 103). Thematic 
synthesis was broken into five stages in this research, as explained below -  
Stage one: Immersion in Data – Organising the texts 
The process of immersion was generally the organisation of the texts gathered from each 
participant through interview transcripts, field notes and observation of body language and 
gestures.  The  majority  of  the  transcripts  were  recorded,  and  the  researcher  engaged  in 
repeatedly listening to the audio recordings and reading through each of the transcripts in 
order to become familiar with the text sets. Through the preliminary interpretation of the 
texts, codes were classified. Various field notes written during the observation and interaction 
with the participants were used to facilitate the recreation of the context in which statements 
were  made,  relating  to  specific  issues  within  the  research.  This  process  is  known  as 
immersion in the data (Van Manen, 1997) 
The researcher at this point was engaged with the reading and re-reading of every interview 
transcript, and some case references being made to the original recording, so that individual 
interviews were well understood by the researcher. From the combination of transcripts, field 
notes and other memos, each interview transcript was classified and similar transcripts were 
collated.  
Stage two: Identifying first order constructs 
The microscopic examination was the first step in the free coding process used to create 
initial codes for comparisons. During the free coding - "data was broken down into discrete 
parts,  closely  examined,  and  compared  for  similarities  and  differences"  (Strauss  et  al., 
1998:102).  The use of line by line coding enhanced the systematic translation of concept in 
this study (Fisher et al., 2006). This is often referred to as one of the key tasks in the synthesis 
of qualitative research. The iterative process of data collection, coding and analysis gave new 
insights to the research, thus tremendously assisting the formulation of new questions for 
subsequent interviews and easily indicating the most appropriate informants.  
During the reading, segments of the data that correspond to the a priori themes were coded. 
Where there was  no  a  priori  codes  coverage for a relevant  data code, new themes  were 
defined to represent the code and these were organised in the initial template. The series of 
interviews  were  coded  into  the  initial  template,  until  the  final  theme  was  defined.  The   72 
template became the basis for the researcher’s interpretation or illumination of the data set. 
These sets of analysis were identified as the first construct. Appendix (II) highlights the data 
analysis and the evolving constructs for this study. 
The first order constructs were totally the participants’ ideas, expressed in their own words or 
phrases,  and  were  used  to  explain  their  knowledge  or  experience  of  the  concepts  being 
captured  in  the  research.  It  reflected  the  precise  detail  of  what  that  person  was  saying 
(Titchen and McIntyre, 1993). The first order constructs were made up of responses given by 
the participants to  the  research questions  about the effect  of FT status in  the NHS.  The 
constructs  were  identified  for  all  participants  in  the  research,  with  a  constant  process  of 
checking for appropriateness and completeness of these constructs.  
Stage three: Identifying second order constructs and grouping into themes  
Following  the  identification  of  the  first  order  constructs,  the  researchers’  theoretical  and 
personal  knowledge  was  layered  on  this  constructs,  so  as  to  generate  the  second  order 
constructs. This process is known as the abstractions of the first order construct. The data 
stored in the first order was migrated into the second order, as themes and sub themes were 
being derived.  In  a number of  cases, similar first  order  constructs  were merged into the 
second order and dissimilar themes were left as stand-alone as a second order construct.  
The use of Nvivo, again in this phase allowed for a comparison of construction within an 
inter-organisational framework. Lines of the same codes that were classified as themes and 
sub themes were compared across the three case studies. This comparison was a check to 
understand the variations and similarities in practice within the case studies.  
The interpretation process started with the analysis of each interview transcript, with a view 
to  presenting  a  representation  of  participants’  data  as  a  whole,  which  then  informed  the 
understanding of each transcript, thereby presenting a richer, deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon. By the completion of the third stage, all relevant text data was grouped under 
their relevant constructs, providing answers to the research questions. 
After analysing the entire interview transcript, a total of 376 free codes were generated. The 
first set of interviews collected between 2009 -2010 (42 interviews), then in order to re-
confirm  and  obtain  further  assurance  on  the  code  generated  from  this  data,  13  further 
interviews were conducted in 2012, thereby making a total of 55 interviews.  From the 376 
free  codes,  17  themes  were  generated,  which  represented  the  first  order  construct.  As 
mentioned above, these codes were grouped and organized into a trees pattern with the use of   73 
the Nvivo. In order to re-confirm and obtain further assurance on the themes generated from 
this  data,  13  further  interviews  were  conducted  in  2012,  thereby  making  a  total  of  55 
interviews. By overlaying the theoretical stance and other data obtained on the first construct, 
the codes were conceptualised in the light of institutional theory, which was a higher level of 
conceptual  abstraction.  This  process  resulted  in  10  main  themes  after  re-assembling  the 
information  found  in  each  code  property;  thereby  the  second  construct  of  the  study  was 
established. 
Stage four: Data Synthesis and Theme Development 
The various themes from the first to the third stage of analysis were put together. The second 
order construct was linked to the first order relationship, thereby presenting the themes and 
the sub themes relationship (Parent/Child link). This phase built further on the elaboration of 
the themes, to ensure a clarification of the relationship. In this instance each sub theme was 
compared with the parent theme to ensure that the classification fitted with the meanings 
drawn from the data. This process involved reading and re-reading each element of the main 
data text, comparison with memos and validation with other studies. The process of moving 
through the data back and forth gave a clearer insight into the implementation of the FT 
status; thereby meanings were enhanced from various actors’ interpretations and perceptions 
of the FT phenomenon. 
Stage five: Enlightening and elaborating the phenomenon 
The full explanation of this stage of the analysis is provided in chapter 8. This is the final 
stage of the data analysis, which leads to the research narrative. It establishes a link between 
the literatures, and the themes and sub-themes identified in this research. At this stage, using 
institutional theory as a lens, a link was established between the main themes and the theory. 
The main themes were also examined critically in order to develop or extend the theory. 
The articulation of the themes, sub-themes, and their interrelationships formed a basis for 
constructing the experience of participants interviewed in the various NHS  organisations, 
starting  from  their  precise  words  and  expression  of  their  opinions  on  the  role  of  FT 
implementation in their organisations to the creation of a narrative on the subject. 
4.5  Data Validity and Reliability 
Data validity in  research involves  the  formation of suitable operational  measures for the 
concepts being investigated (Emory and Cooper, 1991). While the term data reliability is   74 
commonly  used  for  testing  in  quantitative  research,  it  is  also  applicable  in  qualitative 
research, as it is a unit that tests the quality or trustworthiness of a research. The two factors – 
validity and reliability - are essential in the design of any qualitative research. This is further 
extended to the role it plays not only in the analysis of a research, but also in the judgement 
of the result quality. 
The research design strategy adopted for this study obtained information from participants 
through  interview  on  a  one  by  one  basis.  The  objective  was  to  access  each  individual’s 
perceptions  and  experiences  of  the  FT  reform  and  its  implementation  model  in  their 
organisation. The validity and reliability test of the methods adopted in data gathering was 
put through a number of rigours during the interview. Some of these tactics were built into 
the interview questions. Firstly, there was the triangulation of the actors’ responses, so that 
two or more carefully worded questions, which addressed the same subject were put to the 
interviewees from a different perspective each time. Secondly, some of the questions were 
asked in such a way, as to engage the construct of the interviewee in clear terms. This was in 
situations, where the interviewer makes an attempt to disprove emerging explanations. 
The third method of triangulation adopted in the interview was the comparison of responses 
to questions within the same organisational hierarchy. The same questions answered by the 
members of staff at senior management level were compared with responses from middle and 
lower management staff. This helped to facilitate the evaluation of trustworthiness of the 
responses received. Finally, this study also used diverse methods of evaluation, with sources 
ranging  from  individual  organisation  documentations  to  policy  papers  released  by  the 
controlling organisations such as the Department of Health, Monitor and Care and Quality 
Commission. By using different sources in the evaluation process, the appraisal was able to 
build on the strength of each type of data collected and minimised the weaknesses of any 
single source. In the process of evaluation, the researcher was mindful that the approach to 
evaluation was capable of increasing both the validity and reliability of data, and it may also 
lead evaluators to modify or expand the evaluation design and/or the data collection methods 
(Patton, 1990).  
The  findings  of  the  research  were  constantly  compared  with  the  pre-data  analysis 
assumptions, which was the basis of template analysis design shown in Appendix (II). This 
was  done  to  tease  out  any  bias  developed  either  from  the  literature  or  the  researcher’s 
personal  experience;  this  process  enhanced  the  authenticity  of  the  research  (Lincoln  and   75 
Guba, 1985). The rigorous checking of the interpretation with the original transcripts also 
helped to maintain closeness to the participant’s construct.  
4.6  Summary 
This chapter presented an elaborate discussion of the research methodology adopted for this 
study. It elucidated on a number of empirical studies, while building on the nature of the 
phenomenon under study, to justify the use of an interpretive approach for understanding 
accounting innovation in the NHS.  Challenges posed by this accounting innovation, wholly 
suggested the use of interpretive paradigm  for  the study.  The chapter  also  explained the 
process of data collection, the data type and how the data was analysed. Three main data 
collection  techniques  were  used,  which  included  document  analysis,  interviews  and 
observation. The analysis  of data obtained was  supported by the use of Nvivo software, 
adopting the Crabtree and Miller (1999) template analysis process. The next chapter is set to 
describe the research sites in detail, and to project the NHS environment and its relevance to 
the  methodology  adopted  in  this  study,  thereby  giving  a  superior  insight  into  the 
organisational form.   76 
Chapter Five 
Research Site Profile 
5.0  Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research sites, tracing the linkage between the UK 
government and the structure of the NHS within the control of the government. It also unveils 
that part of the NHS that is being transposed into the Foundation regime; noting that the FT 
Hospitals used as case studies in this research emanated from the same NHS structure. These 
FTs were licensed to stand as independent hospitals outside the control of the Secretary of 
State. However, they are still relevant to the body of events in the entire NHS, and, therefore, 
this chapter shows the various connections between the regulators, the NHS organisations 
and entire UK government system, starting from the apex structure of government through to 
the  individual  organisations  that  make  up  the  NHS.  This  chapter  also  considers  the 
introduction of FT within the governance network, highlighting controversies raised by the 
FT concept from several quarters, namely the political parties, the politicians, staff union 
bodies  and  many  others.  The  objective  of  this  chapter  is  to  describe  the  establishment 
pathway  of  the  FT  organisations,  and  the  regulatory,  financial  and  political  environment 
within which it operate.  
5.1  An Overview of the NHS within the UK Government  
The NHS was established in 1948. The vision of the NHS was to provide a comprehensive 
health service targeted at improving the physical and mental health of the nation through the 
prevention, diagnosis  and treatment  of illness.   At the time of establishing the NHS,  the 
vision was “to make all types of health services available to every man, woman and child in 
the population, irrespective of their age or where they live, or how much money they have; 
and to make the total cost of the service a charge on the national income in the same way as 
the Defence Services and other national necessities”. The NHS vision has not changed since 
its inception, given that the organisation is funded exclusively from national taxation of the 
citizens.  
The NHS is a major organisation in terms of prominence and function; it is under the control 
of the UK central government. The government system is arranged into two separate houses, 
namely the House of Commons, which is responsible for the parliamentary function of the 
country, and the House of Lords, which is responsible for the making of laws. The NHS is 
directly responsible to the House of Commons, under the supervision of the Secretary of   77 
State (SOS) for Health, as shown in the diagram below. The role of the Secretary of State 
within  the  UK  parliament  is  a  crucial  one  and  it  is  further  explained  in  the  next  few 
paragraphs. 
 
Figure 5- Simplified Structure of UK Government 
5.1.1  Parliament 
The Parliament in Westminster is responsible for passing all the primary legislation (Acts of 
Parliament)  for  the  health  services  in  England  and  Wales,  it  is  also  charged  with  the 
secondary legislations (Statutory Instruments) for England and Wales, which may be put 
forward to the house. 
The House is ever active in debates about NHS policies and innovations, as the NHS is 
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(eg.  For Health)   78 
Secretary of State for Health remains the Responsible Officer to render account to parliament 
for  all  activities  taking  place  in  the  NHS.  NHS  trusts  are  currently  managed  by  the 
Department  of  Health,  a  department  of  government,  which  is  directly  responsible  to  the 
Secretary of State for Health, with the exception of the NHS Foundation trusts. 
5.1.2  The Secretary of State for Health  
The Secretary of State for Health is a member of the Cabinet within the House of Commons, 
and has  the overall responsibility for the work  of the Department  of Health (DoH). The 
Secretary of State delegates responsibility for the NHS to the accounting officer within the 
DoH, who is accountable both to the Secretary of State and directly to Parliament. The same 
accountability  role  applies  to  Chief  Executives  of  the  Trust  Developmental  Authorities 
(TDA),  who  are  responsible  both  to  their  boards  and  through  the  accounting  officer  to 
Parliament. The responsibility of the accounting officer covers the investment and regulation 
of public finances within the NHS, which includes ensuring that a proper account is kept of 
the finances of the NHS, a prudent and economical administration of finance to avoid waste 
and extravagance, the efficient and effective use of all the resources, and effective delivery of 
a safe clinical service to the public.  
 
Figure 6- Future Structure of the NHS – The Guardian, (2011)   79 
The organisational structure of the NHS has changed repeatedly over the last 60 years, owing 
to the prevalence of reforms and restructuring within the sector, especially in the last two 
decades.   The  existing  structure  (shown  in  figure  seven)  is  still  undergoing  a  radical 
alteration, with the introduction of new reforms surrounding the closure of the Primary Care 
Trusts system, giving way to the introduction of the GP fund holding relationship. In this 
system, the General Practitioners are responsible for the commissioning of service to the 
secondary care units through the Clinical Commissioning Group as shown in figure six. 
5.1.3  The Department of Health  
The Department of Health was set up to support the government in improving the health and 
well-being of the citizens of the United Kingdom. This is done through the modernisation 
efforts  made  by  the  DOH  to  improve  the  standard  of  health  care  delivery.  The  DoH  is 
responsible for setting the national standards for health care services delivered by all NHS 
providers in the UK, it secure resources and make decisions about major investments to be 
undertaken by the NHS and social care, with the aim of ensuring that the outlets have the 
capacity to deliver such investments. The DoH also works with several partners within the 
NHS to foster a high quality service. It works with the Care Quality Commission to drive 
good clinical standards, with the Audit Commission for better accountability, and the SHA 
for effective control of the primary and secondary care units of the NHS. 
The Strategic Health Authorities (SHA) now known as the Trust Development Authorities 
(TDA) were responsible for the enactment of directives and implementing fiscal policy as 
dictated  by  the  Department  of  Health  at  their  individual  regional  level.  Each  SHA  is 
responsible  for  the  PCTs  and  Hospitals  domiciled  around  their  region.  The  SHA  was 
responsible for strategic supervision of services being delivered in their local patch 
The Department facilitates the internal reorganisation of the NHS, when market mechanisms 
were introduced to make a clear distinction between commissioning and provider branches 
within the UK healthcare system. There are a number of Special Health Authorities and other 
bodies, which are either part of the NHS or closely associated with it. They include the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), the Health Protection Agency (HPA) and 
the Prescription Pricing Authority. These organisations are either accountable to the Secretary 
of  State,  or  have  formal  agreements  with  the Department  of  Health.  In  general,  they  all 
provide national services.  

















5.1.4  Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) – Replaced by ‘Clinical Commissioning Groups’ 
The Primary Care Trusts became a commissioner of services with the introduction of market 
system in the NHS in 1991. The PCTs identify the services required within local regions in 
the UK and commission the clinical services through the Acute, Mental Health, Ambulance 
and Community Trusts, who are responsible for the delivery of services; while the PCT pay 
for  services  provided.  The  line  of  accountability  within  the  NHS  is  continuously  being 
transformed. The separation of roles within the NHS, demarcating those whose function is to 
purchase or commission  health care from  the providers,  is  rapidly  changing, while those 
whose function is to provide remains as it is, the commissioning role is being replaced with a 
GP fund-holding system.  This has opened the door for new providers, paving the way for the 
private sector organisations to become providers of NHS care.  
Figure 7- Simplified Structure of the NHS 
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With effect from April 2013, the PCTs ceased to operate; they have been replaced by a new 
body called the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG). With the introduction of the General 
Practitioner (GP) fundholding system in the NHS, where the responsibility of health care 
commissioning is now being led by the GPs, the CCGs became the umbrella body to house 
this  process;  they  are  clinically  led  groups,  which  include  all  of  the  GP  groups  in  their 
geographical area (See figure six). The aim of this is to give GPs and other clinicians the 
power to influence commissioning decisions for their patients, given their proximity to the 
patients. The CCGs are overseen by NHS England. The CCG structures manage the primary 
care commissioning in its entirety. 
5.1.5  Secondary Care Trusts (The Providers)  
The Secondary Care Trusts are the providers of the services commissioned by the CCGs. 
These providers include the acute, mental  health, community and ambulance trusts.  This 
research is focussed on these organisations within the NHS. The FT reform is mainly based 
on the operation of the provider trusts. Every provider organisation in England is expected to 
become a FT hospital by a new deadline given as March 2014. The provider organisations are 
represented in the shade of black in Figure seven above and also denoted as the providers in 
figure six, This is the aspect of the NHS primarily concerned or affected by the FT reform. 
The organisational structure below (figure eight) shows a typical structure of governance in a 
provider hospital setting. The organisations usually have a Chief Executive who is the head 
of the Executive board, and a Chairman who heads both the Executive and Non-executive 
board.  Each  member  of  the  Executive  and  Non-executive  boards  has  their  portfolio,  for 
which they are accountable. While the Executive members are responsible for the day to day 
operation of the organisation, they are also accountable to the Non- executive board, which 
oversees  other  areas  of  patients’  affair,  usually  in  committees  and  ensuring  that  the 
Executives remain accountable to the tax payers.  
Each member of the Executive team has a specific responsibility for one or more divisions of 
the organisation. For example, the Medical Director will usually be responsible for all the 
clinical areas of the organisation. In each of the divisions, there are personnel within the 
senior,  middle  and  junior  rankings.  In  the  medical  divisions,  there  are  the  Medical 
Consultants, Junior Doctors, Nurses, and other allied professionals, who are responsible for 
the core business of the organisation at the front end, where patients care role resides. The 
non-medical divisions, such as the Human Resources and Finance divisions, which composes   82 
of the Administrative, finance and other managerial expertise, who are responsible for the 
management of the organisation,. For the purpose of this research, staff were drawn from all 
ranks across the organisation to participate in this study. 
 
 
Figure 8- Simplified Structure of a typical NHS Acute organisation 
5.2  Brief Background of the Foundation Trust Hospitals 
The introduction of FT status did not gain acceptance in the NHS without a fair share of 
controversies; the reform attracted resistance within the NHS and also in government. To its 
proponents, the creation of FT is a relief for the organisation from the current onerous burden 
of government control over the NHS. To the detractors, it is an introduction of a two-tier 
service within the NHS, which is presumed to  damage the collaborative networks in the 
organisation (Lewis and Hinton, 2005). 
FT  Status  was  established  through  the  Health  and  Social  Care  (Community  Health  and 
Standards)  Bill  2003.  This  Bill  was  tagged  as  one  of  the  most  controversial  pieces  of 
legislation to come out of the government’s 10 year strategy for the NHS in England (Pollock 






































































































































































Executive Director   83 
abolishing the government’s control of the NHS. The effect of the Bill was far reaching - 
drafting recruitment into the FT system not only from the NHS system, but also from the 
private  sector,  as  private  sector  organisations  were  given  the  opportunity  to  become  FT 
hospitals.  
The Bill also appointed Monitor as an independent regulator, established to be at the helm of 
affairs  of  FT  hospitals.  Monitor  is  a  non-governmental  organisation,  in  charge  of  the 
authorisation or licensing of NHS hospitals, and accrediting the new status of FT to qualified 
organisations. The authorisation usually sets out the FT’s main objectives and the health 
services it must deliver, which is often referred to as their ‘terms of reference’. FTs are not 
allowed to operate outside of their terms of reference.  
Monitor reports directly to the Parliament and not the Secretary of State. Effectively, Monitor 
has  the  power  to  create  and  dissolve  FT  hospitals.  Powers  bestowed  on  Monitor  by  the 
legislation include – 
  Controls over the use and sale of public (former NHS) assets 
  Decisions about what NHS health services are required for the local population and 
whether they will be provided by the public or private sector 
  Control of the scale, nature, location, and duration of local health services delivered 
by FTs 
  Control of the scale of public and private provision 
  Control of trust dissolution and merger 
  Control of FT’s borrowing levels 
  Control over private patient income 
The operating framework for FTs differs markedly from the rest of the NHS.  The FTs are 
autonomous organisations, public benefit corporations, which are not subject to the directive 
of the Secretary of State, or the Trust Developmental Authority, being an independent not-
for-profit  public  benefit  corporation,  modelled  on  cooperative  societies  and  mutual 
organisations (Maltby, 2002). Unlike the NHS trusts, they have different financial duties and 
targets. There are several hurdles to be crossed by any aspiring NHS trust before becoming an 
FT, these being engendered in the application process.   84 
FT  applicants  are  subject  to  a  robust  assessment  of  their  finances,  where  they  must 
demonstrate their financial and clinical sustainability, possession of an astute board capacity 
and the capability to operate in a self-regulating environment.  
The NHS under the National Health Service Act 1977 requires the Secretary of State to 
promote a comprehensive, free, health service to improve the health of the people and to 
provide facilities, as he considers necessary, to meet all reasonable needs.  This same point 
was entrenched within Monitor’s role in the creation of FTs by Section (3) of the Health and 
Social  Care  (Community  Health  and  Standards)  Bill  2003.  The  Bill  requires  the  same 
measure of responsibility from Monitor to promote a comprehensive, free, health service to 
improve the health of the people in the most equitable manner. 
The Department of Health requires Monitor to operate a discrete statutory framework and not 
to replicate the Secretary of State’s existing powers of direction or have a role in performance 
management, but only to “take account of the interests of the wider NHS”. Following the 
authorisation  of  a  trust  to  become  a  Foundation  Trust,  some  powers  are  automatically 
conferred on the FT organisations, this include: 
  The right to trade in NHS and non-NHS services 
  To buy and sell land and assets and retain the proceeds 
  To create commercial arms or join existing commercial ventures 
  To subcontract clinical services to commercial companies 
  To borrow money from private lenders within a prudential borrowing regiment 
  That FTs have the right to request a lowering of its annual costs from the secretary of 
state, thereby exercising discretion when valuing the assets  that are transferred to 
them 
  To benefit from subsidies, loans, and grants from the secretary of state, including their 
NHS capital allocations for the next three years 
  To retain surpluses under the new national tariff system 
  To control boundary between the NHS and charged-for health and social care 
  To have the flexibility to direct or transfer staff into the private sector   85 
In the NHS, the allocation of property sale proceeds must be discussed and approved by the 
Trust Development Authority. This is not the case with FTs, as they operate independently, 
without any allegiance to the  TDA. It must be noted that the Bill does include a clause 
protecting former NHS properties. However, the power to alienate protected properties is 
now at the discretion of Monitor, and no longer the government or the Secretary of State. An 
FT can negotiate with its regulator to deregulate and sell protected property after their initial 
authorisation.  
FTs are allowed to form alliances and joint ventures with private sector companies in the 
provision of services, such as diagnostic services, especially where better expertise exists in 
the private sector. FTs can also sell such services to patients where those services are not 
available on the NHS, thereby the patients as private patients. The basis of private treatment 
is that FTs are allowed to generate income from private patients, although this was limited to 
a maximum threshold of 0.7% of the FT’s total income. The legislation provides that FTs will 
not be allowed to generate surpluses by increasing the proportion of their income that comes 
from private patients, this is the object of Section 15(1), which originally stated that: “An 
authorisation may restrict” health care provision for private patients.  
The wide range of financial freedoms given to FTs is expected to enable them to improve 
their financial management, efficiency and performance. Being FTs, they are expected to 
improve  their  business  planning  processes  and  to  develop  new  services,  invest  in 
infrastructure, improve waiting times, maintain standards of care, and invest in education and 
training (Health Matters Journal, 2007). FTs are required to meet national targets, as with 
other  trusts,  but  they  have  more  freedom  to  decide  how  these  standards  are  achieved 
(Department  of  Health,  2002).  The  government  clarified  that  FTs  will  not  be  subject  to 
performance management by the TDA; they will be locally accountable and responsive to 
their local healthcare needs. To facilitate their local responsibility FTs will have members 
drawn from local residents, patients and staff.  
NHS FTs were required to establish a board of governors, which was to be led by the trust 
Chairman.  The  Board  of  Governors  are  to  ensure  that  the  local  community  is  directly 
involved in the governance of the NHS FT. The board of governors represents an array of 
groups,  which  includes  service  users,  carers,  staff,  commissioners,  local  authorities,  the 
voluntary  sector,  the  general  public,  and  others.  The  board  of  governors  is  directly 
accountable to the members of the trust, ensuring that the FT organisation operates in a way 
that is compliant with its objects and terms of authorization.  The members are entitled to   86 
elect at least half of the constituents of the board of governors, who in turn will appoint a 
board of directors.  
5.2.1  Reasons for Rejection of FT reform 
At the inception, when the Foundation Trust model was proposed, the model was opposed by 
a number of bodies, including the British Medical Association (BMA). The BMA is the 
professional  organisation  established to look  after the professional  and personal  needs  of 
medical doctors in all branches of medicine all over the United Kingdom. The other body that 
was at the forefront of resistance to the reform was the Transport and General Workers Union 
(TGWU). 
Some of the major reasons for the rejection of the FT reform by these bodies were – 
1.  The  possibility  that  the  introduction  of  FT  may  lead  to  a  two  -tier  NHS,  where 
foundation hospitals would have greater access to resources and may also “poach” 
staff from non-foundation elements of the NHS, due to the ability to offer better rates 
of pay, above the nationally agreed terms and conditions.. 
2.  Staff and funding may flow to the foundation hospitals, choking off resources to the 
remaining NHS hospitals. The remainder of the NHS would struggle to cope with 
diminished resources  and may never be able to attain the star rating necessary to 
acquire Foundation status, thus spiralling into decline.  
3.  Funding to support Foundation status would come out of the central department of 
health budget, thus shrinking the resource pool for those hospitals that cannot attain 
this status, especially when organisations outside the NHS, such as the private sector 
begins to apply for FT status 
4.  Foundation hospitals  would  threaten national  pay  agreements.  There would  be no 
legislative requirement for Foundation Trusts to adhere to agenda for change, the pay 
plan brokered to address the chronic low pay in the Health Service.  
5.  Foundation hospitals may not increase choice or raise standards across the NHS. They 
may stimulate choice and internal competition, encourage diversity in the provision of 
care and decentralise power.  
6.  Foundation hospitals may have a strong interest in redefining care services as broadly 
as possible to encourage patients to top up care, paving the way for the eventual   87 
introduction  of  a  mixed  economy  of  health  payments  such  as  “co-payments”  or 
vouchers.  
7.  Foundation  hospitals  may  create  healthcare  ‘ghettoes’,  thereby  segmenting  care 
providers, as was seen in education sector (Schools) provision. As the most socially 
mobile families looked into the catchment areas of the highest-performing schools, so 
too would Foundation Trusts enshrine a postcode bias in healthcare.  
8.  The  government  suggested  that  all  hospitals  would  eventually  become  foundation 
hospitals, which may exacerbate the postcode bias, rather than having a mere handful 
of  hospitals  with  different  targets,  priorities,  rates  of  pay,  levels  of  service,  and 
standards of patient care, each and every hospital in England would become a stand-
alone, unaccountable, self-serving entity. This could lead to a multi-tiered NHS in 
which patient care and health outcomes become more fragmented and unequal.  
9.  Foundation  hospitals  would  rock  the  structure  of  the  National  Health  Service. 
Scotland and Wales have refused to adopt the proposals, leaving England to develop 
this model of a mixed economy in health care.  
10. The role of the Regulator, possibly the most powerful role in the health service, has 
not been properly defined and it raises many questions.  
Some  of  these  arguments  were  continuously  being  engaged  with  even  as  the  FT  reform 
continued to spread across the NHS, and many other adjustments are being made to the FT 
agenda in the course of implementation. 
5.3  The Process of Becoming a Foundation Hospital 
Theoretically, the FT process spans a period of six months from start to finish, in accordance 
with  the  Monitor’s  timetable.  However,  in  practice,  there  are  several  hurdles  for  Trusts 
aspiring to become a Foundation Trust organisation that makes this timescale impossible. 
Applicants are subject to a robust assessment of trust’s finance, clinical excellence and long 
term organisational sustainability. 
The primary motivation of NHS organisations to apply for FT status is because it was made a 
mandatory process for all trusts to acquire the status. In addition, there are benefits to the 
organisations, when they are able to achieve the status. 
Overall,  there  are  three  phases  in  the  journey  leading  to  the  authorisation  of  an  NHS 
organisation to become an FT Hospital. The three phases are –   88 
1.  The SHA-led Trust Development phase 
2.  The Secretary of State Support Phase 
3.  The Monitor Phase 










There is no rigid timetable to be followed in any of these phases; the successful completion of 
each phase is dependent on the level of organisation’s preparedness, which differs from one 
applicant to the other. 
5.3.1  The SHA-led Trust Development Phase 
This phase is a detailed part of the application process, where the TDA and the trust agree on 
a timetable, with an understanding of the process, between each other; both parties will also 
ascertain that there are no outstanding issues that could be an impediment to the application 
process. This phase also embodies the public consultation process, which takes a minimum of 
12 weeks. This is essentially a period where the trust consults with its local community to 
gain their support for the trust to apply for FT status.  
The Monitor guidance - ‘Applying for NHS FT Status’ (Monitor, 2004) highlighted some of 
the key requirements for a successful FT application as follows: 
  Governance – an organisation led by a capable, competent and proactive board with a 
clear focus, and supported by clear, robust and appropriate governance arrangements 
throughout the organisation. 
Figure 9- Pathway from Individual NHS to Foundation Trust Organisation (Monitor, 
2004) 
Figure 9- Pathway from Individual NHS to Foundation Trust Organisation (Monitor,2008) 
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  A board with a ‘shared agenda’, where corporate business is the business of everyone 
on the board. 
  A  clear  vision  and  strategy  based  on  the  engagement  and  involvement  of  key 
stakeholders and translated into a robust, realistic and credible integrated business 
plan (supported by sound business-focused governance arrangements to ensure clear 
accountability for delivery of specific objectives). 
  A  strong  business-focused  relationship  with  commissioners  underpinned  by  clear 
agenda 
  A well-articulated and coherent description of how the NHS organisation will move 
from the present to the future. 
  A clear translation of the business plan into a deliverable financial strategy;  
  Robust internal systems and processes relating to governance, project management, 
resourcing, monitoring and delivery. 
  A good track record of delivering plans such as cost improvement and efficiency 
programmes. 
  A good track record of delivering healthcare targets and national core standards; 
  A  strong  track  record  of  financial  performance  supported  by  robust  governance 
arrangements and internal controls. 
  A ‘fit for purpose’ finance function, which understands the requirements of being an 
NHS FT. 
The SHA-led Trust Development Phase requires the TDA, to work in partnership with the 
applicant trust, to help them develop specific areas of operation, which will build the trust’s 
readiness for assessment at the second and third phases. These areas include the development 
of an integrated business plan, which will show the strategy and understanding of the trust of 
its environment.  It also  demonstrates the trust’s survival strategy in the FT environment, 
financially  and  operationally.  The  TDA  works  with  the  trust  to  build  a  sustainable 
governance framework that demonstrates strong leadership skills, a coherent strategy and a 
commitment to present a better service to the service users. One of the major outcomes of this 
phase is the production of the trust’s long term financial model (LTFM), which will show the 
prior three year historical account of the trust, the current year outturn and the Five-year   90 
future  forecast.  Where  the  organisation  has  an  on-going  public  finance  initiative  (PFI) 
project, they must produce a Ten-year future forecast. 
At this phase, the trust must also show that they have the full support of all stakeholders in 
their constituency; this includes the commissioners, the  public, and staff supporting their 
aspiration in becoming an FT. The TDA also work with the trust to undertake an independent 
historical due diligence (HDD). The HDD is usually carried out by an independent firm of 
accountant, who scrutinise the financial and governance records of the trust, to provide an 
assurance to the TDA of their robustness. The HDD also investigates the trust’s financial 
reporting procedures to ensure that they meet the minimum requirement. 
After the above process has been successfully undertaken, the trust will be in a position to 
make a formal application to the Secretary of State with the support of the TDA. It is the 
responsibility of the TDAs to compile all the evidence necessary to demonstrate the trust’s 
readiness for FT authorisation and present the organisation for the next phase. 
5.3.2  The Secretary of State Support Phase 
Following the successful  completion of the SHA led phase, the applicant  must submit a 
formal application to the Department of Health to secure the support of the Secretary of State 
to  move  forward  to  Monitor’s  assessment  phase.  The  formal  application  includes  the 
following documentation – 
  An Integrated business plan; 
  A Long-term financial model in excel format; 
  The Governance rationale; 
  A Draft constitution; 
  The Consultation response and staff engagement; and 
  The Membership strategy 
The  TDA’s  support  must  be  added  to  the  trust’s  application  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 
Therefore, the TDA board, or the TDA provider development board, if appropriate authority 
has been delegated to this body, will complete a high-level summary and an TDA support 
form for each application made. This will be submitted along with a covering letter of support 
from the TDA Chair and Chief Executive or TDA board   91 
The Application Committee receives the application along with the TDA support form and 
covering documentation; this will be the basis of discussion at the Department of Health. The 
Application Committee is a team of senior officials of the Department of Health who advise 
the Secretary of State on issues relating to NHS FT applications. The recommendation made 
by the Application Committee is based on the support of the TDA as declared by the TDA. 
After the satisfaction of the Application Committee, recommendation will be made to the 
Secretary of State in support of the trust’s application. 
The Secretary of State’s support is not an automatic guarantee that the trust will become an 
NHS FT, as the trust must go through the final phase, which is the Monitor assessment phase. 
5.3.3  Monitor Phase 
Once an applicant has secured the support of the Secretary of State, it can formally proceed to 
the Monitor’s phase. At this stage the trust will be allocated to a Monitor Assessment team, 
which includes a senior assessment manager. The team spends some of its time visiting the 
trust,  conducting  interviews  and  undertaking  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  trust’s 
processes. 
As soon as the applicant trust recognizes that the Secretary of State support is forthcoming 
and an application for authorisation will be made to Monitor, it may establish the initial 
membership and hold elections for the appointment of Governors. The assessment process 
includes the ‘board-to-board challenge’, after which a decision is reached by the Monitor 
board on the trust’s eligibility for the status. 
The process of authorisation is usually followed by the issuing of Terms of Authorisation 
determined  by  Monitor.  The  Terms  of  Authorisation  set  out  the  conditions  on  which 
authorisation is granted and with which the FT organisation must comply. The conditions 
reflect both statutory obligations on NHS FTs and other obligations that Monitor considers 
appropriate. 
5.3.3.1 The Board-to-Board presentation 
The board-to-board is that part of the assessment process where trust is given the opportunity 
to present its business plan to Monitor’s board at a meeting. This meeting is usually held 
midway through the assessment period. 
The forum usually is composed of the trust  executive and non-executive board members 
meeting with Monitor’s board, which seek clarification through questions and challenges to   92 
the application submitted by the trust, picking up issues identified through the assessment 
process. The trust board is required to give comprehensive answers and assurances regarding 
the issues raised by Monitor members.  
The meeting allows the Monitor board to assess the level of awareness of the trust board on 
vital business issues, such as the business risk and how the trust plans to manage or mitigate 
the risks. It also allows the Monitor board to evaluate the level of coherence in the trust 
board, both at the Executive and Non-executive level, identifying the skill mix and the level 
of board challenge, especially from the Non-executive members to the Executives. 
5.3.3.2 The decision process  
The Monitor assessment team drafts a paper summarising their findings from the assessment, 
which is presented to the Monitor board at the board decision meeting. This is the forum 
where the application will be formally considered for a decision by the Monitor’s board. For 
any application considered, the decision could result in only one of five decision criteria, 
which include: 
Authorisation – Where Monitor authorises a trust, the trust will be formally notified with its 
terms of authorisation, and henceforth continue to operate its business as a foundation trust 
hospital. 
Deferral – In cases where a deferral decision is conveyed by Monitor’s board, it means that 
there are outstanding issues, which are capable of being resolved within a reasonable period 
of time. Monitor will expressly clarify these issues and give clear guidance to the Trust about 
matters  requiring  attention.  Deferred  trusts  are  not  required  to  begin  the  FT  application 
process from the start. 
Rejection - If an application is rejected, the trust will be formally notified. Unlike in the case 
of a deferred trust, if a rejected trust wishes to reapply for authorisation as an FT, it will have 
to restart the application process from phase one. 
The trust also has the right to either postpone or withdraw its application prior to Monitor’s 
authorisation decision. 
Postponement – The applicant can apply for a postponement to Monitor, where it perceives 
that there are issues  during the assessment process,  which it needs  to  resolve before the 
assessment  decision  is  reached.  Monitor  will  have  to  appraise  the  application  for 
postponement on a case by case basis to decide either to accept or reject the application.   93 
When accepted, the trust will not be required to seek the Secretary of State’s support for the 
second time. 
Withdrawal – A withdrawal of application can be originated by the applicant, when the 
applicant trust expressly requests that its application be withdrawn. Monitor can also deem an 
application withdrawn, when the trust does not reactivate its application within the timeframe 
for which a deferral has been allowed. Withdrawn applications cannot be activated at a future 
date; the applicant must restart the process from the phase one if the applicant wishes to re-
apply for authorisation in the future. 
5.4  Why is assessment important? 
Generally, Monitor’s approach to regulation is one of Risk Management (Monitor, 2004). 
Monitor must be assured and confident about the trust’s capability and must also be able to 
provide  assurance  to  parliament  and  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders  that  FTs  are  legally 
constituted, financially sustainable, effectively governed and locally represented. These are 
essential requirements for FTs to be able to operate with sufficient autonomy, delivering 
national health priorities and increasingly responsive to local needs. Careful assessment of 
trusts is undertaken by Monitor to ensure that only financially sustainable FTs with strong 
management are authorised to carry out business as FTs. This helps Monitor to guarantee 
minimal intervention and a robust healthcare system.  
There are a number of criteria to be fulfilled by the trust for it to become authorised by 
Monitor as an FT Hospital, an applicant will need to demonstrate that they are: 
  Legally constituted 
  Well governed 
  Financially viable 
This means applicants must: 
  Ensure their constitution conforms with the act and is otherwise appropriate 
  Ensure the provision of mandatory services in the business plan and that the applicant 
can and will comply with the terms of the license 
  Make governance proposals, which provide a representative and complete governance 
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  Provide board certification that the applicant has the organisational capacity to deliver 
the business Plan; 
  Provide a board statement, which confirms sufficient working capital for the next 12 
months and is accompanied by the appropriate professional opinion on this statement; 
  Provide board certification that financial reporting procedures are satisfactory and that 
this is based on an appropriate professional opinion 
  Make the trust board to demonstrate that it is capable to generate a sustainable net 
income surplus by year three of the projected period and maintain a reasonable cash 
position; 
  Have a minimum financial risk rating of 3 within the first year of projections unless 
there are exceptional circumstances 
Since the establishment of Monitor in January 2004, the number of NHS hospitals licensed as 
FT organisations has increased each year. By 31 March 2005, there were 25 NHS FTs, by 31 
March 2006, there were 32 NHS FTs; by 31 March 2007, there were 59 NHS FTs, by 31 
March 2008, there were 89 NHS FTs, by 31 March 2010: 129 NHS FTs, by 31 March 2011: 
136 NHS FTs and by 31 March 2012: 144 NHS FTs. The number currently stands at 147 
NHS FT as at December 2013. 
5.5.0  The Foundation Trust (FT) Initiative in brief 
The introduction of Foundation Trust status into the NHS was a part of the government’s ten-
year plan to reform the NHS. In the government’s publication ‘Delivering the NHS Plan, 
(2000)’, it was revealed that Foundation Hospitals would possess greater freedom than any 
other hospitals, as they would be able to operate outside Central government’s control. The 
document also emphasised that foundation hospitals would be drawn from the ranks of the 
best performing NHS hospitals (those achieving 3 stars on the performance indicators). They 
would still be part and parcel of the NHS, but with a greater independence and freedom to 
develop  their  board  and  governance  structures  to  ensure  more  effective  involvement  of 
patients, staff, the local community and other key stakeholders’ (Department of Health, 2002: 
30). The FT model displayed a hybrid of the two accountability arrangements as seen in 
continental Europe - namely, local not-for-profit foundations (such as in Netherlands and 
Belgium)  and  elected  Local  Health  boards  (seen  in  several  Scandinavian  countries).  The 
Department of Health outlined the governance structure of the FT hospitals, when it stated   95 
the eligibility criteria for potential applicants. One of the major objectives of the FT concept 
was the involvement of all stakeholders. The document states that NHS FTs will operate a 
type of governance arrangement that gives local stakeholders – staff, patients, people in the 
local community, and partner organisations such as Primary Care Trusts and local authorities 
–  a  real  opportunity  to  influence  the  overall  stewardship  of  that  trust  and  its  strategic 
development.  
The FT reform was expected to set up a clear arrangement, for better community involvement 
in the running of an NHS organisation, than what currently prevails. Membership of the 
board was to be determined locally rather than nationally. (Department of Health 2002:6). 
The  Health  and  Social  Care  Bill  2012  iterated  the  legislative  proposal  regarding  the 
establishment  of  FT  hospitals.  The  bill  gave  new  financial  powers  to  the  FTs.  This  Bill 
described  foundation  hospitals  as  a  public  benefit  corporation.  Schedule  1  of  the  Bill 
highlighted the different interests that must be represented in the governance structure of 
these  hospitals.  The  Bill  enumerated  the  detail  of  how  appointments  must  be  made,  for 
instance, and that more than half of the board members were to be elected by local residents. 
A  minimum  of  one  member  was  to  be  elected  by  the  staff  constituency  and,  if  the 
corporation’s hospital had an arm of a medical or dental school, at least one member must be 
appointed by the university. In addition, at least one member must be appointed by the major 
CCG to which the foundation hospitals provides services.  
The  government  had  two  fundamental  aims  when  introducing  the  change,  firstly  was  to 
democratise the FT hospitals and secondly was to decentralise its (government’s) chain of 
control. The objective, from the government’s rhetoric was to create a patient-led NHS. The 
government stated that this move was targeted at devolving decision making away from a 
centralised NHS to local communities, which should generally lead to a more responsive 
health service through local accountability. 
5.5.1  Risk Rating Regime in Foundation Trusts  
The FT Hospitals unlike the NHS are not directly performance managed by the Department 
of Health through the Trust Development Authority. They remain accountable to their local 
communities,  commissioners  through  contract,  and  ultimately  to  Monitor  as  a  regulator 
(Monitor,  2008).  Monitor  uses  a  risk-based  approach  to  regulate  the  FTs,  whereby  the 
hospital  board  is  held  accountable  for  the  early  identification  and  effective  resolution  of 
financial and governance issues.    96 
The risk rating system, even though it sounds similar to the NHS star rating system, as in 
both systems, organisations are often penalised by the withdrawal of their autonomy while 
the super performers were allowed to gain financial freedom (Agrizzi, 2008), however the 
methodology of determining the rating is different one from the other.  
Governance and Financial Risk Ratings are awarded by Monitor to each FT hospital; this 
describes the level of risk and opportunities anticipated for that trust. While the publication of 
risk rating remains the assessment style used by Monitor, the merger of the Health Care 
Commission that led to the creation of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) means that the 
CQC is now responsible for the assessment of the quality of health delivery, and as with the 
star rated award approach being used in the NHS, the same model has been adopted by the 
FTs for performance management. Monitor publishes three types of risk ratings for each NHS 
FT: 
Financial  Risk  Rating:  This  risk  rating  is  allocated  using  a  scorecard,  which  compares 
financial metrics consistently across the FT network. The rating runs from one to five (1-5), 
where (1) represents the highest risk and (5) the lowest. The highest risk means that there is 
the likelihood of a financial breach of the terms of authorisation in less than 12 months, if 
urgent steps are not taken, to ensure remedial action. A trust is awarded a medium rate risk, if 
there is a significant concern that the trust is likely to breach its terms of authorisation in the 
medium term, say between 12 and 18 months. The lowest risk is awarded if there are no 
regulatory concerns about the trust breaching any of its terms of authorisation. 
Governance Risk Rating: the governance risk rating considers a number of factors, which 
include: FT compliance with their constitution, growing and maintaining a representative 
membership, maintaining appropriate board structures, cooperating with other NHS bodies, 
risk management, service performance, and improvement in clinical quality (Monitor, 2008). 
The risk rating is presented in colour codes, red, amber and green, where red represents a 
high risk category conveying a significant breach of authorisation, amber is a moderate risk 
indicating that one or more aspects of governance is being breached and green means a low 
risk, indicating the governance arrangements comply with their terms of authorisation. 
Mandatory goods and services: This is also represented with colour codes, red, amber and 
green, where red represents a high risk category, amber is moderately risky and green means 
a low risk.   97 
5.6  Summary 
This chapter presented an overview of the government system in the United Kingdom and 
how the governmental structure links with the NHS structure. The chapter further showed a 
typical organisational chart of the NHS and the various strands of organisations that work 
together in health care delivery, with further elaboration on the antecedents of the reform. It 
presented the various processes required for the authorisation of NHS hospitals to operate as 
foundation hospitals, in line with the legislation that created the FT model. The next chapter 
presents the first product of the data analysis process, which is called the first construct data. 
This is the first output from the data analysis of interview transcripts obtained from the sites 
described above.    98 
Chapter Six 
Data Analysis and Coding Categories 
6.0  Introduction  
This chapter discusses the research codes, which emerged at the data coding and analysis 
phase of this study, part of which was described in chapter four. It illustrates the categories 
that evolved from the data analysis through the application of thematic analysis procedures. 
Thematic analysis refers to a search for cogent and relevant themes to materialise in the data 
analysis process, where  those themes are identified as being vital to the description of a 
phenomenon (Daly, Kellehear, and Gliksman, 1997). This chapter will often refer to the term 
‘free data’, which is similar to the ‘open category data’ in grounded theory. Free data is 
defined as concepts generated from data, which describes those phenomena that are important 
to participants (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The use of Thematic 
Synthesis in this research involves the identification of themes through “careful reading and 
re-reading  of  the  data”  (Rice  and  Ezzy,  1999:  258).  It  is  a  process  that  searches  for 
recognition of patterns within the data; the emerging themes are translated into the main 
categories for further analysis. This chapter provides the detail of the main categories derived 
from the data, as well as the interrelationships between the categories.  
6.1 The main categories 
The analysis of the interview transcripts discussed in chapter four resulted in 376 free codes, 
which were absorbed into  17 open  categories  as  shown in  the table  (3) below, this  was 
obtained through the use of template analysis and the Nvivo software, to form the first order 
construct. This was later streamlined into 9 main themes called the second order construct 
shown in the next chapter. The table below describes the first order construct as derived from 
the analysis.  
6.1.1  Establishment of rules and mandatory assessment framework 
The first inference relates to the start-point of the of the FT phenomenon, in the form of an 
enabling legislation. Becoming a Foundation Hospital requires that trusts align themselves 
with a number of rules, by seeking the FT status and to comply with the FT assessment 
criteria.  The  assessment  process  includes  the  completion  of  a  mandatory  Long  Term 
Financial Model (LTFM), which gives a detailed view of the  trust’s financial plan for a 
minimum  of  five  years  and  a  draft  integrated  business  plan,  which  enumerates  the   99 
organisation’s strategy, governance and the tactics through which the trust would achieve its 
financial plan shown in the LTFM. Other parts of the process include public consultation, 
Governor’s board membership elections and organisational self-assessment. 
 
Table 3- List of open code categories 
6.1.1  Establishment of rules and mandatory assessment framework 
6.1.2  Accounting Identified as a Major driver for Accountability 
6.1.3  Risk Assessment in Service development 
6.1.4  Motivation for FT adoption 
6.1.5  Potency of FT tool in Trusts 
6.1.6  FT in the light of NHS political context 
6.1.7  Trust’s readiness for the adoption of FT for Survival 
6.1.8  Divisional reorganisation and re-shuffle 
6.1.9  Strengthening staff quality at board level 
6.1.10  Staff redundancies as Trust journeys to FT 
6.1.11  Board Training ahead of B2B 
6.1.12  Internal powers and Actor’s perception 
6.1.13  Communication and Interaction at board level 
6.1.14  Inclusion of the Public in the Trust Board 
6.1.15  Attaining FT status as a Badge of Honour 
6.1.16  Creation of Two-Tier NHS 
6.1.17  Protection of Core Services from FT reform 
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The participants generally showed an awareness of the FT concept. Interestingly, the majority 
of the participants could not wait to quickly add that the government forced the organisations 
into the adoption of FT, and they were also upfront about the potential benefits that accrue to 
the trust, when it becomes a Foundation hospital.  The central question was ‘why did the 
organisation appear contented with applying to become an FT in spite of the pressure they 
felt? Some of the responses given are listed in the quotes below -  
[…] Yes, I think it is important for the trust, because if we don’t become a FT we 
could be shut down, acquired or absorbed. It is about existence and you won’t survive 
if you are not an FT so, in a way, it is the only game in town (no choice)’ […] - 
(Workforce Director -Trust B) 
 […] I think there is also a second reason - we don’t actually have an alternative. The 
Government has said that all trusts are going to become FTs, and as a result of that, 
this  is  something  that  we  absolutely  have  to  do’.[…]    -  (Asst  Director, 
Stratetegy/Planning, Trust A) 
 […] I suppose the primary reason is because we’ve got to or it’s expected […] - 
(Dep. Director of Finance, Trust A) 
 […] It is the Government policy that we have to […] (Chief Executive, Trust B) 
Respondents also mentioned that FT adoption by its nature did not give any alternative to the 
trusts. This was a sore point for some participants, and they referred to it as a ‘straight jacket’ 
process, while some called it ‘a one-size fits all reform’. Some of the comments were:  
[…] It is the national direction for all trusts to become foundation hospitals where 
they can achieve it […] (FT Director, Trust A) 
 […] The only reason for putting a formal application in is because we have been 
pushed to do it by Policy, both national and regional policy. In terms of if we had a 
choice, I suspect the trust wouldn’t have applied but maybe we would have wanted to 
bring some of the techniques, the controls, and the methodology employed to run a FT 
into a non FT situation. So the actual pure application for FT is just to respond to 
policy and because we are led on by Strategic Health Authority […] (Asst Director, 
Strategy/Planning, Trust B)   101 
 […] I think it’s probably the pressure on the organisation to aspire to become FT. 
And because of the freedom the FT offers, I think that’s the driving force […] -(Asst 
Director, Human Resources, Trust A) 
Some other participants expressed the fear that their  organisation’s failure to achieve FT 
status within the stipulated deadline, may lead to a take-over of the trust by other, stronger, 
organisations.  Some other participants  were  concerned about  the  way the  trust would be 
perceived by the community it serves, if it was unable to achieve FT status, inability to 
achieve the FT status taints the organisation as ineffective and not fit for purpose by not only 
the regulators but also the community.  
6.1.2  Accounting Identified as the Main driver for Accountability 
The most popular element of the FT reform amongst participants was the completion of the 
Long  Term  Financial  Model  (LTFM).  While  it  was  agreed  to  be  a  major  driver  of  FT 
assessment process, this assessment model, designed by Monitor to test the financial viability 
and sustainability of the trust for a minimum of five years, was also found to be complex, too 
technical and unnecessarily detailed.  
Despite the complexity of the model, the majority of the participants found the FT assessment 
process to be a useful tool for planning and they were in support of it. Some reckoned that the 
LTFM reflected the type of planning required to effectively run a good organisation. Some 
other comments made include -  
[…] So, in terms of the regime from Monitor, I liked it and do like it because, it 
introduced a rigour as well as financial professionalism, which I guess, I had not 
really seen in my thirty plus years in the NHS, so I particularly liked that.  I felt that 
they were just sometimes un-bending and a little bit mono-focused on finance and we 
are more than just that. That is why most people come into the NHS, whether they are 
accountants, engineers or nurses, so I think there were, and are, some excellent things 
about the regime […] -(Director of Finance, Trust B) 
 […] Therefore, financial management gets even more of an increased focus, there’s 
even more of an emphasis on planning our affairs, organising, reporting, holding 
people to account and focusing on the basics of financial management.  I would say 
that FT status has really encouraged us to take a more disciplined approach to our 
financial management here […] - (Deputy CEO, Trust B)   102 
 […] I think it is good. I think the rigour of the financial and economic reporting is 
good. So, I think it means that  trust cannot get into a financial downward spiral 
without knowing anything about it. The LTFM model is much more transparent in 
that you can see your recurrent underlying position, whereas I think in other NHS 
trust  reporting,  you  can’t  necessarily  see  that.  I  like  the  benefit  of  not  having  to 
balance the books annually […] - (FT Director, Trust A) 
 […] I can only say from my experience of this trust pre-FT and post FT.  I think that 
the  difference  is  that  you  have  to  have  clarity  about  the  finances.  The  degree  of 
understanding about income and expenditure has to be very, very strong for a FT to 
survive […] - (Chief Nurse, Trust B) 
[…] I think it is absolutely essential to go through that process because at pre-FT 
many organisations worked in a historic public sector NHS way and I think what the 
FT status brings is a lot of financials that come in commerciality. Because you are 
bringing  in  autonomy,  you  are  able  to  manage  your  resources  more  effectively 
because you have control over it. Equally there are risks associated with that as well, 
and I think that having good regulation, which we do have via Monitor helps.  There 
have  been  some  blunders,  but  I  think  it  is  improving  and  that  is  due  to  early 
intervention […]. - (Chief Nurse, Trust A) 
 […] Now we monitor cash daily like all other serious commercial organisations do, 
which is what we need to do to ensure we can meet our obligations.  It has really 
sharpened up greatly […] - (Treasury Manager, Trust B) 
 […] Yes, again it came back to being quite explicit about what you are spending 
money on and why.  Maybe other FTs have that as well, but we have had to develop 
very good understanding and very good robust processes to defend the type of grades 
we employ in terms of the nursing skills mix, to understand exactly how many nurses 
we  need  to  give  the  care  that  the  patients  need  and  that  has  all  had  to  be  very 
transparent so that it can be reviewed, audited and understood by others who are not 
nurses […] - (Chief Nurse, Trust C) 
 […]  The  early  FTs,  certainly  the  first,  second,  possibly  third,  wave  FT  and  the 
Monitor  way  of  assessment,  I  would  suggest  was  90%  finance  based.  It  was  an 
organisation  headed  by  a  very  strong  and  forceful  individual,  the  first  eighteen 
months  or  so  it  was  almost  entirely  staffed  and  recruited  and  run  by  McKinseys   103 
consultants  and  introduced  American  financial  accreditation  assessment  models, 
purely  finance  and  numbers  driven  and  that  was  its  culture  […]  -  (Directorate 
Manager, Trust C) 
 […] There is far more emphasis on cash and the need for cash.  I mean cash as in 
working capital on the basis of being able to forecast as accurately as possible and 
the cash we are going to need in the short term and long term, and certainly up to the 
end of the financial year. Whereas, before it was necessary as a trust, but there is a 
lot more emphasis on more accurate recording as a FT. Plus with Monitor being 
involved as well and the returns have to be recorded […] - (Treasury Manager, Trust 
B) 
 […] There are several, but I think the most pressing thing is the requirement to be 
financially solvent; it is much more absolute in a FT than a non FT, so it promotes a 
more vigorous business culture. Having said that, it does not mean that finance is the 
first and foremost thing you do, and our trust’s top ten objectives have all the things 
to  do  with  patient  quality  care  at  the  top,  but  without  the  financial  structure 
underpinning we would not be able to deliver that.  For that reason, I think that the 
overriding knowledge that there is nowhere to turn for bail out if you don’t have the 
money to deliver the clinical services promotes a very intensive focus on financial 
matters […] - (Medical Director, Trust B) 
6.1.3  Risk Rating in Service developments and assessment 
Monitor’s  method  of  trust  assessment  is  based  on  ‘Risk  Analysis’.  Participants  in  this 
research asserted that the use of risk analysis in assessing their services and developments 
gave them a higher levels of confidence in their decision making process. This point further 
unveiled the use of accounting as a driver in the process of innovation uptake as the trusts 
were judged by Monitor against the risk profile. The trust also adopted the Monitor risk rating 
system as an evaluation benchmark for old services, and a decision basis for the development 
of new services. 
Accounting as a concept was further implicated in this study, as staff across the board, were 
increasingly required to undertake a comprehensive risk assessment to justify funding for any 
service  development  or  project  funding  requests  made  to  the  trust  board.  Some  of  the 
participants compared the new process of decision making in their organisation pre and post 
FT, and they made the following comments on that basis -   104 
[…] I would say we put in more risk analysis now, but before it would have been 
more short-term and less emphasis on the longer term.  We do a lot more scenario 
planning in terms of the future and more emphasis on two-year, three-year, four-year 
forecasting.  At  our  board  level,  and  even  at  levels  below,  we  are  always  doing 
horizon scanning […] - (Dep. Director of Finance, Trust B) 
[…] I think what I mentioned before about the carrot and stick, Monitor has ensured 
that  this  trust  in  particular  has  placed  much  effort  and  emphasis  on  really 
understanding  where  costs go and where income comes  from and …...[…]- (Div. 
Finance Manager, Trust B) 
 […]Yes in two ways. Firstly the fact that Monitor set their financial risk rating by 
reference to a comprehensive set of financial measures, it has really forced us to be 
very aware of this particular matrix, to ensure that when we plan, we plan to be a risk 
rating of no less than 4, and that drives us to ensure that all our financial plans are 
deliverable. Monitor has raised the profile of that aspect of risk […] - (Deputy CEO, 
Trust B) 
6.1.4  Motivation for FT adoption 
Most of the participants agreed that there were benefits for the organisation, if they achieved 
FT status, although a minority were argued that the FT is a momentary political strategy of 
the labour party, which would soon be abandoned by another government. This is because 
their experience in the organisation has shown that most of the innovations seen in the NHS 
were deemed good and necessary at its initial conception but later replaced by another party 
with  another seemingly lucrative  reform. Some participants  commented that some of the 
reform programmes abandoned by an earlier government regime for a particular reason or 
another  were  also  being  re-introduced  by  a  new  government  and  labelled  as  good  and 
effective, such is the case of GP fundholding system in England.  
Another line of argument made that evolved was about benefit of the FT reform to the later 
adopter. A few participants in Non-FT‘A’ argued that between the time that the FT status was 
introduced and their organisation’s uptake, most of the benefits that came with the status 
originally had been eroded. This is because the benefits only acted as an incentive for the 
early adopters of the status, most Non-FTs are now able to access some of the FT benefits . 
The following comments were made to support the organisation’s motivation for FT adoption 
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[…] I think the reasons to become FT have changed over time,, I think when people 
originally set out on the FT journey they received some financial benefits, but over the 
years they have been eroded as the financial regimes have merged or come together 
in some ways […] (Director of Finance, Trust A) 
 […] In my mind there are no real benefits, changes or differences in the financial 
regime of an NHS trust. FTs have some perceived benefits, they can borrow, have you 
found a FT that has borrowed other than from the Treasury? Because the Treasury 
rules are so tight they can’t go anywhere else.Tthey say FT can set their own wage 
rates, I understand there is  one FT  in  the country that has  set  its  own,  which is 
Southend. Can you tell me another benefit that a FT has got different to an NHS 
organisation? […] - (Dep. Director of Finance, Trust A) 
 […] I think the discipline of Foundation status was meant to be a good thing in itself. 
And it fits in with a lot of aspirations to become more business-like. And a lot of the 
stuff  that  Monitor  does,  the  way  they  approach  things  seems  to  be  much  more 
business-like,  much  more  structured  in  the  way  they  go  about  looking  at  an 
organisation. So, in fact it fits into our overall aspirations anyway […] - (Clinical 
Director, Trust A) 
 ‘[…]  it  gives  opportunities  in  term  of  financial  freedom,  working  in  a  more 
disciplined way within the Monitor financial framework as an  organisation […] - 
(Financial Accountant, Trust B) 
6.1.5  Effectiveness of the FT tool in Trusts 
Particularly in the non FT organisations, the FT framework was perceived to be a very useful 
tool that sharpened the work process  and the  organisational,  structure.  This  organisation, 
while  in  its  non  FT  state,  took  advantage  of  implementing  some  of  the  FT  financial 
techniques to refine its work process. For example, in addition to the FT assessment process, 
the organisation implemented the ‘Service Line Management’ (SLM), which is a tool used 
mostly by FTs, designed by Monitor and mandated for use in FT organisations only.  
Service Line Management is a tool that allows the organisation’s operations to be managed 
along its service lines. SLM was found to be more popular in the non-FT case study than FT 
status itself. Some staff within this organisation could not differentiate between SLM and FT 
status.  SLM  measures  the efficiency of services  along department/division/directorates in 
such a way that the organisation can easily know, which areas of their business are making a   106 
profit or a loss, again this shows the relevance of accounting as a tool for control in the FT 
environment. 
[…] I think FT is a good discipline because there are times when you know you need 
to do things and perhaps for some pressures it does not really happen when you are 
in the FT process, it ensures that you deliver on some of those things in a time and 
structured  way.  For  me,  the  whole  process  of FT  and  the things  you have  to  go 
through  is  good.  The  other  thing  is  that  it  really  tests  the  board  and  their 
understanding  in  terms of  the Executive and Non-Executive Directors.  It is  about 
saying actually, are these people fit to do the job? As CEO and accountable officer, I 
think it is also good to get an external scrutiny on some of those issues and it tests 
yourself as well […] - (Chief Executive Officer, Trust A) 
Notwithstanding the benefits perceived about FT status, some participants argued that FT 
status  did  not  bring  any  real  change  to  the  trusts  They  buttressed  their  point  by  citing 
examples of FT organisations that were currently undergoing financial and clinical crisis. 
These respondents also noted that the organisation’s successful compliance with the adoption 
of  FT, merely gave an external credibility to the organisation, and boosted the confidence of 
its staff and users, showing that the organisation was capable of conforming to government’s 
standards.  
6.1.6  FT status in the light of NHS political context  
As  mentioned  in  6.1.4  above,  the  FT  agenda  was  perceived  to  be  political.  The  general 
consensus was that the NHS remained a highly politicised organisation, frequently used by 
various governments to appeal to and to win over the electorates. Several reasons were given 
for this, ranging from the mounting deficit that characterised the NHS dating back to the 
2003/04 financial year, to the various reforms that led to the implementation of FT status. 
Participants stated that the Labour government had used the FT agenda to win the support of 
the public; in order to emphasise that the government is committed to providing an efficient 
healthcare system in England. Some other participants commented that the government used 
the FT agenda to keep the healthcare providers on their toes, with a view to fostering a better 
service delivery and a more efficient healthcare provision to the public, given the financial 
investment made since the labour government came into power. The participants also made 
the following comments -    107 
[…] I think that FT was introduced by the Labour government and there is a lot of 
political investment to ensure that FT is seen to be successful. I think there was a 
driver to actually devolve responsibility to the frontline. I think it is absolutely the 
right thing to do. Some of the early FTs probably benefit from the fact that there is a 
lot of political capital in FTs being seen to be a success and as a result of that some of 
the earlier FT got more benefits than might have otherwise been the case […] - (Dep. 
Director of Finance, Trust A) 
 […] Hmm. I think the government got spooked when we all made deficits, didn’t 
they? They did not like that - the NHS going into deficit. And so they wanted a system 
whereby  they  have  more  control  of  that.  They  also  wanted  to  at  least  energise 
autonomous organisations and get people in hospitals actually working in a much 
more commercial sense. By commercial what I mean is thinking about the patients 
because that is what we are here for, but it is also thinking about how you spend your 
money. How you get your investment right, how you meet local needs, I think there 
was a whole raft of issues where they needed to get the public much more with health 
care, because they weren’t winning the battle at that stage in terms of the public 
believing health was improving. So, I think it was one of those ways of getting a much 
more democratic hospital because that is what the Governors (elected to the board) 
were supposed to be. Local accountability, local democracy […] - (FT Director, Trust 
A) 
[…] I am fairly sure if I were a politician and looking at the ever mounting costs of 
the NHS, I would be looking at any way of controlling it and one thing I would be 
absolutely certain about is that if you make an  organisation a FT, that trust will 
control cost because that is the only way to survive […] - (Chief Nurse, Trust B) 
6.1.7  Trust’s uptake of FT for Survival 
The need to become an FT was linked to the survival of NHS organisations. This was an 
opinion expressed by the staff in the early adopter FT organisation, which adopted FT at the 
early stage of the crusade. This organisation is one of the highly rated NHS trusts in England, 
which was able to achieve FT status almost as soon as it was introduced within the first wave 
of authorisation.  
Actors  in  this  organisation  confirmed  that  FT  adoption  was  necessary  to  ensure  the 
organisation’s survival, however it was not the sole reason for their organisational success,   108 
but it had contributed to their success in some ways. Becoming a FT to them meant cutting 
the red-tape involved in decision making, to pave the way to faster decision-making process. 
In this organisation, the adoption of FT changed the face of the NHS for them; a number of 
the actors likened working in an FT environment to working in a private sector organisation. 
[…] From my perspective in the work that I do, what I do, attaining FT status is 
important because there is more empowerment for the individual trusts and they are 
able to do more with their money instead of being overseen by another organisation.  
It has enabled trusts to be more in control of their own funds and they can invest and 
do all sorts of things that couldn’t be done in the past. It has enabled trusts to become 
responsible  for  their  spending  because  they  have  gained  empowerment  […]  - 
(Treasury Manager, Trust C) 
[…] I can say that we are better off being a FT because it means we can react in a 
more individualistic way to situations without having to constantly go to departments 
and ask permission, but I don’t really feel that it’s impacting on me that much that I 
can give you truthful answer one way or another.   My gut feeling is that we’d be 
much better off being a FT, but if you ask me why, other than the ability to react as an 
organisation, say on an individual basis I couldn’t say more than that […](Treasury 
Manager, Trust B) 
 […] It is very much like working in the private sector.  It is much more a private 
sector viewpoint. Things such as our working capital are very important.  If we don’t 
get  our  income  we  cannot  meet  our  financial  obligations  […]  -  (Financial 
Accountant, Trust C) 
It must also be stressed that from the perspective of the non-FT case study, FT adoption was 
neither a major priority nor the key driver for its work process. The organisation struggles to 
meet some of its key financial and clinical targets. FT was seen as another change that needs 
to be made as a requirement to remain in business, they lived with the fear of non-compliance 
with the FT rules, which may lead to being taken over by a stronger organisation.  
Most of the participants believed that the organisation delayed applying for FT until a time 
they  could no longer put it off. Hence, they embarked on the process despite their non-
readiness. This was an expression from an Executive Director in the trust - 
[…] Well certainly there is the option to delay, because we are the king and queen of 
delaying, we have been to the altar more times than Elizabeth Taylor.  But I think that   109 
this is fast going to come to an end, however, from what I see there are 16-19 major 
Acute teaching trusts of which we are just one of them that actually are going to 
really struggle to meet the financial criteria laid down by Monitor […]. - (Director of 
Finance, Trust A) 
Comment from participants showed that the adoption of FT in this trust was to satisfy the 
desire of the stakeholders; this included the government and the local population, as they 
could query why the organisation was not an FT.  
[…] The reason to become FT - certainly the first is to link in with the public. We set 
off last year with a range of what we call big conversation, which is talking to the 
public and engaging with them so we can actually get that benefit without being an 
FT.  However, having been in an FT previously at De… and taking that one through 
to FT status I am afraid there is no substitute from getting out from under the SHA 
and DoH Radar […] - (Dep Director of Finance, Trust A) 
The actors flagged a number of issues, which were of higher priority to the organisation than 
FT status. These issues included the achievement of its target efficiency savings, meeting its 
year end surplus target, sorting out its Accident and Emergency targets, and so on. Given the 
choice-less nature of the FT reform, the management of the trust commented among other 
things, that the addition of the pursuit of FT status to their stretched targets puts a lot pressure 
on the organisation - 
[…] Because this organisation has got no option, it has to either apply to become an 
independent FT trust or it gets taken over by another organisation, and it’s very late 
in the process […]. - (FT Director, Trust A) 
 […] So I think the reasons for applying are now basically two, one is the link to the 
population we serve and trying to get some ownership and links out in the community; 
and the second one is to get some independence from the SHA to reduce some of the 
bureaucracy and the bureaucratic behaviour that we see operating from the DoH and 
the SHA […] - (Div. Finance Manager, Trust A) 
In the non-FT organisation some of the staff expressed concern for the trust’s non-readiness 
for FT rigours. They argued that a ‘good non-FT would be a good FT and a bad Non-FT will 
only be a bad FT, notwithstanding the pressure put on the organisation. Further comments 
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[…] I have not seen any change yet. When we will become a FT, I don’t know, I mean 
I think we are weak in finance, I think we’ve always been sort of financially focussed 
any way.  At the moment I’ve not seen any indication of readiness […] - (Head of 
creditor, Trust A) 
 […] The first and second wave of FTs, they were if you like…., maybe this is an 
unfair thing to say, but if you drew a distribution and I don’t know how you would 
rate it, saying good clinically, successful, vibrant, the organisation that you may want 
to work for, they are the good hospitals, compared to the ones, which are less good.  
They have pretty much, a much higher proportion of what I would have recognised as 
the good, well managed, ambitious hospitals with good managers, good clinicians, 
forward looking clinicians, people that want to link resources to clinical outcomes, 
wanted to understand their cost base, wanted to do things differently and better and 
they weren’t just prepared to wait and let things happen…...  So you have the better 
hospitals, becoming FT and they were the ones that would have been better, whether 
they were FT or not’ […]. - (Div. Finance Manager, Trust A) 
6.1.8  Divisional reorganisation and re-shuffle 
In order to become a FT hospital, trusts must satisfy the various criteria as set out by Monitor. 
First they must demonstrate that they have a well constituted board. This was judged by 
Monitor based on the skill mix and coherence among members of the board. The trust must 
also  show  that  it  is  capable  of  operating  within  the  basis  of  freedom  allowed  for  FTs. 
Opinions from the FT organisations revealed that there were a number of re-organisation 
programmes within the trusts, targeted to make the trusts fit into the structure required by 
Monitor for the purpose of attaining Foundation status. These steps are further discussed in 
6.1.9 and 6.1.10 below.  
Staff in the trust highlighted a number of steps taken by the organisation to comply with 
Monitor’s requirements -  
[…] Recently they (Management board) got rid of one division, so that changed how 
we send out reports, we now send out by emails. The format (report) has been the 
same with little improvement […] - (Management Accountant, Trust A) 
In the Non-FT organisation the researcher observed the various changes to the organisation 
processes,  as  most  of  them  were  being  implemented  during  this  field  work.  The  change   111 
involved a series of restructuring of the hierarchy and departments, leading to displacement 
of staff, reorganisation of processes and redesign of departmental spaces. 
6.1.9  Strengthening staff quality at Board level 
In the Non-FT trust, several changes were made to the organisational chart; some Divisions 
were shut down, while some others were merged. Amongst the board membership, a couple 
of Non-Executive Directors were replaced; they were not only replaced, their replacements 
are people that had specific skills matched to Monitor’s prescription. This is an action of the 
trust to convince Monitor that it has a well constituted  board, as prescribed by Monitor. 
Comments made by some board members to that effect were - 
[…] Well, we just got two Non-executives that we brought in, we specifically went for 
an extra Non-Executive, and so we have increased the number of Non-executives. We 
brought in somebody from a commercial background, so we have more hands on the 
board from a commercial perspective and then the other Non-Executive we brought 
has  got  a partnership background,  working with a Local  Authority, working with 
Regional Development Agencies, working with healthcare. So he is very strong on 
regionalisation and partnerships. Those two we felt we got in terms of strengthening 
the  board.  So,  those  two  appointments  were  very  important.  We  then  got  our 
barrister; we’ve got the accountant, and also the financial guy. So, I think we’ve 
strengthened the board with those two appointments plus one Executive as well […] - 
(FT Director, Trust A) 
[…] Okay, we have recently had two Non-executive Directors appointed with a very 
strong business/financial background, so we have been more focussed  in the last few 
months on gaining that expertise within our trust board, in the Non-Executive element 
of the trust board. …..in terms of the Executive element we’ve always had a strategic 
focus so we have Strategy and Planning Director on the board, which is not usual in 
absolutely every organisation, is it […](Dir. Strategy/Planning, Trust A) 
The events leading to changes in the board membership was also recalled by members of 
staff in one of the FT organisations - 
[…] Once again, there is a strong emphasis on having financial expertise in order to 
be on the board, so Non Executives particularly, have a broad spectrum. Generally 
there would be two or three with strong financial background and maybe one or two 
who have public health or general health background […] - (Chief Nurse, Trust B)   112 
 […] This trust had a structure, which is similar to the current structure but I think 
what we have done over the last few years is to streamline some of the processes so 
that the Executive board really is the key decision making body from the executive 
perspective. With all the other committees on the side I think that the decision-making 
is much more streamlined than it was before […] (Dep CEO, Trust B) 
 […] The whole trust was being restructured at the same time, so we did not have 
Clinical boards before FT.  Now we have clinical board structure and we also drew 
leadership from medical staff for those clinical boards’ membership rather than from 
managers.  In doing the restructuring we allocated Senior Nurse to the Heads of 
boards, and then below them we had just the Matron’s level and the Ward Sister […] 
(Directorate Manager, Trust B) 
6.1.10  Staff redundancies as Trusts journey to FT Status 
Staff redundancies were witnessed amongst the middle to lower level staff in large numbers 
in trust ‘A’. This started when all personnel (Clinical and Non Clinical excluding the board 
members) in the trust were requested to reapply for the jobs shown in a newly designed 
organisational chart, as all posts were deemed vacant. Therefore, they were re-interviewed for 
their jobs, with no guarantees of any sort; the displaced employees were encouraged to apply 
for other available jobs and where they could not be re-absorbed, they automatically became 
redundant. Some participants’ highlighted some of the challenges faced during the period in 
the following comments - 
[…]  We’ve  just  gone  through  a  ‘management  of  change’  and  I  think  that  the 
management of change has been done on the basis of what we need now and what we 
need  in  the  future  and  if  FT  hasn’t  been  taken  into  consideration,  then,  that’s 
worrying ………… I am sure it has been. I know it has been from my view […] (Dep. 
Director of Finance, Trust A) 
[…] I won't to say it is the individuals, it is the role itself, they have changed and if 
that individual does not have the skill for the new role, that is why they don't fit in 
anymore […] - (Div. Finance Manager, Trust A) 
 […]  Yes,  we  have  let  people  go  and  there  have  been  some  redundancies  […] 
(Director of Workforce, Trust B) 
 […] The change has been focussed on the three triangles and as a result some people 
are displaced […] - (Dir. Strategy/Planning, Trust A)   113 
 […] When I got here there were 4 Heads of Nursing and there are now 2 Divisional 
Nurses  and  neither  of  those  Divisional  Nurses  are  my  Head  of  Nursing.  The  big 
change is the Matron, when I got here there were 18 Matrons, we only appointed 2 in 
Medicine and 4 in Surgery from those that are already Matron. We have just been out 
to  advertise  to  recruit  the  other.  So  dynamics  to  that  population  have  changed 
completely. That has not been easy to do. Without doing it, we cannot deliver the 
agenda, because we don’t have the people with the right drive to want to change the 
way we deliver Service of Care and without that we can’t have SLM […]– (Chief 
Nurse, Trust A) 
 […] Most of the members of my team failed, I did not employ them, I have only been 
here  6  months,  so  everything  is  changed,  people  are  being  moved  around  […]  - 
(Clinical Director, Trust A) 
 […] It has been a terrible few months, I have lost most of my managers and most of 
them are demoralised. That is what you get when you do management of change, you 
get management time and time again bringing performance issues, where everything 
falls; it is really difficult, very demoralising. I think the trust did the right thing, I 
knew this would happen, but the trusts wants to force things to fit the same […] – 
(Directorate Manager, Trust A) 
The major point for consideration among the actors was whether the staff displacement and 
redundancies  were  as  a  result  of  the  FT  implementation,  or  not.  The  majority  of  the 
respondents affirmed that it was, but, on the contrary, amongst Senior Management cadre, the 
redundancy  effort  was  explained  as  what  any  normal,  efficient  organisation  must  do  to 
remain competitive, with or without the FT drive. A majority of the respondents assumed that 
the redundancy incident was one of the FT pre-requisites, which the trust must implement to 
prove itself worthy of the FT status to Monitor. The Director of Strategy in this organisation 
referred to it as an ‘underlying factor’ - 
[…] The move to FT is an underlying factor, not a dominant one, the drive is the 
knowledge of corporate/executive that we need to seriously look at everything we do 
and we need to challenge ourselves around what we do in the future […]  - (Dir. 
Strategy/Planning, Trust A)   114 
6.1.11  Board Training ahead of Board to Board  
In addition to reorganisation of divisions, the Non-FT organisation embarked on several days 
of training for the board members, titled ‘Board Time Out’. The essence of this programme 
was to coach the board members about the FT process and to ensure that they have a full 
understanding of the trust’s current financial and management situations and its strategy for 
the  future.  As  this  understanding  would  be  put  to  test  by  Monitor  in  a  board-to-board 
challenge, the board’s success or failure to display the required knowledge would determine 
whether the trust was suitable to be licensed for FT status or not. One of the key staff that was 
involved in the process highlighted the importance of the board time out for the organisation -   
[…] On the Board Time Out strategy- I guess every appointment has a degree of 
understanding about the technical elements of finance and our financial position. So, 
even if it is not directly in your role, I think the FT preparation has certainly brought 
it out to the fore, so that anyone of the Directors could answer financial questions to 
some degree. I think that is what it has done; it has spread understanding among the 
top teams without a doubt […]. - (Dep Director of Finance, Trust A) 
The principle of board time-out was useful and acceptable to the FT Regulators, however 
observation showed that the board time-out was not a routine event in the calendar of the 
trust, rather it is a strategic training dedicated to crossing the FT board to board hurdle. The 
programme was being used as a form of gaming or board manoeuvre. Comments from staff 
about the board time out revealed that the trust was using it as a training forum for the non-
executive members, in particular, and a few weak executive members of the board, who 
lacked the requisite levels of knowledge about the trust’s business as demanded by Monitor. 
Some  of  the  activities  in  the  board  time  out  sessions,  included  various  presentations  by 
internal staff and external consultants, tailored to simulating a ‘mock’ board challenge. This 
was done to prepare board members for the time when they would meet Monitor’s board for 
the real board challenge. The essence of the board challenge was to test the trust board’s 
knowledge of the trust’s operations, covering their skill mix, strategies, finance, and estate 
plans. Members of the trust must be jointly and severally prepared for any question that could 
arise. Some of the explanations given by related staff on board time out were - 
[…] Board Development - It's about looking at the skills and, you know, if there are 
any gaps in their (board members’) skill and then trying to fill in those gaps. It’s 
about educating the board members a little bit about the areas that they are working   115 
in.  Just  the  same  thing  about  the  financial  skills,  management  skills,  more 
management skills and that‘s what it is […] - (Dir. Human Resources, Trust A) 
 […] I think one of the biggest thing that the FT regime focuses its mind particularly 
on are the Non-Executive Directors, in that they will have a lot more responsibility 
and accountability and  through the application process,  they will  be subjected to 
some rigorous questions. They have got to sit across the table with Monitor to answer 
the difficult questions, and I think that is also true about the Executive Director. If one 
has to look at other organisations, the type of Non-Executive Directors that come into 
FTs, they need to have a lot of experience of working in lively organisation with tight 
governance […] - (Dir. Human Resources, Trust C) 
6.1.12 Internal powers and Actors’ perception  
  The Experience from Non -FT Case Study 
All the participants in the Non FT case study recognised that the flow of information within 
the  organisation,  especially  between  the  different  groups  of  participants,  was  crucial  to 
facilitate the smooth implementation of the FT process; Most of the actors, particularly at the 
Non-FT organisation’s middle to lower cadre, agreed that the flow of information regarding 
the progress of the FT application was often patchy. This refers specifically to information 
flow from the Management cadre to the other staff levels on the subject of FT status. This 
marked out the power of the management to make changes without informing the staff and no 
one could query their judgement on this. 
Poor information flows were reported between the Senior Executives and their Divisional 
staff, this information gap was also blamed for the limited staff engagement with the FT 
implementation process. The perceived poor information flow was described mainly in terms 
of its content inadequacy to  give a robust understanding to staff and  also its late timing 
among participants. Staff (from both the clinical and non-clinical Divisions) at the lower 
levels of the structures showed a very patchy knowledge of the progress of the FT application 
as shown by the following comments -  
[…] Anyway, I cannot say. Since I’ve been here- (over 6 months), I probably had 1 or 
2 conversations about FT status. I saw one or two communications when I joined by 
way of induction. You know if somebody asks me the question now or may be later on. 
Where are we in the FT application? Are we doing ok or what?  I wouldn’t really be 
able to answer […] - (Div Finance Manager, Trust A)   116 
 […] I cannot remember anything (About FT) lately; maybe they might have talked 
about the process, but not actually how the process is going […].  (Management 
Accountant, Trust A) 
Staff were also asked if the issue of FT was being discussed amongst their peers, in terms of 
updates given within their departments or in meetings, or by emails and web shots on the 
organisation's intranet, the following responses were given - 
[…]  No!  FT  does  not  come  up  as  part  of  our  discussions  […]  -  (Div  Finance 
Manager, Trust A) 
[…] I don’t know anything about it, it’s been more of the management and not down 
below […] - (Payment officer, Trust A) 
 […] I don’t think there has been an update on FT for some time, so I think if you just 
go out  there and do a  survey of  how  many people thought we are even working 
towards it, you will probably have a fairly slim answer in terms of not many people 
will think we are working towards it […]. - (Dir. Strategy/Planning, Trust A) 
 […] I don’t think it's discussed that much (among staff). I suppose, yeah, I wouldn’t 
say this is why they lack an understanding of what being a FT really means […] - 
(Dep Director of Finance, Trust A) 
 […] No updates, but it is on the web site, I read about it when I was going to be 
interviewed […]. - (Management Accountant, Trust A) 
 […] I don’t think we fully appreciate what difference it will be for us and I think at 
the moment we are also busy. We just tend to focus on day to day, we don't think of 
what happens to the future. I don’t think the staff will appreciate the changes […]. - 
(Head of Creditor, Trust A) 
 […] Top down communication - No. I don’t think it is.  I think they are trying to put it 
in place. If somebody joins the organisation, they get a letter saying you are part of 
this organisation, which is about getting the FT status. I think it is almost procedure 
driven, you get  a letter but  whether that person  understands  anything about  FT., 
There’s nothing really in the induction that tries to explain - this is what FT status is 
about, this is why we would want to do it, this is why it will be good for you as an 
employee. That is so tough, people know at the back of their heads, but they don’t 
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they’ve had a letter from Julia saying you’re important to us on this journey. I think 
that is all it is. It almost because it’s been seen as how can we communicate to all, we 
send  a  letter  out,  but  it  doesn’t  necessarily  gets  the  message  across  […]-  (Div. 
Finance Manager, Trust A) 
The Senior Management group expressed the notion that there was no need to inform the 
lower administrative and clinical staff about the progress of the FT application, since it had 
nothing  to  do  with  their  day  to  day  work.  There  was  also  the  thinking  amongst  the 
Management cohort that lower level staffing personnel did not care about the information. 
Hence, they would be less interested to share any information with colleagues, as expressed 
below -.  
[…] I think that the staff on the front line don’t care, because they don’t actually 
identify with the organisation, if you talk to them, they identify if their ward, their 
department and perhaps their speciality.   They just do not see, if you ask them where 
they work, a lot of them will tell you they work at xxxx Infirmary or the xxxx Hospital. 
They won’t say they work for the trust because that is just not the way […] - (Director 
of Finance, Trust A) 
 […] Again I come back to my previous point, which is that most of them don’t care.  
Those that understand the implications of being an FT once it’s explained, I find 
generally they are supportive, but for the frontline staff it seems irrelevant.   I think 
you would have to drill down the organisation until people are saying Why? Why 
bother? What’s it going to mean to me and what benefits will I receive?, and the short 
answer to that is, it's not […]  - (Director of Finance, Trust A) 
 […] I am not entirely sure I want them to know about the FT application. What I 
want them to know is the benefit to them as a member of staff and that is where we 
need to concentrate our effort and not for every member of staff to fully understand 
the integrated business plan and that is not going to happen […] - (Chief Executive, 
Trust A) 
[…] I know, they (Lower level staff)  have a low level of details, hardly any detail 
really and I think the message coming back is that people are confused, not about the 
fact that one day we will be FT, but they haven’t got a whole lot of information about 
what’s happening.. The way we have developed our approach has tended to be by 
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integrated business plan converted into a language that front line staff necessarily 
understand […] (CEO, Trust A) 
[…] I think most of them (Lower level staff) just wanted to do the job and go home at 
the end of the day.  They do the best they can do.  FT information won’t really make 
that much difference to them on a day to day basis […] - (Director of Finance, Trust 
A) 
  Information Exchange: The Experiences from the FT Case Studies  
It is useful to review the experience of the FT organisation on information and to compare 
with that of the non-FT case. This study showed that the FT case study’s experience at the 
time of application appeared to be different. There was adequate information circulation from 
the  top  level  to  other  staff  levels.  The  information  was  also  considered  adequate,  and 
participant’s opinion showed that they were well abreast of the events; some of the quotes 
portrayed the experiences thus - 
[…]Absolutely! Our trust was one of the first FTs. There was phase one point one I 
believe, and as part of this there was a heavy emphasis on communication within the 
organisation. We had a whole project team focusing on FT status and every single 
person along the line of Clinicians and Management was involved in that process,. A 
web site was set up and there were lots of road shows.  There was a huge amount of 
communication, particularly around getting people involved in becoming Governors 
and also staff and clinical representatives and that required a lot of communication 
[…] - (Directorate Manager, Trust B) 
 […] Everyone was aware that we were applying for it. One of the things about this 
trust is its very strong communication process and everybody knows we were applying 
for it. That was about the level that people understood.  The CEO is very good at 
explaining this type of things to as many people as he can, although the detail didn’t 
get  transferred  because  people  had  no  idea  about  that.    He  explained  the 
understanding behind it and the opportunity associated with it.  I think the emphasis 
was always on the opportunities that it presented to us […] - (Chief Nurse, Trust B) 
 […] Anybody just working on our side (Department) was not really involved in the 
transition. Information would have been passed down that becoming an FT was the 
way forward and we would have been notified of the name change. As far as we were   119 
concerned, it was just a name change. Particularly, in those days I was not involved 
with cash as I am now […].  - (Official, Trust B) 
[…]  Even  though,  I  was  not  part  of  the  team  involved  but  I  was  aware  of  its 
progression because I was part of the Finance team and the trust was keeping us 
informed at the time and I knew that we were having to produce financial information 
to  various  bodies  for  the  FT  status,  so  that  was  my  awareness  […]  -  (Treasury 
Manager, Trust B) 
One  of  the  key  staff  who  participated  in  the  FT  implementation  process  at  the  FT 
organisation elaborated on the level of information made available to staff within the trust at 
the time. This confirmed that staff were given enough information about the change without 
being overloaded with the day to day operational detail of FT, thus - 
[…] I think they knew…. but probably only limited to the knowledge that we were 
going through the process, but they did not understand what that process would be in 
detail […] - (Official, Trust B) 
6.1.13  Communication and Interaction at Board level (Non-FT Experience) 
The nature of the information flows among the top level management staff appeared to be 
good,  up  to  date  and  clear;  this  was  agreed  as  necessary,  because  decisions  on  the  FT 
implementation, and the compliance framework were the primary responsibility of the Senior 
Management staff. General opinion regarding this issue included -   
[…] On Communication and Understanding at the top level - we have done a lot of 
development like the seminar; the board seminars, they are development sessions for 
the board. What I do is - every step takes six months and if I, take the IBP and use the 
IBP as the key document. Mr A would take the LTFM and report back to them every 
six months. And we keep them briefed in term of what SHA is saying […]  - (FT 
Director, Trust A) 
 […] To be honest with you, I am not as worried. At the top management, we have the 
right level of debate, people have a good understanding,. You know when we are 
going for FT, obviously we did a lot of prep, getting all the details . I am not worried 
that people don’t know about some pages in the financial model. Obviously if you 
have not read it for a while you may not know what is on page.....28 or something, 
you need to remind yourself, we all need to do that. I think in terms of understanding, 
it is not perfect, but I think it is in a reasonable place […] - (Chief Executive, Trust A)   120 
 […] First  of  all I don’t know  how  much  staff  understands about  FT  status. Any 
change that will come, has to filter down through the management, it takes quite a 
while and whether they actually notice any changes. I don’t think there would be 
significant change to the way they do their job […]. (Chief Nurse, Trust A) 
6.1.14  Inclusion of the Public in the Trust Board 
Local accountability was one of the major reasons for introducing FT status in the NHS. It 
was promoted by the government to ensure that FT organisations are held accountable by 
their local communities and for the members of the community or the public to have a say in 
the decisions being made by their local FT, hence, the need to conduct a public consultation 
ahead of FT authorisation.  
Public membership is one of the mandated conditions for FT status approval. The trust boards 
in this study therefore each held public consultations on the subject of their FT application in 
their localities, after which members of the public were drafted to the board, as mandated by 
the FT assessment framework. The following comments reflected trust’s opinions as they 
seek audience with the public and what they made of the requirement to consult the local 
communities - 
[…] FT takes a lot of people liaising with the local population, writing reports and so 
on, it takes a lot of manager’s time, and at the end of the day the nature of what they 
do has not changed workload wise. You get more people checking that Monitor is 
happy, and the local population know what is going on […].  - (Chief Executive, Trust 
C) 
 […] Certainly, the first one is around links in with the public. We set off last year 
with a range of what we call Big Conversations, which is talking to the public and 
engaging with them so we can actually get that benefit without being an FT […] - 
(Director of Finance, Trust A) 
 […]  FT  has  brought  very  little  change  to  our  work,  other  than  a  structure  and 
constitution for engaging the public that we don’t have and we can’t create as an 
NHS trust […] - (FT Director, Trust A) 
The researcher observed that the public consultation process was a major burden on the 
trust’s executive and  compliance was only  ceremonial,  while the study participants  were 
reluctant  to  openly  admit  managerial  manoeuvres  engaged  to  secure  the  tick  on  public   121 
consultation compliance, one of the actors admitted the exclusion of the board of governors 
in meetings.  
[…]…..but  it’s  one  thing  to  have  a  Consultation  Document  that  you  publish  and 
consult staff and the public on, but it’s quite another thing to see what the changes 
mean in practice […] - (Directorate Manager, Trust A) 
 […] The actual FT framework is quite attractive at the technical level of doing things 
efficiently and effectively, understanding what your costs are and understanding what 
your income is. The softer side in terms of the engagement side, frankly for me ….I am 
not really convinced that the membership has that much of a voice and I am yet to be 
convinced. …..I am not just convinced that the public membership and the boards of 
the FT (that’s for me) really works that well. More of the board meetings are held in 
the public and I think that is what we have noticed - we have our board meeting every 
month in the public. Okay! There is the closed section after it, why is the other board 
meetings in private? […] - (Directorate Manager, Trust A) 
It was also admitted that there are positive side to the admission of the public within the 
board. Some participants from the FT organisation acknowledged that the inclusion of the 
public to serve within the trust board as give them the benefit of easier access to public 
opinions. There are instances where the board Governors had been used as a sounding board 
for new initiatives, to reflect what patients want. 
[…] I think we would perform reasonably well, as a board, that is cohesive, who 
understood the issue, not complacent and the Chairman is absolutely clear about the 
transparency and openness of that process. We have good public challenges within 
our board meetings, we have a good relationship with the public representatives who 
attend the meeting, how representative they are is opened to question,. If you look at 
the level of question from the public and the level of accountability of the board, the 
type and responses we make,  they are grounded in a practical reality about patients 
and services, it is not ground statement about financial performance above everything 
else […](Chief Executive, Trust B) 
 […]… because I attend internal performance meetings and there are a number of 
committees  where  Governors  are  involved  and  are  either  there  as  Governors  or 
chairing these meetings.  I have come across one where we were talking about access 
via  a  contact  centre  and  how  long  it  takes  to  answer  calls  and  so  on  and  our   122 
Governors were becoming more and more interested in the reasons why calls were 
taking so long to be answered or how they could be improved.  So I would say that the 
Governors were much more involved […] (Directorate Manager, Trust B) 
Some of the participants considered local accountability and public engagement as a mere 
facade within the  trust’s operational  framework, especially the inclusion of the public in 
board  meetings.  The  trusts  engaged  in  many  public  meetings  to  demonstrate  their 
engagement with the public; some referred to it as a mere box-ticking exercise, because the 
board took all the vital decisions that affected the operation of the organisation with little or 
no input from the Governors. When participants were asked if they knew any member of the 
board  of  governors,  no  one  was  able  to  identify  any.    This  is  an  evidence  of  no  active 
relationship outside the board’s sphere. 
6.1.15  Attaining FT status as a Badge of Honour 
The general attitude of trust management as they pursued FT licensure was found to vary 
from one trust to the other. In the FT organisations, the attitude of management and staff was 
more  business  oriented,  as  becoming  an  FT  to  them  means  taking  control  of  the 
organisation’s destiny, securing the much desired freedom from the bureaucratic control of 
the DoH and the CCG, and operating under an air of innovation and self-regulation. Hence, 
the participants from the FT organisations attributed FT status as a major success factor in 
their attainment of a clinical leadership role in the NHS.   
In the Non-FT organisation, participants attributed FT status to a symbol of class, in order to 
possess a sense of belonging and relevance to the sector. Across the staff hierarchy similar 
indications were given as shown in the quotes below - 
[…] We have to make sure that we are not lacking behind. If you are surrounded by 
FTs and you are not an FT, I don’t think it is a place you want to find yourself […]-
(Chief Executive, Trust A) 
 […] We don’t want NOT to be an FT. I suppose it is the key motivator, we don’t want 
to be left in the group of organisations that can’t achieve it […]. - (FT Director, Trust 
A) 
 […] I think its two things; one is a status thing, in terms of how it is perceived 
outside and that in itself is a ‘badge’, you know, From that point of view, I think the 
issue is then becoming a FT becomes a status symbol and a badge of honour so that 
you go for  it at  all costs. I hate to  mention this  (laughs) but  it seems to  be, the   123 
evidence is suggestive of what happened at Midstaff
2 Hospital […] - (Chief Nurse, 
Trust A) 
 […] The status itself, it implies FTs as a type of an organisation, the title implies a 
level of competence to my mind. I think an FT label is an important one, it’s important 
to have, because it implies that you are functioning as a business, you have an outside 
regulator that is assuring that all is right . There are still things that can go wrong 
but actually my perception of this is that FT boards operate at a slightly higher level 
and have more drive integrity […] - (Dir. Strategy/Planning, Trust A) 
 […] I guess because it was seen as a badge of quality and badge of achievement 
really for all trusts in England, it would means that your standard and quality around 
financial management and delivery of service were at a particular level, so we wanted 
that badge […]. - (Chief Nurse, Trust A) 
 […] If you are not a FT. Why not? It is because you are not very good to become FT, 
so everybody has to be seen to be good to become a FT […] - (Div. Finance Manager, 
Trust A) 
 […] In the NHS at the moment all organisations are actually moving ahead towards 
that (FT) and so we are as well and it also gives much more autonomy, that is what I 
understand, So that could also be a reason I guess. And another thing is it looks good, 
you will want it, you know - the elites. Competing to be the one of the best that’s just it 
[…] - (Directorate Manager, Trust A) 
6.1.16  Creation of a Two-Tier NHS 
The FT reform was implemented in phases, whereby trusts applied for the status at different 
times, as soon as they are ready to go through the assessment framework. The provider sector 
presently has a pool of organisations where some are Foundation Hospitals and others are 
Non Foundation Hospital. This class distinction was tangible amongst the actors. Being a 
Foundation Hospital was percieved as being in a different class within the NHS; some actors 
referred to it as an ‘Elite Club’ within the NHS. From observation, it was obvious that the 
                                                 
2 Midstaff Hospital is an FT organisation being investigated under the ‘Francis Inquiry’, following reports of massive failings in the standard 
of care leading to several deaths. The Inquiry concluded that ‘a number of the deficiencies at the Trust had existed for a long time. Whilst 
the executive and non-executive Board members recognised the problems, the action taken by the board was inadequate and lacked an 
appropriate sense of urgency’ the inquiry has however given a number of recommendations to help the entire healthcare system.   124 
actors generally perceived themselves in the light of the organisation's status, demarcated by 
the Foundation Status. The following quotes were given in the light of this assertion - 
[…] I think there is a fundamental different feel between organisations who are non-
FTs  and  those  who  are  FTs.  There  are  the  constitutional  obligations  around 
members, Governor and governance and accountabilities through to SHAs for NHS 
trusts and not for a FT.  There are financial freedoms, loans and the ability to invest 
etc that can be done in a FT.  The expectations around FT and risk ratings, [mobility] 
the need to have surpluses and there is also the culture in the organisation.  It feels 
like it is standing on its own two feet […].-(Dir. Of Workforce, Trust B) 
 […] I wish we were free from regulations. We are still subject to all the regulations 
of the Care Quality Commission and all the clinical regulations remain the same.  It 
is more a question about the line of accountability. We do not have the same line of 
accountability to the Strategic Health Authority in the same way as non-FTs do and 
so the SHA is less intrusive with us than they would be with a non-FT hospital on 
matters of performance. But we are very aware of our responsibilities for Monitor 
and  we  take  those  very  seriously.    That  does  not  feel  like  non-regulation.    The 
freedoms for us are around the financial flexibilities around things like properties, 
(which can be sold to raise funds), borrowing and the ability to raise money in a way 
that we choose. But it’s not a freedom from regulations […] - (Medical Director, 
Trust B) 
 […] Clearly there is  the autonomy associated  with managing your  finances  in  a 
different  way.  You  are  regulated  by  Monitor  and  allowed  to  compete  on  a  more 
commercial basis than, say, your standard non-FT would.  That’s my understanding 
of the benefits […] - (Chief Executive, Trust B) 
 […]The consistency with which performance must be grappled, FT deals with the 
issues more immediately, on financial side, the FRR gives a continuous assessment of 
how the trust must be performing across a wide range of metrics while the Non-FT 
are focussed on a narrow range […]. – (Financial Accountant, Trust B) 
 […] I can say that we are better off being a FT because it means we can react in a 
more individualistic way to situations without having to constantly go to Departments 
and ask permission, but I don’t really feel that it’s impacting on me that much that I 
can give you truthful answer one way or another. My gut feeling is that we’d be much   125 
better off being a FT, but if you ask me why, other than the ability to react as an 
organisation, say on an individual basis I couldn’t say more than that[…] - (Chief 
Executive, Trust C) 
6.1.17  Protection of Core Services from FT reform 
Implementation  of  a  major  change  such  as  the  FT  was  one  that  affected  all  of  the 
organisation’s processes and structures; this was projected to create a notable shift in its core 
services. In all the organisations, participants reckoned that the change in status made little or 
no  difference  to  the  trust’s  core  services.  Amongst  the  staff,  the  clinical  staff  especially 
noticed no major change to their work.  
Staff asserted that the routines on the wards remained the same, except for changes in the 
organisation’s structure, which was predominantly an administrative function, core clinical 
functions remained the same. Comments from staff in both Foundation and Non-Foundation 
organisations highlighted the following - 
[…]  I can’t see any impact directly linked to FT in our service deliver. That was 
always the big worry when FTs first got established as it nearly got dumped, the 
whole concept, because there was a cry to say show us what benefits it ha., People 
were really struggling to find the real benefits., We sort of cobbled together one at 
Derby! It was about faster decision making, which was sort of true, only that we made 
the decision before we became an FT, but we brushed over that bit. Very difficult to 
find hard concrete service deliverables that are a direct result of FT status […] - 
(Chief Executive, Trust A) 
 […] I think we would have been doing the same things as if we were a trust. The vast 
majority of work is about delivering health care really well and that would be the 
same whatever the status. We are doing it within our means; we are serious about 
governance in this organisation […] - (Dir. Of Workforce, Trust B) 
 […] The question is, does it give you a practical advantage? I am not sure nowadays 
it gives..... Typically when you look at what is happening in Stafford and other FTs, 
they feel equally and fantastically as non FT’s. I think literally it’s a badge to me; it 
isn’t more of a status […] - (Dir. Strategy/Planning, Trust A) 
[…] I think by business service, you mean clinical services. I don’t think there is 
evidence that it has happened yet -  Impact of FT on trust's operation - I can’t say I 
have observed any […] - (Dep. Director of Finance, Trust A)   126 
 […] I don’t really think our business priorities will have to be any different,. At the 
end of the day, the clinical services you need to provide must be a really good and 
safe clinical care  Patient safety will have to be on top of the agenda of the clinical 
services. Now clearly that is a good business model to have as well, we are a hospital, 
if that is not part of the philosophy then you should not be in this job, whether you are 
FT or not […] - (Chief Executive, Trust A) 
6.2  Summary 
This chapter described the output of the first stage of data coding using template analysis, 
extracting  relevant  open  codes,  which  resulted  from  the  respondents’  opinions  about  the 
subject of this study. Direct responses from the interviews were aligned with the research 
question, from which a total of 376 open codes were gathered. It was further streamlined 
through the use of thematic synthesis approach, which delivered the 17 themes described 
above, representing the first order construct of this study. Following the open coding process, 
the next stage of the thematic analysis was applied; this resulted in the formulation of the 
second order construct of the research. The second order construct is the main discussion in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
Development of Core Themes 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the final segment of the data analysis, which began in the last chapter, 
with the adoption of the template approach for code classification, which resulted in the first 
order construct and now followed in this chapter with the use of the thematic synthesis to 
generate the second order construct. The first order construct, which were predominantly the 
codes identified as relevant to the study from the actors’ perspective highlighted in Chapter 
Six, were processed further to produce the second order construct, which composed of the 
researcher’s inference, based on the knowledge gathered from literatures, field observations 
and experience in the healthcare field.  
The core codes identified in the last chapter were found to be actively related either directly 
or indirectly to the focal code pinpointed in this chapter. This chapter involved the use of an 
abstraction process as enumerated in 4.4.2; this involved the grouping of different codes into 
themes  and sub  themes.  Through the continuous  moving forward and backward between 
different codes, the literature and earlier analysis, in-depth interpretations were identified, to 
build elements of explanation, which could not be easily articulated by the participants, given 
the complex nature of the FT status phenomenon. The main goal was to discover what made 
this phenomenon what it is, the absence of which will make it impossible for it to be what it 
is (Van Manen, 1997). 
This chapter is organised as follows - Section 7.1 discusses the thematic synthesis, which 
essentially was  the creation of themes  derived  from  the state of affairs or circumstances 
within the organisation, its varied connections and the outcomes. Sections 7.2 present the 
main or focal theme for this study - Struggling for Compliance, which was the product of the 
abstraction process as highlight in 4.4.2. Sections 7.3 highlight the interconnectivity of the 
actors,  which  was  illustrative  of  the  central  theme.  Sections  7.4  and  7.5  present  the 
circumstances and outcomes of the actors’ interactions, within their connection framework. 
Lastly, Sections 7.6 present a thematic construction for this study depicted in the theme of 
struggling for compliance. 
7.1  An overview of Thematic Synthesis 
The  process  of  thematic  synthesis  was  found  useful  in  this  study  for  the  purpose  of 
connecting data to its interpretation. Basically it is a tool that generates themes in the data   128 
analysis (Daly, Kellehear and Gliksman, 1997). Themes capture the important elements of 
the data within the context of the research question and they present the pattern of responses 
and meanings buried within a data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  Through the process of 
thematic  analysis,  qualitative  data  is  encoded,  and  thus  the  researcher  develops  word  or 
phrases as labels to distinguish each level of the data.  
The output from the analysis was further blended to produce an interpretation, showing the 
relationships within the data. In this analysis, after labelling the various codes obtained from 
the actors, referred to as the first construct, the researcher identified the relationship between 
these codes. This was through a process of abstraction. This formed the basis of the data 
interpretation process, which involved a comparison of lines of the same codes across the 
three organisations that took part in this study. This comparison was the main check for an 
understanding of the variations and similarities between the different organisations, and when 
layered with the timelines and contexts, answers were provided to the research questions. 
The  abstraction  process  was  followed  by  synthesis  and  theme  development.  The  main 
objective was to identify the main phenomenon, in the absence of which other themes would 
become irrelevant or even impossible, to generate. The main phenomenon referred to the 
central idea or pattern of events, actions or behaviours and interactions associated with a 
specific circumstance or context.  
 The prior analytical processes in this study largely influenced the way the thematic synthesis 
was  employed,  rather  than  by  the  components  of  the  framework  itself,  the  study  was 
primarily driven by the data. This is shown in Sections 7.2 to 7.6 below. The seventeen 
categories defined in Chapter six were absorbed into nine main themes through the process of 
data synthesis and theme development. Table 4 below shows the conceptual categories that 
were put together to form the nine main themes.  The Table identifies the main theme of each 
category. It must be noted that the main theme of this study was an output of the synthesis 
routine, hence, it became the focal theme, shown as the first theme in the table, and without 
this focal theme all other themes would be irrelevant. In fact, to a large extent, other coding 
categories had a bearing on the focal theme. It should also be noted in addition that some of 
the coding categories were implicated in more than one theme. 
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Table 4- List of Themes and Categories 
Reference  Themes - (Second Order Construct)  Coding Category - (First Order Construct) 
7.3.1  Struggle For Compliance    Trust’s uptake of FT innovation  
7.4.0  CASE STUDY INTERACTION FRAMEWORK (Regulator’s Action) 
7.4.1  Emergence of Complex Rules    Establishment  of  rules  and  mandatory 
assessment framework 
7.4.2  Advancing a Rigorous Framework    Accounting as a driver for Accountability 
  Risk Assessment in Service development 
  Motivation for FT adoption 
  Potency of FT tool in trusts  
7.4.3   Linking Accountability Agenda    FT in the light of NHS political context  
7.5.0  REACTION FROM TRUSTS 
7.5.1   Diffusion of Uncertainty in organisation    Creation of a Two-Tier NHS  
  Internal powers and actor’s perception 
7.5.2  Establishing Legitimacy     Divisional reorganisation and re-shuffle  
  Staff redundancies as trust journeys to FT 
  Communication  and  Interaction  at  board 
level 
7.5.3   Management manoeuvrings/Games    Strengthening staff quality at board level  
  board Training ahead of B2B 
  Inclusion of the Public in the trust board 
7.6  OUTCOME OF INTERACION 
7.6.1   Organisational Business Planning    Protection of Core Services from reform 
7.6.3  Inter organisational Behavioural Effect    Attaining FT status as a Badge of Honour   130 
7.2  Putting Foundation Trust Status in Context 
The government under the Labour regime introduced the FT status with the objective of 
devolving power while creating local accountability within the NHS. This was rooted in a 
requirement for all healthcare provider organisations- Acute, Mental Health, Ambulance and 
the Community trust, to seek a new status, which breaks their attachment to the government 
and  make  them  accountable  to  the  local  population  they  serve  instead.  Hence,  the 
management structure of these providers changed to accommodate duly elected members of 
the  public  as  Governors  serving  in  their  trust  boards.  The  government  appointed  and 
relinquished its controlling power to Monitor, who became responsible for the assessment, 
authorisation and eventually regulation of all trusts that qualified as Foundation hospitals. 
With the creation of Monitor as the independent regulator of FT Hospitals, all trusts were 
mandated to apply for the FT status, which would enable them to operate as a FT Hospital, 
thereby conforming to the accountability objective set out by the government. In return for 
the compliance, these organisations were offered new powers, freedoms and benefits, which 
they had not previously had. 
Given the benefits offered by the status to organisations that are able to comply with the 
accountability  and governance  arrangement put forward by the  government, many of the 
organisations signed up for the rigour involved in the authorisation process to become FT 
organisations. The full detail of the assessment process has been discussed in chapter Five. 
The FT assessment process is a journey taken by organisations on an individual basis, where 
each organisation applies to engage in the process when ready. The application batches were 
denoted with the word '’Waves’'; the first set of trusts to become FTs were called the first 
wave, then the second wave and so on. This study sought to understand the implementation 
of  FT  status,  which  is  still  on-going,  over  ten  years  after  the  first  wave  of  FTs  were 
authorised.  
The process of structuring the research data into themes enabled the central phenomenon, to 
be  located  within  the  study.  The  central  phenomenon  refers  to  the  central  idea,  which 
interacted with other patterns of events, and incidents encountered along the pathway of the 
FT implementation process.  
7.3.0  The Central Phenomenon 
The main theme or the central phenomenon, to which all other main categories were linked to 
form a descriptive whole in this NIS study emerged from the data categories as shown in   131 
Appendix (II), and it was defined as a ‘Struggling for Compliance’.  The process was by 
abstraction of the free codes to identify the first and second construct of this study. The main 
theme was produced by the stage four of the data analysis process explained in 4.4.2. All the 
other  themes  identified  in  the  course  of  thematic  synthesis  relates  to  the  core  theme  of 
struggling for compliance. 
7.3.1   Struggling for Compliance  
NHS organisations had a mandate to become Foundation Hospitals within a stipulated time 
frame, by applying through Monitor’s assessment framework. The trusts took various steps to 
become eligible for the FT status, hence, the actions taken by each organisation differed one 
to the other, but a common thread was observed among all the organisations that participated 
in this research. The common ground includes a reorganisation of divisions, the introduction 
of change programmes, loss of staff both at the top and bottom cadres of the organisation, 
recruitment  of  staff  specifically  with  a  finance  background  both  at  executive  and  non-
executive levels and various managerial manoeuvres, including use of power to manage flow 
of communication to staff .  
Participants in the FT organisations confirmed that at the time of their assessment to become 
a FT, many colleagues were displaced and some were adjudged not suitable for the new 
working  environment.  At the same time,  new  employee were recruited, who were better 
qualified and, in some instances, possess ‘private sector’ experience. The FT process also 
witnessed the re-organisation of divisions and departments within the trusts, including actual 
space reallocation to move teams together, which had hitherto been separated in order to 
reflect the new organisational structure. 
In view of the divergent reorganisation, a mixed perception was evident from one trust to the 
other. Actors within FT organisations confirmed that information dissemination was adequate 
and  timely  for  them  at  the  time  of  their  FT  application  process  and  that  they  had  been 
adequately updated about the trust’s progress in its bid for FT. Some other staff confirmed 
that they were not only informed about the process but also actively participated as members 
of  the  central  team  who  were  responsible  for  the  supply  of  information  and  the 
documentation of evidence required in facilitating the FT application. 
Staff in the early adopter case study knew much about the organisation’s plan, which had 
been  well  explained  to  them  from  the  angle  of  what  the  organisation  stood  to  gain,  if 
successful in its FT bid. Some of the employees were not fully convinced of the benefit of FT   132 
at the time, given their experience of several reforms in the NHS, which they considered were 
merely driven by politics, and will soon fade off without accomplishing any major change. 
This was especially the case in the non-FT organisation, and it is fair to state that actors in 
this trust had little or no knowledge about the FT process. As a late adopting organisation, the 
aim of FT remains unclear to them, this was further aggravated by the poor communication in 
the trust.  
The Deputy Chief Executive in the early adopter organisation did acknowledged that staff in 
the organisation had been given only information found relevant to them, a general idea was 
fed to the staff from time to time, but this update appeared sufficient to carry the staff along, 
even though the level of information available to them was nothing as comprehensive as that, 
which the board had to grapple with.  
For some of the central facilitators of the application, the most challenging part of the process 
was the inclusion of the public into the board, where they had to co-opt new members to the 
Governor’s board by election, after a period of public consultation, which involved many 
public meetings. They had to physically meet the members of the public, in some cases in 
out-of-office hours, mostly in locations outside of the trust but within the local area, such as 
in the town halls, these also added to the rigour of the FT assessment. 
Another Chief Executive described the rigour to become FT as strenuous and at the same 
time found the benefit offered by the status as worthwhile for the organisation, as it is now 
able to operate without the incursion of the government, breaking out from the bureaucracy 
of the Department of Health to hold its destiny in its own hands as an organisation. This 
submission was reflects the government’s plan when FT status was introduced - to make the 
NHS organisations engage with the public they serve and to give the public a voice in what 
the NHS does. 
This  study  explored  the  FT  process  through  which  organisations  within  an  institutional 
framework  were  mandated  to  comply  with  a  new  organisational  form,  having  specific 
requirements, which culminated into adopting the FT innovation within the health care sector, 
in  spite  of  individual  organisational  challenges.  The  institutional  arrangement  required  a 
mandatory compliance to the adoption of FT status without any alternative. The challenging 
position of the organisational actors and their resolve to comply with the FT requirements in 
order to conform to the institutional dictate was referred to as ‘Struggling for Compliance’.   133 
Organisation’s  need  for  compliance  with  the  complex  FT  reform  was  tied  to  their  only 
survival chance and alluring with the incentives attached to compliance. Non compliance 
would mean the death or take-over of the organisation, which is a risk the organisation were 
not ready to take. On the other hand these organisations want to benefit from the benefits 
offered to FTs. This is the sort of dilemma faced by organisations within the NHS, especially 
where they are not robust enough to face the rigours of FT assessment. Hence, compliance 
involves  a  form  of  struggle  or  the  other.  The  compliance  difficulties  faced  by  the  NHS 
organisations were not immediately obvious or noticeable, since this reform was perceived as 
a means to drive efficiency within the organisations. However when the tenets of the reform 
and  the  manner  of  its  implementation  are  linked  with  the  organisational  context  in  the 
medium term this struggle becomes apparent.  
Organisational actors were determined to implement the FT reform, despite the challenges 
surrounding  them,  for  a  number  of  reasons.  The  implementation  of  the  reform  was 
mandatory, but it also provided some benefits, which included the financial freedom to retain 
and build up surpluses, with the additional right to determine how the surplus was used. The 
FT status empowered the organisation to approach commercial sources for borrowing for its 
business,  which  hitherto  had  not  been  allowed,  the  organisation  was  also  able  to  easily 
restructure and modernize its services without seeking the approval of the regulators and 
lastly, the organisation became accountable to the local population instead of the Secretary of 
State once it had been authorised as FT. 
The organisations’ requirement to comply with  the reform was inextricably linked to the 
political ambitions of the government, as these organisations themselves had their existence 
woven  to  the  nation’s  political  stance.  Generally  the  NHS  is  a  highly  valued  institution 
amongst the British citizens because of its position as the sole body responsible for the health 
and well-being of the citizens. Given its antecedents, which dated back to 1948 when the 
NHS was established, it became imperative that the continuity of the NHS is preserved by all 
ruling parties at all cost. Ruling parties in government emphasize the importance of the NHS 
and the need to continually ensure that the NHS remains alive, and its outlets, capable of 
delivering an efficient service to the nation from time to time in a bid to assure the citizens. 
This assurance not only makes the government popular, it also assures the citizens that their 
welfare is a priority of the government. For successive governments to continue to deliver, or 
be seen to be delivering, a citizen’s centred agenda, the government continuously tinker with 
the NHS by implementing one reform or the other, under a variety of phrases and rhetoric.   134 
Unending reform agendas became a fashion in the NHS, especially since the introduction of 
the New Public Management in 1990s, and this led to the introduction of the FT status. The 
complex/ambiguous rules that line the road leading to adoption of the FT reform links with 
the struggle of NHS organisations to comply with FT change. The FT status requirements 
were complex, and in most of the organisations, an arduous task given their financial and 
structural form, which results in the phenomenon of a struggle in order to comply. This is 
also reflected in the comment below- 
[…]Yes, I think it is basically, it is a classic NHS where the government set a new 
performance standard, so FT is the in-thing, so if you apply and get  FT, you become 
the first one to get it, you become famous, you get a lot of coverage, in the book of 
DOH you are the good boy, so you get the grant, it is always a culture of the NHS, of 
the high flyer and slow flyer, and the high flyers are always the first to get the badge, 
I think everyone rush to get the FT so as to be seen to be good, the first 10- 15% did 
that and everyone tries to catch up, I think the case at mid staff actually slowed it 
down, when everyone said, hey slow down if that trust is a FT and did that bad, what 
is the point of FT? […] (Management Accountant, Trust A) 
In this study, the phenomenon of Struggling for Compliance was demonstrated by an equal 
and opposite interaction between the government and the NHS organisations. The initiation 
of the FT reform was established by the  government through the Secretary of State in a 
rhetorical rule, which was enshrined in the NHS Act 2006 requiring all NHS secondary trusts 
to  adopt  the  FT  Status  within  a  stipulated  time.  This  demonstrated  the  government 
commitment to the implementation of the FT reform. The implementation of FT engaged the 
use of accounting as the main driver to establish its agenda over the organisations. 
The government  used this  platform to  introduce a new accounting  and reporting regime, 
which was promoted by Monitor, whereby the NHS organisations moved away from the star 
rating  system  of  performance  measurement  into  a  Financial  Risk  Rating  system  of 
assessment.  NHS  organisations  were  made  to  complete  a  Long  Term  Financial  Model 
(LTFM), which gave robust information concerning the trust’s long term survival. The model 
took a view of at least a five year plan into the future of the organisation. This moved the 
organisations away from reliance on a one-year budgeting exercise into that of a five year 
budgeting programme.   135 
From the organisational standpoint, the adoption of the FT status was conducted in a manner 
that allowed them no option or alternative. It was also linked to their survival, thereby forcing 
the organisations to comply with the FT. By complying, the organisations were seen as fit for 
the FT status. In addition, as the organisations sought to present a good image to members of 
the public, who are the users of their services, achieving the FT cape mark meant that the 
organisations  would  achieve  a  progressive  business  status  in  the  minds  of  the  local 
population. Successful implementation of the FT reform also gave the organisations access to 
the benefits offered under the reform- financial and regulatory freedom.  
The implementation of the FT agenda was a challenging task, due to the complexity of the 
rules and the rigour involved in each phase of the implementation. The adoption, therefore, 
witnessed  a  number  of  actions  from  the  trusts,  which  could  be  classified  as  managerial 
manoeuvring, or games, to facilitate the achievement of the status and also prove themselves 
worthy of the new status to stakeholders.   
Some of the struggles encountered by these organisations, in addition to the completion of the 
LTFM, include the compliance with a number of other deliverables, such as the inclusion of 
members of the public into the trust board arrangement, compliance with specific clinical 
targets, for instance delivery of a three month consistent Accident and Emergency (A and E) 
target, delivery of a Strategic Business Plan detailing either a five or ten year plan of the trust 
as the case may be. This document defined unambiguously the plans of the trust as it related 
to the delivery of its efficiency targets, estate plans, targeted risk ratings and plans for the 
development  of  new  services.  From  the  points  highlighted  above,  it  could  be  noted  that 
Struggling for Compliance was borne out of two influences. The first was the pressure from 
the government, and the second influence was an inter-organisational influence, which is a 
mimetic  influence.  The  government’s  influence  was  perpetrated  through  the  legislation, 
which  birthed  the  change,  resulting  in  the  difficulties  experienced  by  the  trusts  as  they 
journeyed into the FT gateway. This legislation put the organisations under a severe pressure 
to  achieve  the  expected  targets  if  they  were  to  qualify  for  the  status.    An  example  of 
struggling to comply with the requirement to become an FT organisation was, reflected in the 
following quote: 
[…] I think …. we don’t actually have an alternative, the government has said that all 
trusts are going to become FTs and as a result of that, this is something that we 
absolutely have to do […] - (Chief Executive, Trust A)   136 
The 2003/04 financial year, was a major financial era when a number of NHS organisations 
were hit with a colossal deficit position and incapable of achieving the required efficiency 
savings in spite of the government’s investment in the sector, this antecedent gave a vivid 
picture of the genesis of the struggle, with FT introduced in 2004/05, at the time when most 
NHS organisations were barely operating to survive, the added requirement to achieve FT 
became even more onerous for some of the organisations. In this study, actors struggled to 
keep up with their Accident and Emergency targets required of them, and that became more 
difficult when the FT criteria required them to have a 3 months consistent achievement of the 
target. Achieving the routine Cost Improvement Programme (efficiency saving) was also a 
known challenge to most NHS organisations on a year by year basis. The FT assessment 
framework extended this requirement, by stipulating higher levels of efficiency targets, with 
the requirement to present clear and robust organisational plans for the achievement of the 
target, not only for one year, but for a period of five years.  
Another struggle was the criteria attached to the board requirements for FT organisations; all 
the trusts in this study continued to reshuffle their board membership in order to present a 
well constituted board as required for FT assessment. This was a challenge in a sector that 
found it difficult to recruit specific skilled professionals at the board level, either due to lack 
of affordability of  a competitive pay or the geographical location of the  trust. In the FT 
terrain, an organisation’s failure to recruit individuals with the ‘right skill set’ is a risk, which 
may hamper its eligibility for FT status, if the trust is perceived as having ‘not a properly 
constituted’ board.  Comment from a board member reflects this - 
[…] We have looked at the members of the board and are currently in the process of 
replacing  a  couple,  mainly  to  make  ourselves  more  robust  for  FT  status.  […] 
(Director of Finance,  Trust A) 
The  other  major  area  of  struggle  was  the  general  health  check  assessment  of  FT 
organisations, which was assessed based on Monitor’s Financial Risk Rating (FRR) metric; 
this  is  a  simulation  of  a  number  of  accounting  ratios  (Liquidity  ratio,  Earnings  Margin, 
surplus margin and Return of Asset), which arrives at an overall rating called the FRR. This 
rating measures the health check of the organisation. Given the indicators being used for the 
risk rating, trust ‘A’  in this case study failed to achieve the FRR, where they had been 
required to achieve a minimum of  (3) points out of five (5) in each of the five forecast years 
of assessment. This was one of the major reasons the trust embarked on the measures, which   137 
was distressing but unavoidable, if it must achieve the FT criteria. Here is a comment from a 
management staff - 
[…] At the moment, nobody would lend to us, we can’t get the right risk rating, so we 
wouldn’t get it and that wouldn’t help us. It would help us if we could just pull our 
baseline up the recurring balance […] (FT Director, Trust A) 
The position was clear to the extent that all trusts must become an FT; indeed this study also 
showed that the trusts were also interested in this struggle, driven by their quest to benefit 
from  the privileges offered to  FT  organisations. They present  themselves  as  an effective 
organisation to both their Regulator and the Users of the service – the Public. This pursuit 
was often driven by the management’s self-interest to succeed at all cost.  The motive behind 
this drive may have been for efficiency reasons or perhaps to achieve the status in order to 
gain popularity. Staff within the trusts had different perceptions of the trust’s motives and, 
indeed the benefit offered by the FT status.   The following comments were made to justify 
the organisation’s motivation for wanting FT status - 
[…] Well, potentially a lot of benefits. I think within the organisation itself it means 
we become much more rigorous in the way we do things, we look at the financial 
planning of the organisation and it fits in the Service Line Management process that 
we put in place. And without the organisation it gives us the flexibility to be able to 
add  a  working  partnership  or  potentially  takeover  other  organisations  […]  (Div. 
Finance Manager, Trust B) 
[…] I think it would give us more control of what we do and how we do it, that is my 
understanding of it.  So we will be in control of our own destiny really. We will do 
that within an environment  of  more  self-assessment and making  sure that we are 
achieving for ourselves. Although we will be monitored, obviously we will be more in 
control of what outcomes are important to us and how we ensure that they happen 
with evidence as well […] (Div. Finance Manager Trust A) 
As  mentioned  above,  there  are  a  number  of  challenges  involved  in  achieving  FT,  but 
notwithstanding  these  difficulties  many  trusts  applied  for  the  status.  This  study  noted  a 
number of primary motivating factors for the adoption of FT status, topmost of which was the 
trust’s motivation to obtain the regulator’s approval and then to be recognised as a financially 
stable organisation, thus obtaining the privilege of regulatory freedom. Amongst the Senior 
management staff, there was the third factor of being accountable to the local people who   138 
they serve, but this was often linked with provision of a better service as reflected in the 
following quote: 
[…] From my perspective in the work that I do, attaining FT status has given us more 
empowerment, to the individual trusts and they are able to do more with their money 
instead of being overseen by another organisation.  It has enabled trusts to be more in 
control of its own funds and can invest and do all sorts of things that couldn’t be done 
in the past. It has enabled trusts to be responsible for their spending because they 
have gained empowerment. […](Treasury Manager, Trust B). 
[…] I suppose the only disadvantage (of not being an FT) is that we haven’t got the 
autonomy  that  FTs  have,  not  reporting  to  the  SHA,  direct  involvement  with  the 
Department of Health. And you can't keep your surpluses but we’re not currently 
making surplus anyway. […] (Dep. Director of Finance, Trust A). 
The general opinion was that the bureaucracy within the NHS often stifles the creativity of 
the management, thus a need for regulatory freedom. For instance, in the circumstance where 
a trust is delivering a service at a loss, they are usually unable to close down such a care 
pathway without facing sanctions from the regulators.  Regulatory bodies impose their views 
on the trust’s service delivery plan, which may put trust in financial and delivery difficulties. 
These  organisations  feel  better  off  without  the  regulatory  incursions,  as  reflected  in  the 
following quotes:   
[…] Yes, to get out of direct control of the Strategic Health Authority, the Department 
of Health and the Secretary of State, I would say for the work involved….yes, it is 
worth it. […] (Dir. Of Workforce, Trust B) 
It must also be mentioned that while actors were not asking for a self-regulatory regime, they 
were not pleased with the SHA (or CCG now) and DOH regulatory framework. The current 
regulatory system was the most blamed for the poor performance of non-FTs by the actors. 
As could be seen in the comment below, actors also commended the new regulator (Monitor) 
for the shift in focus -    
[…]I think the major thing is that our governing body has forced us to bring patient 
quality to the top of the agenda. Whether it’s because we are an FT or we have all 
observed what has happened elsewhere, Mid-Staffordshire for example, I’m not sure. 
The governing body has helped channel focus where it wasn’t before. […] (Chief 
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[…] I think it’s probably because FT is the way forward. If you want to have the 
autonomy  that  goes  with  running  an  organisation,  it  is  important  to  have  FT 
status[…] (Directorate Manager, Trust B). 
7.4  Case Study Interaction Framework 
The case study interaction framework is a depiction of the actions of the regulators, which 
ignited a reaction from the organisational actors (the institutional and Organisational actors’ 
discourse).  The  outcome  of  this  interface  resulted  in  the  phenomenon  of  struggling  for 
compliance.  This  study  found  three  main  areas  in  which  FT  implementation  were  most 
profound  in  the  NHS.  First  was  the  action  of  the  government,  which  introduced  a  new 
legislation- an establishment of rules, instituting FT Status into the NHS. These rules were set 
with a deadline for all trusts to comply with, or face the consequences of non-compliance. 
Non-compliance would be interpreted as the trust not being ‘fit for purpose’ and thereby 
incapable of operating in an FT environment. Such trusts may be taken over by other FTs, or 
a private sector organisation, to be run as a commercial entity or even merged with similar 
trusts to gain synergy for survival.  
The  second  part  of  the  interaction  was  the  response  of  NHS  organisations  to  the 
government’s  legislation.  The  establishment  of  the  rule  indeed  set  in  motion  a  rapid 
uncertainty in the entire health sector, and drew the attention of all NHS organisations to the 
FT process; this consequently resulted in the various types of organisational response shown 
in this study. The reaction was presented in the form of two separate responses from the 
organisations – first was the organisations’ coping mechanisms with diffused uncertainty in 
the sector, while the second was their pursuit of legitimacy. This was also reflected in the 
sharp  practices  displayed  by  organisational  actors.  Often  referred  to  as  managerial 
manoeuvrings, they were a form of gaming.  
The last part of the framework unveiled the outcome of the FT authorisation strategy; this 
showed the resulting effect of the FT legislation, this represents the effects or products of the 
FT rule.  
7.4.1  Emergence of Complex Rules 
The  first  action  that  took  place  following  the  introduction  of  the  FT  status  was  the 
establishing of rules and regulation. This took the form of  an enabling act that upheld the FT 
status, its power and finally its mandate. The NHS act 2006 required all NHS providers to 
adopt the new status by becoming a Foundation Hospital. The promulgation of this legislation   140 
was not without a number of resistances from various workers’ unions and in-fights within 
the political parties. The establishment of the law removed the power of the Secretary of 
State,  and  conceded  its  role  as  the  head  of  the  NHS  to  Monitor  signalled  a  clear 
demonstration of the government’s commitment to follow through with this reform. This 
meant that the new  FT organisations would no longer be accountable to the government 
through the Secretary of State, but rather to Monitor and their local population. 
The mode of implementation of the law was set into levels and phases, which started with the 
creation  and  empowerment  of  a  new  regulator.  The  empowerment  of  the  independent 
regulator of the NHS to authorise trusts that met the required criteria was enumerated in the 
NHS Act 2006 (section 35), the qualifying conditions were also highlighted in Section 35(2) 
of the Act. 
The FT assessment procedure was further broken down in terms of requirements, steps and 
phases  in  the  NHS  Act  and  other  published  schedules,  supplements  and  guidelines.  The 
authorisation criteria for FT licensure were made explicit in the Act. Monitor must ensure 
that  it  authorises  only  organisations  that  were  Legally  Constituted,  Well  governed  and 
financially viable. Monitor’s commercial approach to the process was found to be new and 
strange to the NHS way of working, as reflected in some comments - 
[…] It is very much like working in the private sector.  It is much more a private 
sector viewpoint. Things such as our working capital are very important.  If we don’t 
get our income we cannot meet our financial obligations. (Treasury Manager, Trust 
C). 
[…] So, you have Monitor with a very commercial approach, financial regulator and 
it is interesting those were the words from the new government for Monitor, alongside 
price setters.  (Director of Finance, Trust A). 
The acts required that trusts must seek the leave of its local constituents prior to engaging 
with the FT application process. Trusts conduct a public consultation to seek the view of 
individuals who lives in the proposed catchment area of the trust, failure to seek the approval 
of the local resident is a clear breach of the FT authorisation process -  
[…] Monitor must not give an authorisation unless it is satisfied that the applicant 
has sought the views about the application of the following: individuals who live in 
the  proposed  public  constituencies  if  the  trust,  individual  who  will  eligible  to  be   141 
member of the patients or service user constituency of the trust […] (NHS Act 2006 
Section 35 (5)) 
Some of the comments made by the trust staff reflect their level of engagement with the rules 
set out for the process - 
[…]  The things I like about it, are that it makes you, with the change in government 
even more, accountable for the services you provide and make you accountable to the 
local population, in a way that does not happen with non-FT, at the moment it is clear 
that my bosses sit at the SHA, with the model it makes it clear that I stand and fall on 
my local performance and ultimately responsible to the local population, for me, I live 
in  this  local  community,  all  of  my  family  lives  here,  and  ultimately  I  should  be 
responsible to them for the care I provide, not to the people sitting in Birmingham, the 
SHA is away from us and in a way Birmingham focus, as for me, I think it is about 
being in charge of your destiny, doing things that make sense to the people of north 
Staffordshire and not the people in Birmingham and I think for me that has got an 
appeal, it is quite scary, the local people can be far more of a telling boss, and they 
should be really and I think that is the right model. (Chief Executive, Trust A) 
7.4.2  Advancing a Rigorous Framework  
Engaging with the application process after obtaining public consent involved a number of 
additional criteria that had to be met by applicants. The FT requirements specified the types 
of documents that had to be submitted at each phase of assessment. The major submission 
comprised  a  Long  term  Financial  Model,  a  trust’s  Strategic  Business  Plan  and  the 
establishing of a formal governance framework. 
- Completing a Long Term Financial Model (LTFM) 
Trusts were required to complete the LTFM, which was an Excel based financial model 
designed by Monitor. The LTFM's requirement was detailed and complicated. As a result of 
the complications, most of the organisations engaged the services of financial consultants to 
populate  this  model  for  them.  The  detail  of  the  model  included  the  financial  accounting 
details of the trust, key performance indicators and graphical charts showing organisational 
performance. In the LTFM, the trust was required to show nine years-worth of accounting 
information – this consists of the historical accounting details of the last 3 years as shown in 
its published accounts), the current operating year and a forecast for 5 years. The same level   142 
of  detail  was  expected  to  be  included  in  the  trust’s  Key  Performance  information.  This 
information was shown in various forms of graphs, charts and trends within the model suite. 
The LTFM became a living document of the trust, which every member of the trust board 
was expected to familiarise themselves with and kept updated from time to time.  
- Preparing the Strategic Business Plan 
In addition to the LTFM, the trust also had to compile an integrated business plan, which 
gave detailed information of the trust’s operations covering the previous three years and the 
future plans (both strategic and operational) of the trust for the next five years. The business 
plan document was often given in a template format laid out by Monitor. The document had 
chapters  focusing  on  financial  planning,  service  development  planning,  risk  analysis, 
demographics and market analysis. 
The narrative in the business plan document mirrored the financial forecast shown in the 
LTFM. This document reflects the organisational plan and strategic goals in the medium 
term. 
- Challenge to a Formal Governance Framework 
In addition to the documents listed above, at the start of the application process, the trusts 
worked with its SHA for the assessment process. trusts were required to complete several 
forms as part of a self-assessment process and governance framework. trusts also presented 
their business plan to the TDA, discussing the challenges and prospects. The TDA evaluates 
the robustness and quality of the trust’s plans and its capacity to implement them.  
Through this process the board of the trust continuously worked with their TDA to fine tune 
several areas of the trust’s operation and governance structure, with a view to making it fit for 
the FT environment. Some comments made by respondents about the assessment rigour were 
as follows - 
[…]  I think the discipline of Foundation status was meant to be a good thing in itself. 
And it fits in with a lot of aspirations to become more business-like. And a lot of the 
stuff  that  Monitor  does,  the  way  they  approach  things  seems  to  be  much  more 
business-like,  much  more  structured  in  the  way  that  they  go  about  looking  at  an 
organisation. So, in fact it fits into our overall aspirations anyway. (Div. Finance 
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The application of FT rules was not entirely perceived as an equitable process in some circles 
of the NHS. There were issues around the loss of a trust’s individuality, the early adopter, 
especially the first and second waves of FT, were perceived to be the stronger organisations 
within the NHS, while the later adopter was seen as weak, as most of them had issues with 
finance, management and operation of the organisation, as was evidenced in some of the 
comments -  
[…] My own view is that, the government is trying to shoe horn this (FT) as an ideal 
to every trust that there is and I am not sure it works for every trust that there is […] 
(Dep. Director of Finance, Trust A). 
In  addition  to  working  with  the  TDA,  the  trust  was  expected  to  engage  with  its  major 
commissioners – The Clinical Commissioning Group. This was to ensure that its financial 
plan/forecast synchronized with its commissioner’s intention. The trust’s involvement with 
its commissioners extended to the development of new services, which the trust planned to 
deliver in the future. All these discussions had to be held with the TDA and the CCG, in order 
to be sure that the commissioners were indeed in need of the services being developed and 
willing to pay for such services within their commissioning plans. 
7.4.3  Linking Accountability Agenda 
In  an  extension  of  the  trusts’  challenge  to  a  formal  assessment  framework,  the  Monitor 
assessment guideline required trusts to engage with members of the Local Health Economy. 
As a pre-condition for FT authorization, the trusts publicized their intention to pursue FT 
authorization, providing reasons to support their decision to become a Foundation Hospital 
and seeking the support of the public in their FT application. This was done through a public 
consultation process, where a number of public meetings were held to discuss with the local 
users. This culminated into the drafting of members of the public onto the trust’s Governing 
board, an active part of the Foundation Trust board. 
The  challenge  of  drafting  membership  from  the  public  onto  the  Governor’s  board  was 
highlighted in the following quote -  
[…]There was a huge amount of communication, particularly around getting people 
involved in becoming Governors and also staff and clinical representatives and that 
required a lot of communication. […] (Directorate Manager, Trust B). 
The FT structure was sharply differentiated from any other NHS structure ever known, as a 
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organisation’s  governance feature. The inclusion of Governors  on the  trust board was  to 
foster  local  accountability  within  the  trust,  which  was  one  of  the  major  reasons  for 
introducing FT status into the NHS. Members were drawn from all walks of life through 
voting,  and  interested  parties  put  themselves  forward  for  election  onto  the  board  of 
Governors. The experience of one of the trusts on governorship is highlighted in the quote 
below- 
[…]The  principal  difference  in  FT  is  the  existence  of  Governors.    The  basis  of 
Governance within the organisation is very similar and many FTs have chosen to 
have a board structure to look the same as many non-FTs.  Ours is slightly different 
but that’s because we have chosen the type of organisation we are and not simply 
because we are an FT. So we have far more doctors on our board of Directors than is 
common in the NHS. This in turn means that the mechanisms for appointment of the 
Chairman and Executive Directors are different, because of the involvement of the 
Governors.  Accountability is to the board of Governors, which in our case, is made 
up of local patients, local population, staff, national patients and stakeholders. […] 
(Medical Director, Trust C). 
7.5  Reaction from the Trusts 
This section presents the response from the organisations to the FT requirements as they went 
through the process to achieve FT status, thereby activating the struggle for compliance. As 
mentioned above, some of the early FTs arguably had less struggle with the compliance 
criteria when compared to the late adopter, especially the star rated organisations, given their 
financial, managerial and operational capacity at the time when FT status was introduced to 
the NHS. Most of the early adopters (which are very few in number) in the waves one and 
two of the FT authorisation phase were the strong and financially viable trusts in the NHS. 
They  were  the  three  star  rated  hospitals  at  the  time.  The  authorisation  requirement  was 
relatively  compatible  with  their  existing  processes,  and  they  were  able  to  evidence  the 
required compliance in order to gain the status. This was not the same for the later trusts, 
whose background had been that of financial struggle and bail outs. 
The reaction of the trusts began after the promulgation of the FT enabling law, followed by a 
high level of uncertainty spreading through the  organisations, all the trusts responded by 
seeking legitimacy through compliance with the adoption process. However this compliance 
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7.5.1  Diffusion of Uncertainty 
The promulgation of the NHS Act 2006 created uncertainty within the NHS secondary care 
environment, as this rule required all NHS trusts to pursue the mandatory adoption of the FT 
status.  The  uncertainty  was  reflected  in  individual  trust’s  financial  stability,  structural 
integrity and robustness of its plan to sustain its funding stream.  
At the time of FT introduction, most trusts in the NHS faced several challenges to achieving a 
financial break-even, as demanded by the regulators. NHS trusts were required to achieve a 
determined  level  of  efficiency  saving  in  addition  to  their  duty  of  financial  break  even.  
Several areas of the global NHS funding stream were impacted by the general economic 
downturn,. The effect of rising inflation and population growth in the UK put enormous 
pressure on the health budget. In addition, the effects, of the liquidity challenges of previous 
years within the NHS still lingered as some trusts that had been bailed out of their financial 
deficit  were  still  in  the  bailout  repayment  cycle.  The  unpredictable  nature  of  the  entire 
government settlement scheme and the Local Health Economy (LHE) challenge diminished 
the  trusts’  concentration  on  activity  outside  their  current  year  operations.  The  following 
quotes reflected the effect of economic changes: 
[…] If you look at the NICE economic evaluation of any new procedure or drug they 
have been hugely influential in the way care services and interventions have been 
taken forward and I don’t think that is just about FT status, but the whole culture of 
healthcare is changing, but I do think we are edging closer to an independent sector 
style. […] - (Clinical Director, Trust A). 
Demographic  changes  within  Local  Health  Economies  and  individual  trust’s  challenges 
added  to  the  significant  level  of  despair  in  the  NHS,  which  culminated  into  a  state  of 
uncertainty  within  the  trusts,  thus  influencing  managers  to  take  drastic  action  to  modify 
existing service pathways in order to manage their cost within the finite financial envelope. 
This resulted in a form of an unstable environment in the medium term, as reflected in the 
following quotes: 
[…]    I  became  less  and  less  convinced  of  the  benefit  of  FT  particularly  in  this 
economic climate and particularly when you have got a large PFI sitting on the box 
as  well.  I  think  the  benefits  are  fairly  slim,  even  to  the  best  of  FTs  with  those 
circumstances operating..... […] - (Dir. Human Resources, Trust A).   146 
The  reality  of  the  changes  necessary  to  become  an  FT  linked  with  the  reactions  of  the 
organisations to ride through the economic challenges within a limited cash resource. On a 
general note, some of the actors were not confident that their trust would be able to meet the 
required criteria for them to become a FT, as reflected in the following quotes: 
[…]  I  think  the  major  difference  is  that  historically  in  the  NHS,  people  and 
departments carry out their services and they have not really paid too much attention 
to how much that service is costing. They have nominal staff, nominal pay and go on 
with the job….  Obviously, patient care is top priority and finance has to fit in with 
that, but the reality is that we have an envelope in which we have to work within […] 
- (Div. Finance Manager, Trust B). 
[…] It is changing because of the future and it is changing perhaps because of the 
current  economic  conditions.  And  in  the  future  with  Service  Line  Management 
reporting  being  implemented,  people  are  looking  to  start  decommissioning 
services….. And I think maybe that is partly to do with FT and partly to do with the 
position we are in financially in this local health economy […] (Dep. Director of 
Finance, Trust A). 
The traditional planning gap within the NHS was focused on a year to year operation, so that 
no-one planned beyond one year’s operation. The FT process required trusts to make a plan 
for  a  period  of  at  least  five  years;  this  was  strange  and  new  to  the  sector.  The  new 
requirement was seen as complex even though some actors saw it as a positive step, but 
achieving the leap from one to five years planning was a major constrain for some actors, 
both technically and structurally, as reflected in the following quotes: 
[…].    I  think  there’s  still  plenty  of  scope  for  this  organisation  to  improve  its 
forecasting  and  it’s  long  term  planning  and  it’s  becoming  increasingly  important 
given the current economic climate […] (Clinical Director, Trust A). 
[…]. There is far more emphasis on cash and the need for cash.  I mean cash as in 
working capital on the basis of being able to forecast as accurately as possible and 
the cash we are going to need in the short and long term, and certainly up to the end 
of the financial year. Whereas before it was not necessary as a trust, but there is a lot 
more emphasis on more accurate forecast as a FT.  Plus with Monitor being involved 
as well, the returns have to be recorded, it is even more important […] (Treasury 
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Uncertainty at the trust level was immediately obvious, both at the  organisational and at 
individual levels. Organisation’s inability to tick all the boxes for FT adoption sent a signal of 
non-compliance to the staff and, therefore, a feeling of despair from not knowing what would 
become  of  the  organisation  if  it  failed  to  achieve  the  FT  requirement.  The  uncertainty 
triggered employees’ low morale, as staff witnessed the trust’s reorganisation process, which 
involved several changes with no assurances of job security, especially where staff were 
required  to  re-apply  for  their  jobs.  During  this  process  many  of  them  were  left  for  a 
prolonged period in the transition tray – classified as ‘job at risk’; this low Morales in staff 
consequently resulted in the loss of many work force hours. The evidence of uncertainties in 
the working environment of actors’ was reflected in the following quote: 
[…]  Bringing  that  into  the  Divisions  now,  I  don’t  really  hear  what  is  going  on 
because it is private and confidential. All I know is that there are a lot of people out 
there who are not happy at the moment because their own post is not given to them 
again and they are applying for different ones […] (Management Account, Trust A). 
[…]  In medicine, I am not so happy and that needs to be sorted by this management 
of change. I think in principle, I was in favour of the management of change. These 
things are difficult, when you do them; they are not going to be pleasant. They need to 
be  done  as  rapidly  as  possible  so  that  people  are  not  paralyzed;  those  are  the 
problems we have. We still have new appointments to the post because there are 
people who left and some of the outcome of the recessional process was a little bit 
bizarre. You know, there some people who were displaced who weren’t as quite as 
bad as it appeared to be […] (Clinical Director, Trust A). 
7.5.2  Establishing Legitimacy 
In almost all the authorisation instances, the legitimating feature was observed. While the 
change process varied from one organisation to the other, it was a far deeper operational 
change  for  some  of  the  organisations  to  achieve  the  expected  level  of  compliance  in 
comparison  to  the  other.  The  most  radical  and  deepest  changes  were  notable  in  the  late 
adopter trust in this study.   
- Redesign of the Organisational Structure 
Trusts  attempted  to  show  compliance  to  the  TDA,  as  they  worked  in  readiness  for  the 
authorisation. The first line of rhetoric that was common in the trusts was the redesign of the 
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different and as such the structures would work differently. For a start, the adoption of FT 
presupposed the inclusion of the public into the  organisational structure, where members 
were elected onto the board of Governors, and the same schema was adopted for the re-
organisation of departments and divisions. 
The non-FT organisation merged some of its divisions to form a bigger whole and in some 
cases some divisions were shut down; this was to show the commitment of the trust to FT 
adoption. Redesign of the organisational structure was implemented in a robust manner. The 
organisation launched a programme entitled ‘Management of Change. This programme is one 
that involved staff and encouraged them to take part in the organisation redesign, by bringing 
suggestions through their line manager or even anonymously, and these suggestions were 
considered, some of which formed part of the new organisational chart. 
Divisional Heads were also required to review the existing structure of their divisions within 
the  context  of  the  organisation’s  target,  which  was  shared  at  the  strategic  level  of 
management. This focussed on building a new organisation that was fit for purpose, as the 
existing structure was adjudged to be inadequate for the FT regime. 
The first product of this programme was the redesign of a new organisational structure, which 
showed a new hierarchical arrangement of the entire trust, some of its features included a re-
naming of some divisions, the merger of some others, and the nullification of the rest. Based 
on the new organisational diagram, each Divisional Lead created a blank work force pot, 
these empty pots were later filled with staff (as will be explained in the following section) 
through  recruitment  internally,  and  then  externally.  This  process  was  to  acquire  the 
legitimacy of the regulators. A similar process was undertaken in FT ‘B’ in order to comply 
with the Monitor template. 
[…] This trust had a structure, which is similar to the current structure but I think 
what we have done over the last few years is to streamline some of the processes so 
that the Executive board really is the key decision making body from the executive 
perspective (Directorate Manager, Trust B) 
Recruitment Process in the Trusts 
The approach at the trust level was reflective of a plan to streamline the operation of the trust 
in order to fit into the FT template. The main plan was focussed on the creation of a new 
organisation that was fit for the Monitor template, with a better organisational structure as 
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the job descriptions and determining the required level of competences, which led to the 
recruitment of new staff. The trust also simultaneously introduced new training programmes 
to sharpen the skills of existing staff. 
Most of these changes focussed on the quality of the staff, thereby calling for specific types 
of competences, in specific roles. With the redrafting of the job descriptions, all jobs were 
thrown into a pool and all the staff needed to re-apply for the jobs they wanted, provided they 
possessed  the  required  qualifications  and  experience  specified  for  the  job.  This  led  to  a 
massive displacement of staff in trust ‘A’. Actors needed to go through the process of re-
applying for jobs and where they found that they were no longer competent for their ‘old 
job’, they applied for new jobs, either within their current or other departments. Actors who 
could not fit into any role were put on hold until all vacancies were filled.  
Following the filling of all vacancies, staff members without a post were given the option of 
voluntary redundancy. In the same vein, those jobs that could not be filled from the pool of 
internal staff were advertised externally to be recruited into. 
In a particular department in trust ‘A’, a recruiting company was employed to evaluate all the 
jobs available, conduct a psychometric test on the staff, which is followed by an interview 
process, then successful candidates were allocated a post, the same was confirmed in the 
quote below - 
[…] Yes there was a test, we did all of that, and they (Staff) were assessed against 
them and they could not do it… (Chief Nurse, Trust A) 
[…] A lot of people are qualified and some people are unqualified. I have noticed that 
a lot of people are worried about applying for jobs, because they haven’t got the 
qualification. They’ve got the experience, some people could have 15years experience 
in  a  particular  field  and  another  person  could  have  the  qualification but  not  the 
experience and I’m not sure where that lies with the future but a lot of people are just 
here carrying on, worried that they have not had the qualification to apply for … even 
though they have been doing the same job […] - (Management Accountant, Trust A) 
Adopting Monitor’s financial tools 
One of the strategies adopted at trust 'A' was a complete adoption of the Monitor’s tool, 
though they were yet to become an FT organisation, the trust found Monitor’s Service Line 
Management (SLM) technique useful and they implemented it, despite the understanding that 
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through their service lines, and mandated the use of the SLM for this purpose. The actor in 
this case implemented SLM ahead of its FT authorisation, to substantiate its readiness for FT.  
SLM implementation was found to be more popular amongst staff in the trust compared to 
FT status. While most of the staff were aware of the details behind the implementation of 
SLM, they showed a very patchy knowledge of FT implementation and the progress made by 
the organisation so far. Top executive staff admitted that while the use of SLM was directly 
related to the work of individual members of staff, the FT implementation was not.  
[…] First  of all I don’t know  how  much staff, understand about  FT  status.   Any 
change that will come, has to filter down through management, it takes quite a while 
and whether they actually notice any changes. I don’t think there would be significant 
change to the way they do their job […]. (Dir. Human Resources, Trust A) 
[…] I don’t think FT is discussed that much (among staff). I suppose, yes, I wouldn’t 
say this is why they lack an understanding of what being FT really means […] (Dep. 
Director of Finance, Trust A) 
7.5.3  Managerial Manoeuvring/Games 
This study also observed that in the course of FT implementation that the trusts adopted a 
number  of  strategies,  which  are  referred  to  in  this  study  as  ‘managerial  manoeuvres’  or 
‘gaming’  These  actions  were  identified  as  games,  as  they  were  purposive  activities 
undertaken to convince the TDA, and indeed Monitor, that the trust was in readiness and 
working towards the achievement of status, in a misleading manner.  
Some of the gaming strategies included the coaching of the board members ahead of the 
board to board challenge, the exclusion of staff in the FT process, and appointment at the 
board level. The Practise of gaming was part of the strategies engaged by the trusts, which 
facilitated their attempt to seeking legitimacy in the course of  struggling for compliance. 
Some of the tactics adopted were discussed below: 
Recruitment at board Level 
A major feature in most of the trusts going through FT assessment is a reshuffling of the 
board level management. The organisation – trust ‘A’, in its bid for FT status, attested to the 
reshuffling  of  members  of  both  the  Executive  and  Non-Executive  boards.  A  number  of 
recruitments were made at this level to comply with the Monitor’s rule that demanded a 
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engaged in replacing those members of the board who were perceived to be weak or not fully 
qualified within the scope of Monitor’s criteria.  
The compliance with the Monitor criteria especially within the board appointments was a 
demonstration of Monitor’s power over the trust’s ideals. It is not clear if the adoption of 
Monitor's template was in the best interest of the organisational objective. However this type 
of appointment was often based on the dictates of the current powers that presided over the 
affairs of that organisation. This is also shown in the following quote - 
[…] You have to hold on to the concept that the NHS is a huge social organisation, 
and relatively bereft of solid academic management thinking and, therefore, often 
functions on the level of anecdotal emotion. So, management of change often comes in 
with new directors or new managers. One can always justify the reasons for doing it, 
but  in  my  experience  of  nearly  30  years  in  the  Health  Service,  it  is  rarely  done 
through sound management analysis. It is usually done on the level of creating a 
structure that the individual views as fit, how that fits with their personal way of 
working. So, for me, management of changes are done often for the wrong reasons or 
at the very least through inadequate management thought and analysis and that is 
true of the Health Service. Management of change is almost a wrong use of word, 
perhaps they should call it 'boot a few people out and shuffle the chairs'[…] (Clinical 
Director, Trust A) 
On-the-job  skills  of  new  recruits  were  not  easily  testable,  especially  where  they  were 
recruited from the private sector, which has a different dynamic to the public sector. Also, 
attracting Non-Executive to the board is quite difficult for the trusts, and these posts had no 
incentive  as  most  of  them  were  not  salaried,  except  for  allowances,  which  are  usually 
minimal.  
Within the authorisation rule of Monitor, there was a very strong emphasis that members of 
the Non-Executive board must have strong financial expertise, which was partly the reason 
Monitor’s  assessment  was  perceived  to  be  more  focussed  on  the  financial  state  of  the 
organisation than any other aspect, such as health care quality. This was disclosed in the 
following quote - 
[…] Once again, there is a strong emphasis on having financial expertise in order to 
be on the board, so Non-Executives particularly, have a broad spectrum. Generally 
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who have public health or general health backgrounds[…] (Directorate Manager, 
Trust A) 
The change of board members was born out of making the organisation good or ‘robust’ for 
the FT process, and not from a genuine need of the organisation, which generally showed that 
the organisation was only ticking the boxes, and making important decision such as recruiting 
at board level in order to satisfy the regulator. Some Executive members of the board made 
the following comments - 
[…] Yes, they (Non-executive board members) are scared about it; we have looked at 
the members of the board and are currently in the process of replacing a couple, 
mainly to make ourselves more robust for FT status […] - (Director of Finance, Trust 
A) 
[…] I suppose it’s me that’s driven it in a way …I just pointed out to the trust board 
that  actually  there  was  nobody  on  the  non-execs  who  had  any  recent  relevant 
commercial, non-public sector experience! My recommendation was that we co-opted 
people,  however  the  chairman  decided  to  go  to  appoint  an  additional  new  non 
executive, which has finally come through, we have also had a member not to be 
renewed this time and there is another non exec who may not go past September.  We 
have had two new members appointed one with an interesting mix of commercial and 
public sector experience, which I think the blend will be quite useful and another pure 
private sector, a chairman of a company that is in the FM market.  What we are 
hoping these two individuals will do is to provide a little more edge to the trust board 
and its discussions a little more commerciality or what I called when I first came here 
“healthy business thinking”  the key being the  “health” and “business thinking” […] 
-(Director of Finance, Trust A) 
Staff Communication  
Staff at the Senior and board level status were found to be up to date with communications 
relating  to  the  trust's  FT  application  progress  in  comparison  to  the  staff  members  at  the 
Middle to Junior levels in trust A. The information available to staff below the management 
level was patchy, and so staff at this level lacked the information or knowledge about the FT 
process, which to a great extent affected their day to day activities. This study observed that 
changes were constantly being made to the organisational process at the operational level 
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Some of the board members argued that FT reform did not affect the work process of the 
middle and lower level staff directly. However it was evident from observation that most of 
the  changes  made  at  the  organisational  level  had  a  direct  influence  on  the  Divisional 
structures, which affected the group of staff in question. In most cases, actors at the non-
management level were frustrated by the lack of information, especially with the tangible 
degree of uncertainty lingering over them. The study showed that the poor information flow 
in the organisation was well known amongst the management staff as well.  
From the interviews, there are evidences that front-line staff discussed other organisational 
changes  and  events  except  the  FT  implementation  amongst  themselves,  because  FT  was 
generally seen as an exclusive business of the Senior Management, as shown in the following 
quotes-  
[…] General information flow between colleagues is pretty good. As regards FT it’s 
not something that we tend to discuss or talk about really, it’s not something that we 
can get involved in at the staff level […] (Payment Officer, Trust A). 
An inter-organisational comparison between the aspiring FT case study and the fully licensed 
FTs regarding the issue of communication flow, showed that staff in the FT organisations 
were fully aware of the FT process and their management gave regular updates on the process 
in staff meetings, and other various ways such as email shots etc. The FT case organisation, 
being  an  early  adopter  pointed to  the fact  that they were  a financially and operationally 
stronger organisation, and were never shy away from updating staff about the process. This 
comparison further confirmed the greater struggle witnessed in late adoption of FT.   
One  of  the  Directors  in  trust  ‘B’  explained  the  events  within  the  trust  at  the  time  of 
application for FT; the process of communication at the trust showed a lot of openness from 
the management towards the staff as seen in the quote -  
[…] We did a lot of communication at the time because we wanted to make sure 
people were aware of the issues and what the opportunities were. We also wanted to 
make sure that everyone was clear that it wasn’t a move out of the NHS […] (Chief 
Executive, Trust B).  
Foundation Trust Disconnect from Accountability 
The late adopter trust’s disconnect from accountability emphasises the observation discussed 
in  section  6.1.14.  At  the  instance  of  the  mandatory  public  consultation,  which  is  a  pre-
requisite for FT approval, the trust interacted actively with the public for the purpose of   154 
achieving  public  support,  this  unveiled  another  artificial  compliance  for  the  purpose  of 
legitimacy. There was no clear evidence of trust’s commitment to remain accountable to the 
public,  in  spite  of  the  participation  of  the  public  group  as  Governor  on  the  trust  board 
membership. 
There were evidence of Governor’s exclusion in some areas of the trust’s business classified 
as  ‘Private  board  matters’,  there  were  also  a  number  of  indications  suggesting  that  the 
members of the board of Governors did not fully understand their role within the trust board.  
Coaching the Member of the board 
The last feature of the managerial manoeuvring was observed in the coaching of the members 
of the board ahead of the board to board challenges. The aim of this encounter was to assess 
individual board member’s capacity, testing their knowledge of the trust’s strategies, service 
and financial plans. 
In trust ‘A’, the board members undertook a periodic training specifically focussed on the 
board to board challenge. The trust organised off-site sessions titled 'away days' or 'board 
Development Programme' exclusively for board members. The sessions were a forum, where 
board members were trained and updated on the expectations and the kind of challenges that 
must be anticipated in a proper board to board scenario.  
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  board  development  programme  was  popular  among  all  the 
organisations. It was being used as a means to keep the board members up to date on issues 
surrounding the trust. However this is not the same as the act of coaching and practicing 
likely  questions  to  be  asked  in  the  board  challenge  event,  for  a  straight  regurgitation  as 
observed in trust ‘A’. This highlighted the general lack of confidence or the inadequacy of the 
board’s  capability.  This  was  affirmed  in  a  quote  from  one  of  the  organisers  of  board 
development programme in the trust – 
[…] Board Development- It is about looking at the skill and to know if there any gap 
in their (board member) skills and then trying to fill in those gaps. It’s educating the 
board members a little bit about the days ahead, which they are working towards. 
Just about the same for financial skills, management skills, more management skills 
and that’s what it is […] (Dir. Human Resources, Trust A). 
 […] On Communication and Understanding at the top level- We have done a lot of 
board  developments  like  the  seminar;  the  board  seminars,  they  are  development 
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Plan (IBP) and use the IBP as the key document. Mr. X would take the LTFM and 
report back to the board every six months. And we also keep them briefed, in terms of 
what the SHA is saying etc […] (Clinical Director, Trust A). 
[…] I think if you are to hold a mock board to board,  2 years ago and now, I would 
hope that you will see an improvement in the board of directors, in terms of evidence, 
we have given the board financial information, which has influenced their decision 
[…] (Dir. of Strategy/Planning, Trust A). 
Aside from the board development programmes, there were other programmes of training on 
which board members were enrolled. This involved the employment of consulting firms to 
sharpen the skills of the members ahead of the board challenge. This was highlighted in the 
quote below by a member of the board - 
[…]Board development work! I think that will grow even more. Together we are all 
doing the cadet programme organised by Kings Fund, and that has helped us focus as 
well. There is a lot going on with the board at the moment […] (Chief Nurse, Trust 
A). 
On a general note, the involvement of the Trust board in the entire programme was often to 
signal the trust’s readiness to become an FT to the regulators. This does not in any way 
guarantee the continued commitment of the trust to FT status, but it was, however a means of 
gaining legitimacy and ensuring organisational survival. 
7.6  Outcome of Interaction 
The outcome of the interaction between the government’s directives and the organisational 
response has a direct consequence, which has been summarized under three major headings 
namely–  Organisational  Efficiency  Effect,  Intra-organisational  destabilisation  Effect  and 
Inter-organisational Behavioural Influence. The outcomes enumerated below were exhibited 
to varying degrees in each of the organisations depending on the state of the organisation at 
the time when the status was adopted. 
7.6.1  Organisational Business Planning  
The FT regime had a profound influence on the organisations’ financial planning, especially 
their engagement with the use of the Long Term Financial Model. The Outcome was more 
evident in the budgeting operations of the organisations, such as the budget planning cycle, 
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were four organisational planning effects that resulted as a direct upshot of an organisation’s 
response in the course of struggling for compliance.  
The organisations were pressured to think differently, by having a longer term view of their 
budgetary plan, thereby cultivating  an increased reliance on the mechanism of budgetary 
control, effective use of risk analysis in organisational planning and the inclusion of Service 
Line Management in financial reporting.  
- A Longer Term View of Budgetary Plan  
The implementation of FT rules required the completion of the Long Term Financial Model, 
which demanded forward planning of at least five years. The mandatory use of this model 
necessitated a holistic strategy on the part of each organisation to formulate a robust plan 
with the inclusion of its commissioners. The trusts became more attracted to the business of it 
commissioners, thereby gaining a better understanding of its CCG’s plan and its direction of 
investment in the long term. This understanding informed the trusts about which services 
were  required  by  its  major  commissioners.  It  also  improved  the  trust's  views  about  the 
marketing of its spare capacity to other outlets that required such services. This is all new to 
the NHS organisations, dissimilar to the way they operated prior to the introduction of the FT 
status as shown in the following quote - 
[…] I think the major difference (between FTs and Non-FTs) is that historically in the 
NHS people and departments carry out their services and they have not really paid 
too much attention to how much that service is costing. They have nominal staff, 
nominal pay and go on with the job.  With the advent of FT, and becoming more so in 
the NHS, they are better at it and profitability is key because people need to say, what 
is this service bringing to the organisation in terms of income, quality issues, how 
well are patients being treated.  Obviously, patient care is top priority and finance 
has to fit in with that, but the reality is that we have an envelope in which we have to 
work within […] (Div. Finance Manager, Trust B) 
The LTFM created an increased awareness and better understanding of the business drivers, 
such as the service capacity and the marketability of services amongst the actors. Budgetary 
planning became more meaningful in the various Divisions within the organisations. The use 
of the LTFM created a meaningful approach to the way trusts carried out their business as 
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[…] FT has raised awareness of profitability of services, which in turn has raised 
awareness of appropriate remuneration for different kinds of work and that has been 
a  particular  issue  for  complex  organisations  dealing  with  very  high  risk  patients 
requiring  detailed  analysis  of  the  kind  you  would  do,  as  FT  might  need  you  to 
recognise complex cases not being remunerated. So the combination of the financial 
rigour required of a FT and understanding profitability with the individualisation of 
financial  flow  through  PBR  has  uncovered  some  of  these  areas  where  costs  and 
income  do  not  match  and  organisations  have  to  bear  that  in  mind  when  they 
determine their repertoire of services and focussing their efficiency and productivity 
efforts. […] (Directorate Manager, Trust B). 
- Increased Reliance on the Mechanism of Budgetary Control 
The robust financial plan created by the LTFM and the self-regulatory regime became a 
building block that enabled the FT organisations to get better at managing their financial 
situations;  thus  reducing  the  element  of  surprise  that  was  usually  the  case  at  end  of  the 
financial year. The status conferred the right for the trust to be adequately remunerated for 
work done and this right extended the freedom for the trust to resort to the judicial option for 
services not paid for by the CCGs. While non FT organisations lacked the right to sue for 
debt owed to it, FT organisations were able to use this option, with which, they were able to 
rely better on their financial plan and be rest assured of not losing income. 
[…]  FT  has  brought  business-like  thinking  into  the  NHS,  an  understanding  of 
profitability, which in turn means a better understanding of costs, which ought to 
make it possible to either run the NHS with the same money but with better outputs, or 
the  same  outputs  with  less  money  because  of  the  greater  understanding  of  the 
financial position.  It has brought more interesting thinking in terms of use of physical 
assets e.g. buildings, and I think it has generally upped the pace in financial thinking 
[…] (Clinical Director, Trust B) 
As a result of the status, the Service Level Agreement contract between the CCGs and the 
trust became a much more credible and reliable piece of document that is binding on both 
parties, performance under the contract was an assurance of income for the trust and non-
performance could easily be monitored on a monthly basis, thereby eliminating failure and 
the need for arbitration at year end, as was reflected in the following quote:   158 
[…]  FT  gives  opportunities  in  term  of  financial  freedom,  working  in  a  more 
disciplined  way  within  the  Monitor  financial  framework  as  an  organisation  […] 
(Chief Executive, Trust C).  
- Increasing the Accounting Role through Divisional Empowerment  
One of the major requirements for FT organisations was the adoption of a financial planning 
tool known as the Service Line Management (SLM). The use of SLM allowed the trusts to 
manage their organisational performance through the service lines, which basically devolved 
budgetary control to the Divisions. As a result, individual divisions were able to assess their 
performance and to ascertain whether they were a profit-or-loss making service centre. Also 
at organisational level, the trusts were able to understand the level of performance of each of 
their services. SLM proved to be a useful tool for the organisation, enabling them to set levels 
of investment and targets for Divisional Heads, with the assessment and monitoring of these 
targets made easier with the SLM tool. The use of this tool empowered individual Divisional 
Managers to better manage their costs, as explained in the following quotes: 
[…] I think it's back to the philosophy that the power has to go down to the lowest 
level, you know we are trying to link the SLM to Directorate Manager and Clinical 
Directors, in term of the management structure, we are going along this line anyway,. 
The argument is that do you need to be an FT to go along this line, I think  you don’t, 
but I think it fits in with the FT philosophy along  devolution to the lowest possible 
level at clinical level and that is why things make sense […][…] (Chief Executive, 
Trust A). 
[…]Well, potentially a lot of benefits. I think within the organisation itself, it means 
we become much more rigorous in the way we do things, we look at the financial 
planning of the organisation and it fits in the Service Line Management process that 
we put in place. […] (Div. Finance Manager, Trust B). 
The  adoption  of  the  SLM  system  in  the  trust  was  found  to  be  more  popular  in  the 
organisations than the implementation of the FT itself. While most of the staff found SLM 
easy to explain and relate to, majority of them do not understand the FT process as they did 
with SLM, as reflected in the following quotes: 
 […]  Reporting  has  changed  in  a  way  as  in  you  hear  a  lot  about  Service  Line 
Reporting, Service Line Management and communication. On that in our departments 
has been really good because we have everything improving and we have a lot about   159 
that – SLM that has cascaded really well. But apart from that in what we do, I don’t 
think a lot has changed with FT. […] (Div. Finance Manager, Trust A). 
The  introduction  of  SLM  was  an  absolute  delight  to  some  of  the  Divisional  Managers, 
because they were able to access their Divisional performance at the touch of a button and are 
also  able  to  make  immediate  corrective  action  where  they  believed  the  service  was 
performing below the required expectation, as reflected in the following quote: 
[…] FT status says we need to have Service Line Management, that’s why we are 
doing it. But it’s always been sold as we have some financial challenges, we need to 
understand where our expenditure goes, we need to understand where we get the 
income in, and Service Line Management helps us do that. It helps put the clinicians 
in the centre of it and that will lead to a better Trust and a better hospital and more 
efficient and productive hospital, rather than, we’re doing this to get FT status […] 
(Dep. Director of Finance, Trust A). 
- Effective use of Risk Analysis for Spending Plan 
The adoption of FT status created a new way of working, as seen in the use of risk analysis in 
the organisations. Prior to the adoption of FT, development of services in the organisations, 
did not necessarily require being risk assessed. Monitor’s way of working is through risk 
assessment (Monitor, 2008).  At the back of the LTFM completion, is the Financial Risk 
Rating scoring mechanism, which became a basis for measuring the risk inherent in various 
projects. This study observed that recent service developments in the trusts adopted the risk 
rating metric, which gave a better grounding for the organisation’s decision making process. 
Observing the process of business case approval revealed that all the organisations in this 
study have  adopted the Monitor Risk  Rating business  plan template; this  is  a  prescribed 
standard  template,  which  worked  on  the  basis  of  risk  rating  metric.  The  organisation’s 
knowledge and quantification of the effect of risks in their business has improved with the 
use of this template. Risk assessment discipline is further highlighted in the following quotes: 
[…] so I think we are operating in a different way. It’s not less, because we are 
putting lot’s more work into things like risk management but many people would say 
you should be doing that anyway. […] (Chief Executive, Trust B). 
[…] I think the financial risk management has been more sophisticated in FT. I think 
the non-financial risk and the assurance framework is broadly similar. However, I am 
speaking from the experience of only one FT and maybe Imperial was in a more   160 
advanced position than some other organisations, but the financial risks, because of 
the framework set by Monitor, how to assess financial robustness is better developed.  
Many aspiring FTs, are now using the same methods that Monitor have put in place 
for FTs. […] (Treasury Manager, Trust B) 
Intra-Organisational Destabilisation Effect 
Some  of  the  outcomes  of  organisations’  pursuit  of  FT  compliance  were  classified  as  a 
destabilisation mechanism to the organisational routines, as they affected the smooth running 
of the organisations. These were influences created as a direct result of the trusts’ pursuit of 
FT  authorisation.  To  varying  degrees,  the  organisations  were  left  with  the  additional 
challenge of undertaking additional work, which included convincing staff of the sincere 
nature of the reform, which extends in some instances to engaging with the staff and the 
public  with  the  view  to  convincing  them  that  the  FT  reform  works.  The  desire  for  FT 
authorisation  led  to  the  creation  of  a  self-focussed  plan,  false  confidence  in  a  one-off 
certification, and a distraction from organisational performance, as explained below: 
1. Formulation of Ambitious Plans 
Ambitious forecasts in the Long Term Financial Model refers to the budgets or plans whose 
inputs were creatively made in order to align with the unsubstantiated aspirations of the trust, 
rather than achievable organisational targets. This was reflected in the way the Five years 
plans of the trusts were drawn up. Achieving a financial risk rating of a minimum of three out 
of  five  was  a  major  requirement  for  all  would-be  FT  organisations,  and  this  risk  rating 
became the basis on which the self-focussing plans were based. It was a common knowledge 
within some of the organisations that the trusts would struggle to achieve such levels of risk 
rating, but in order to achieve FT status, ambitious plans, which were undeliverable were 
coupled together, which in itself is a way of setting the trust up for failure in the future.  
This was noted in one of the Service Development Plans proposed by trust ‘A’, where the 
trust planned to derive an income stream from a new service, while on the same service 
design, it made an assumption, which cut deep into the pay in order to achieve the required 
efficiency savings. The outcome of the service development showed an ambitious plan that 
was unachievable as there was insufficient provision for personnel cost to undertake the work 
involved.  This is also evidenced in the following quote: 
[…]Yes in two ways. Firstly the fact that Monitor set their financial risk rating by 
reference to a comprehensive set of financial measures, it has really forced us to be   161 
very aware of these particular matrix, to ensure that when we plan, we plan to be at a 
risk rating of no less than 4, and that drives us to ensure that all our financial plans 
are deliverable. Monitor has raised the profile of that aspect of risky […] (Director of 
Finance, Trust A). 
[…]  XXX  organisation,  for  instance,  were  in  a  sound  position,  but  trying  to  put 
together a five-year plan, when there is no indication or where a source funding is not 
obvious, It’s almost an impossible challenge for them at this time. […] (Directorate 
Manager, Trust B). 
2. One off Certification 
One of the major consequences of FT status was the effect of the one-off certification. Trusts 
were  assessed  at  a  specific  point  in  time,  in  the  life  of  the  organisation  to  become  a 
Foundation Hospital. Depending on the performance of the trust at that particular point in 
time, they may succeed or fail in becoming an FT.  A report from Monitor highlighted the 
fact that Seventeen out of the Eighty Five trusts that were licensed as FTs were in significant 
breach of their Terms of Authorization within only eight years of operation (Monitor, 2012). 
This raised a number of queries about the integrity of the assessment process; it also casts a 
shadow of doubt on the FT rigour, given the complexity of the framework and the level of 
rigour involve, failure of FT organisations produced by such framework taints the image of 
Monitor too, whether its framework was sufficient to guarantee the emergence of a robust 
organisation, capable of regulating themselves and ensuring survival in the long run. The 
resultant effect of positional certification has led to a number of other significant problems 
already and still has the potential to lead to a more costly health service: 
a. Poor quality of service 
The poor service delivered by some NHS organisations had been a headline issue in the 
media;  in  some  instances  patient  mortality  had  been  involved,  with  a  calling  for  the 
intervention of the government from the citizens.  
b. High cost of regulation 
Constant intervention by the government and Monitor in hospital management as a result of 
trust’s  delivery  of  a  poor  care  quality  could  significantly  increase  the  cost  of  regulating 
hospitals. Further cost spent on investigations, litigations and out of court settlement could 
impact not only on the organisation's image, but also organisations’ liquidity and eventually 
its survival. Such is the case with the Midstaffordshire Hospital, which has proved expensive   162 
to the government in term of the amount spent in setting up enquiry panels to investigate the 
organisation’s failings.. 
c. A High rate of hospital failure 
One-off  assessment  of  hospitals  for  the  conferment  of  FT  status,  does  not  guarantee  a 
sustainable high performance of the organisation. Where organisations are awarded the cape 
mark of FT and subsequently lack the necessary know-how to stand as an independent entity 
in terms of managing itself, the Health Care sector is likely to be inundated with a high 
number of failing hospitals. 
3. Organisational Distractions  
The length of time it takes to go through the process of FT authorisation was perceived to be 
a major distraction for the organisations, and the FT process continues to be time-constrained 
and stringent. Monitor’s timetable spans over a period of 18-months, through which the board 
Executives and a few others in the organisations are engaged in the assessment rigours, in 
addition to their daily organisational routine. The effort and dedication required of the trust in 
this process was phenomenal. One of the actors described the work load as two and half times 
the  normal  work  schedule  of  an  Executive  member.  Another  actor  attested  that  the  FT 
process distracts the management’s attention away from the daily routines in trust ‘C’ and 
that while focussing on achieving the FT milestone, the trust’s performance in some of its 
clinical targets dipped. 
4. Creation of Dual Reporting Lines 
A majority of trusts that applied for FT status were attracted by the organisational freedom it 
gives, from the CCG and TDA incursions, which in itself reflects the central government’s 
control.  Evidence from the trusts showed that whilst FT organisations were regulated by 
Monitor, they were still constantly required to submit data returns to their TDAs, though they 
were not obliged to do so by regulation. The organisations feared that shunning the requests 
from the TDA might create a bad relationship, which could be costly to the trust.  
This meant that FT organisations reports to two masters with different operating formats. 
Experience in one of the trusts unveiled that the trust sends its returns to Monitor and then 
amends the same report for the purpose of sending it to the TDA, the amendment of the 
report is necessary to make it fit the TDA’s acceptable format. This is often a loss of working 
hours in favour of organisational legitimisation, it is also an evidence of non-realisation of the   163 
FT freedom promised - a failure on the part of Monitor to deliver the regulatory framework 
promised to FTs.  
5. Spreading ‘Fear Factor’ within organisation 
Another organisational impact is rooted in the organisation’s fear of the unknown. This was 
one of the major reasons why some organisations applied to become FT, especially amongst 
the  late  applicants.  Actors  often  referred  to  some  threats  made  by  the  regulators, 
presupposing that the Management board of any organisation that was unable to achieve the 
status  for  their  organisation  would  be  replaced.  This  pressure  added  to  the  need  for 
organisations to seek legitimizing themselves by all means.  
6. Depletion of Staff  Morale 
The overall morale of staff in Trust ‘A’ was negatively affected by the events that unfolded 
with the organisation’s decision to apply for the FT status. Given that the NHS had witnessed 
a number of reforms, one after the other, for several years, it took a lot of effort from the 
Executives to explain and convince their staff about the benefits of FT status.  There was 
evidence of cynicism amongst the staff and a general lack of trust that FT status offered 
anything good to the organisation or to themselves as individual members of staff.   Some of 
the comments made include - 
[…].Staff  feel really down because every year, we come back to say we need to plan 
more cost savings, we need improve efficiency, we need to do this or that, I think it is 
more like demoralising to staff. When we put that hand in hand with why do we have 
to do this, are we really doing this in order to get FT status?  I think that colours their 
vision for FT status. Rather than seeing the FT state as something to aspire to, it's 
seen  as  something  the  Executives  aspire  to  get,  therefore,  we  have  this  cost 
pressures. . […] - (Dep. Director of Finance, Trust A). 
7. De-Linked FT reform from Trust Core Duty 
The introduction of FT reform in all the trusts affected all departments in one way or the 
other. This is in terms of the re-organisation and restructuring of various departments; these 
changes  cannot  however  be  traced  to  the  clinical  roles  of  the  organisations,  which  was 
primarily  the  patient  care.  Actors  witnessed  and  attested  to  these  changes  in  their 
departments, a change in board composition, changes in line-reporting and the format of 
reporting  in  various  ways,  but  they  were  yet  to  see  any  meaningful  change  in  the  care 
pathway that is currently in use, which would influence the overall experience of patients.   164 
[…] I don’t think it has entered their psyche at all. I think whether an FT or not, 
probably it doesn’t matter .......... clinical staff generally judge how they do on clinical 
outcomes and their academic position and the research that they undertake, but for 
me FT or not, for the staff, I would have thought it wouldn’t matter what we did, 
unless they see something tangible that impacts on their daily clinical work, I can’t 
see the difference it would make to their psyche […] - (Medical Director, Trust C). 
The  implementation  of  FT  status,  no  doubt  affected  both  the  clinical  and  non-clinical 
departments of the trusts, but very little effect on care pathways itself. A Nursing Manager 
commented  that  the  only  change  in  the  organisation  that  would  ever  be  obvious  to  the 
patients was the change in the organisation’s name, it would only be noticeable, if the patient 
ever read the signboard located outside the building. Most of the actors emphasised that the 
attainment of FT status was to make the organisation more efficient and to operate more 
effectively, and that this had very little to do with the care function of the organisation. This 
is reflected in the following quote: 
[…] This is not due to lack of effort of the team that are doing it, but I think staff are 
not interested in FT, it makes no difference to a doctor or a nurse or a cleaner, he is 
still got to go clean the floor, he is still seeing the patients, so FT makes no difference 
at all […] - (Clinical Director, Trust A). 
7.6.2  Inter-Organisational Behavioural Effects 
The  most  significant  inter-organisational  influence  noticed  in  the  course  of  FT 
implementation was the comparison made by the  actors between organisations. This was 
common among actors in trust ‘A’ (the late adopter organisation), these comparisons tend to 
shape  the  behaviours  of  the  actors  and  influence  their  decision  on  FT  adoption.  They 
compared their organisation with similar (in size, services provided etc) organisations, which 
they perceived to be doing well and had achieved the FT authorisation. The basis being that if 
the other organisation can achieve the FT status, then they must also be able to achieve the 
same.  
Given that some of the organisations had benchmarking partners within and outside their 
Local Health Economy, there was a constant surveillance of what other organisations (who 
are perceived to be good) were doing. This comparison influences their decision, whereby 
they  copy  the  actions  of  the  perceived  successful  organisation.  In  other  words,  some 
organisations only put themselves forward for FT assessment because other organisations,   165 
perceived  to  be  at  the  same  level  and  perhaps  benchmarking  partners  had  succeeded  at 
achieving the FT status. Inter-organisational pressure was identified as a source of mimetic 
influence in the late adopter organisation. 
The non-FT organisation that participated in this research did not make a formal application 
to become a FT organisation until five years after FT had been introduced; the organisation 
delayed the application because of its financial and operational challenges. However they 
constantly compared themselves with an FT organisation in the local area and firmly reckon 
that if that other organisation could achieve FT status, then there is nothing stopping them 
from  achieving  the  same  feat.  The  management  board  sent  staff  to  a  number  of  FTs  to 
understudy what makes them strong with a view to implementing the same.  
The trust ‘A’ only applied for the FT status, at a time when the FT concept had become fairly 
well embedded in the NHS system. Key staff within the organisation believed that the major 
benefits, which made FT adoption attractive at the earlier stage were no longer in existence; 
therefore, applying was strictly for the purpose of getting the FT badge.  
Key staff in the Non-FT case organisation asserted that being an FT would  bring some 
benefits, but not as many as the benefits enjoyed by early adopters, but also not being an FT 
meant ‘not belonging’ in the Health Care Sector.  
Judging  from  the  trust’s  motivation  to  become  an  FT,  they  were  simply  steered  by  two 
different influences, firstly, by an inter-organisational pressure, from which they made other 
organisations a yardstick to gauge their chance of success and secondly by the need to seek 
survival, which emanated from the government’s threat to close the FT gateway at a certain 
date (Currently March 2014).  
7.7  Summary 
This chapter discussed the second construct of the thematic analysis, where the 17 first order 
constructs were layered with NIS and the researcher’s experience of the Healthcare sector to 
form  the  final  9  themes,  called  the  second  construct  of  the  research.  The  chapter  also 
provided a summary of the process undertaken to reclassify into themes, highlighting the 
relationship between the themes, thereby justifying the emergence of the core code, which 
shows the organisations’ Struggle for Compliance. The thematic synthesis flagged up the 
central  position  of  accounting  as  the  main  instrument,  a  tool  to  control  and  make  the 
organisations comply with the Authority’s directives. It elaborates the interaction between the 
action  of  the  government,  the  reaction  of  the  organisations  and  the  outcome  of  this   166 
interchange. The next chapter discusses the core code in detail in line with extant literature, 
showing the findings of the research in detail.    167 
Chapter 8 
Thematic Analysis of Struggling for Compliance 
8.0  Introduction 
This chapter describes the engagement of the thematic analysis of a struggle for compliance 
in the light of relevant extant literature. The purpose of using NIS as a lens was to build a 
robust understanding of the FT phenomenon and to ascertain the relevance of the theory to 
the behaviour of the NHS organisations unveiled in this study. NIS has been discussed in 
detail already in Chapter three, and so this chapter focuses on the new institutional Sociology 
(NIS) and its relevance to the findings of this study. 
8.1  Research Discussion in the light of NIS 
Adoption of innovation has been discussed in general from several theoretical perspectives, 
including institutional  theory.  In particular, the  NIS  possesses an  appropriate framework, 
which covers the same corollaries observed in the implementation of the FT reform in the 
NHS. In the choice of a theoretical lens for this study, a relationship was established between 
the subject of the research, the nature or context of the actor's environment and, the most 
appropriate way to extract knowledge from these actors and their setting.  
This research captured three specific events in the process of FT adoption, originating from 
the behaviour of the actors within the organisational setting, as shown in Figure nine below. 
The first event was the mode of interaction between the various actors, both at the macro- and 
micro-levels of the organisation, which reflected the actions of the regulators. The second 
was the reaction of the NHS organisations, while the third was the outcome or the resultant 
effect of the first and second process.  
The general sense drawn from the FT implementation process exposed the central aspect of 
the  finding,  which  represents  the  core  phenomenon  in  the  entire  FT  mechanism.  The 
organisations’ struggle with the adoption of the FT innovation immediately became obvious 
as the central result of this study. Persistent attention to the process of FT implementation 
uncovered the organisations’ struggle in their bids to comply with the various formalities 
required to  achieve the FT authorisation. Investigating the process of FT implementation 
assisted in understanding the nature of the accounting and governance change involved in FT, 
and the response of organisational actors to the regulator’s push to adopt the FT status.   168 
 
Figure 10- Struggling for Compliance - Summary of the central phenomenon 
In the assessment of the interactions at both the macro- and micro-levels, the macro-level 
described the interaction between the regulating bodies of the NHS (TDA, Monitor, DoH and 
other NHS trusts) and the individual NHS organisation; this was noted as a type of an inter-
organisational field, because these bodies remained an external constituent of the NHS trusts. 
There were also the micro-level relationships, known as the intra-organisational field, this 
represents the NHS organisation itself (workforce) and its environment, including its cultural 
and  administrative  practices.  The  micro-layer  of  the  relationship  was  that  aspect  of  the 
institution  that  was  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  FT  innovation,  directly 
influenced by the rules and pressures to adopt the FT change. Also enclosed within the micro-
level were the managerial manoeuvrings or attempts to acquire legitimacy in the process of 
achieving the FT authorisation, which was  addressed in the NIS as  common methods of 
employing buffering and bridging mechanisms (Scott, 2003). 
The core phenomenon identified in this study emanated from the formal rule or directive, 
which consisted of two subcategories, namely, the organisations’ motivation for adopting the 
FT  reform  and  the  attendant  difficulties  experienced  in  the  course  of  implementing  the 
reform.  The coercive and subsequent mimetic influence noted in the organisations’ adoption 
of the new rule was extensively addressed in NIS and in loose coupling literature (Burns and   169 
Scapens, 2000; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Lukka, 2007; Modell, 2002; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 
2003).  
The motivating factor behind the NHS organisations’ push for the adoption of the FT status 
was wholly driven by a coercive pressure from the macro-environment, in the form of rule 
enacted by the NHS regulating body; the rule mandated the organisations to seek the FT 
status as a requirement for continuing existence. Therefore, in reaction to the establishment of 
rules, the NHS trusts embarked on a number of strategies to engage with the challenges 
imposed  by  the  new  ways  of  working,  set  out  in  the  NHS  Act  2006.  The  organisations 
responded in two main phases, the first was directed at the uncertainty diffused within the 
organisations by the complex rule and the second was the use of a game-like compliance and 
managerial  manoeuvring  to  circumvent  the  rules  within  a  reasonable  and  acceptable 
boundary, in an attempt to seek legitimacy.  
This reaction was found to be synonymous with the NIS description of organisations’ attempt 
to gain legitimacy, either as an instrumental or ceremonial feature (Suchman, 1995). In the 
FT  instance,  there  was  a  more  elaborate  focus  on  the  concept  of  institutional 
entrepreneurship, which offered fresh insights into understanding the rise of new institutions 
through  the  introduction  of  actors  and  human  agency  roles  (DiMaggio,  1988;  Fligstein, 
1991). Similarly, the concept of loose coupling was implicated in the actor’s behaviour, this 
explains the ceremonial adoption of the FT reform and the display of attendant power and 
self-interests  of  the  managers  within  the  web  of  policy  adoption  in  the  organisations. 
(Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Collier, 2001; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Tsamenyi et al., 
2006). 
The final phase of analysis dealt with the outcome of an interaction between the institutional 
actor (the Government and Monitor) and the Organisations, which resulted in a mixture of 
positive and negative consequences. The outcome was broadly in line with NIS findings in 
other  studies,  it  reveals  the  response  of  the  organisations  to  institutional  processes,  the 
consequence  of  which  may  result  in  the  acquisition  of  legitimacy,  with  or  without  the 
achievement of internal efficiency. The results also showed that the degree of legitimacy 
acquired and efficiency achieved is an indication of the extent of the buffering of the new 
rules  to  the  actual  practices  within  the  organisations  (Covaleski  and  Dirsmith,  1983; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).   170 
8.2  Struggling for Compliance within the organisational Framework 
Struggling for Compliance illustrates the core finding from the study of FT implementation 
within the NHS as highlighted in 7.3. The study found that the reason behind the struggle 
within the organisations was rooted in the organisations’ desire to acquire legitimacy through 
the implementation of a complex FT rule; the adoption process is also located within the 
context of organisational power relations and managerial manoeuvring.  
8.2.1  Struggling for Compliance: A shift in organisational routine 
Organisations' struggle for compliance with the implementation of Foundation Status reform 
referred to the determination of the actors to align with the mandatory requirement of their 
regulators, by complying with all the accounting and governance changes required in order to 
qualify for a new status. This process involved a lot of rigour and complexity in terms of the 
stipulated target in the assessment pathway. Some of the changes introduced by the new rule 
include a change from the conventional annual budgetary practices, adoption of a new risk 
rating system and the diffusion of a new governance template.  
The FT rule extended the organisations’ planning horizon from one year to a minimum of 
five years. Generally, aspirant FT organisations were required to present a five year plan on 
the Monitor’s LTFM, at post-authorisation the requirement became reduced to a three-yearly 
plan.  Considering  the  unpredictable  nature  of  service  delivery  parameters,  such  as  the 
political,  economic,  cultural  and  demographic  changes,  the  actors  complied  with  the 
requirements but with difficulty, firstly, because they lack the necessary manpower with such 
skill set and secondly making an accurate, or near accurate plan for the period stipulated 
within the set of information in their possession was a tall order, if they were to achieve any 
degree of certainty. However, because the requirement was an institutional rule necessary for 
the achievement of the FT status, non-compliance with the rule was not an option. 
In addition to the challenge of five year forecast, the NHS organisations were also required to 
seek the support of the members of the public in their bid for FT status. Engagement in a 
public consultation process, meant the trust board must be involved with road shows and 
meetings with members of the public in locations within the local community, to explain their 
intention to adopt FT innovation, and also  to seek public membership onto the organisation's 
board of Governance. This public engagement was an additional task to the normal role of the 
managers, which added to the struggle, as it demanded additional time and dedication from 
the trust management.    171 
The study noted that the organisations, faced with the various FT challenges, engaged in 
several  gaming  strategies  to  comply  with  the  mandate  (Modell,  2001).  This  type  of 
compliance  was  referred  to  as  a  ceremonial  compliance  rather  than  an  instrumental 
conformity. Ceremonial compliance was often noticed not only as a product of organisations' 
unwillingness to comply or resist innovations (Burns and Scarpens, 2000; Siti-Nabiya and 
Scarpens, 2005), but also as a result of contradictions in the rules (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
The coercive pressure from the government in the form of an institutional rule, which was 
directed  to  foster  a  local  accountability  between  the  NHS  organisations  and  the  public, 
pushed  the  organisations  to  both  the  government  and  their  public  constituents.  This 
connection strapped the organisations to the achievement of a dual legitimacy automatically 
(firstly, from their regulators and secondly, the local community). The organisations showed 
an absolute resolve to achieve the FT status by seeking legitimacy from the two parties, 
firstly the regulators, for the purpose of survival, and secondly, the members of the public, 
through  a  public  consultation  process,  to  assert  its  credibility  and  gain  acceptance,  in  a 
ceremonial fashion as observed in Trust ‘A’.  
The  study  also  showed  that  the  organisations’  motive  in  their  engagement  with  the  FT 
process was to benefit from the privileges offered by the new status. This was especially the 
case with the early adopter organisation in this study. The process of engaging with the public 
in some organisations reflected manipulating legitimacy, as observed in the late adopter case 
study. The time taken by this process and the outcome achieved represented a compromise in 
organisational efficiency (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991).  The next few paragraphs describe 
how organisations were influenced by the regulators and the organisation’s reaction that gave 
rise to the outcome of the FT implementation. 
8.2.2  Institutional Pressure to Acquire Legitimacy 
Institutional pressure was the primary influence that steered the NHS organisations in the 
direction  of  seeking  legitimacy;  and  it  took  the  form  of  a  coercive  pressure  from  the 
government. The main source of the coercive pressure was the Secretary of State for Health, 
who established the complex FT rule, and then appointed Monitor, for the administration of 
the FT reform. The adoption of the status involved organisations’ compliance with Monitor’s 
financial and governance framework (the inclusion of the public on the board). This was 
operationalized through the completion of a Long Term Financial Planning (a minimum of   172 
five years budgetary planning) and producing evidence of board Governance that was fit for 
purpose by the organisations. The organisations in return for compliance acquired operational 
freedom, with a change in their reporting line from the Secretary of State to Monitor. They 
were also rewarded with financial freedom, a freedom to retain their surpluses (profit), power 
to borrow from commercial sources, to invest and manage their own assets. 
Coercive pressure was the only influence at work and was noticeable at the early stage of FT 
introduction. Adoption of FT status became more popular over time; most of the strong and 
high  performing  organisations  were  able  to  scale  through  the  adoption  process,  while 
majority  of  the  weaker  organisations  struggled  along  the  adoption  pathway.  This  study 
observed that the nature of the pressure amongst the late adopter organisation was not only 
coercive but also involved a mimetic pressure, as these organisations were influenced to seek 
legitimacy  not  only  for  survival  through  the  regulator’s  coercion,  but  also  to  prove  to 
contemporary organisations, service users and various stakeholders that they were capable of 
achieving  the  FT  feat.  As  a  result,  they  adopted  the  standards  and  templates  of  similar 
organisations  by  copying  earlier  adopters  of  the  status  who  had  been  successful.  The 
knowledge  acquired  from  successful  organisations  initiated  the  mimetic  pressure  on  the 
actors. This mimetic behaviour was predominantly found in the late adopting organisation.  
For the early adopter, coercive pressure to implement FT reform was found to align with the 
organisations’ efficiency and growth plans, which may have reduced the level of struggle 
experienced by those trusts. Staff within those organisations had a very different view about 
their role and outlook regarding the work they did. They were found to be more sensitive to 
the trust’s liquidity position, and they exhibited a superior awareness of the  trusts’ plan. 
There was evidence that early adoption of the FT reform was linked to the organisations' 
strategic motives (Oliver, 1991; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). While the pressure to achieve FT 
status was equally meted to all organisations, the late adopter exhibited a different outlook as 
they sought the status. 
On a general note, the organisations while in the process of adopting Monitor’s accounting 
and  risk  management  tool,  paid  less  attention  to  pressing  managerial  and  financial 
complexities within the organisation, in favour of the institutional pressure for FT adoption. 
As a result, the FT distraction had a considerable consequence on organisational performance 
in some of the trusts. This partly explained the level of resolution or desperation as the case 
may be on the part of the organisational management to implement FT rules.     173 
The respondents  from  the late adopter case study expressed concern about  the spread of 
uncertainty and the levels of dissatisfaction amongst staff, which pervaded the trust as a result 
of the FT authorisation uptake. The spread of uncertainty has been linked to Mimetic pressure 
(Dimmagio  and  Powell,  1983).  This  includes  uncertainty  of  technology,  symbolic 
uncertainty, and ambiguity of organisational goals (Dimmagio and Powell, 1983; Ribeiro and 
Scarpen, 2006). This study highlighted the type of mimetic attributes, commonly found in 
managerial actions, at the point of reform uptake, and found that it was usually a taken for 
granted  assumption  rather  than  a  strategic  choice  (Oliver,  1991;  DiMaggio  and  Powell, 
1983). 
In this study, seeking legitimacy was initiated by the establishment and adoption of the FT 
rules. The FT rules relied significantly on the use of accounting as a basis for administering 
trusts' authorisation, which fostered a new governance and accountability form upon them. 
Enforcement of the rules resulted in the managers’ adoption of the instrumental, ceremonial 
(Covaleski  and  Dirsmith,  1991)  and  strategic  decline  features  in  the  course  of 
implementation. While instrumental adoption is suggestive of efficiency value for legitimacy, 
ceremonial  adoption  ignores  working  towards  efficiency  and  accountability  value  for 
legitimacy, it is rather based on superficial compliance to acquire the FT badge. Strategic 
decline value describes actions of the organisational actors rooted in manipulative legitimacy 
at the risk of organisational efficiency. 
8.2.3  Institutional Process and Power Relations 
The ability to initiate a change in organisational environments is a function of individual or 
group power. Individual or group perceptions of an innovation or the presence of distrust 
amongst organisational actors do not result in any change in the direction of innovation or the 
mode  of  implementation  unless  those  individuals  or  groups  had  organisational  power  or 
access to steer it otherwise. (Goddard and Powell, 1994).  
The way power was seated or its distribution amongst the members and managers, and on 
larger scale, between the corporate centres and departments, in the three organisations varied 
extensively. Power distribution was the main determinant of each organisation’s ability to 
either accept or reject institutionalized practices. This is a key part of any organisation’s life 
(Greenwood and Hining, 1996). The role of intra-organisational power relation was noted in 
two distinct areas among the case organisations, namely - the self-interest of the Management 
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power through the flow of information in Trust ‘A’ was a major factor that placed some staff 
in a better power stead over the others in the organisation. 
8.2.3.1 Self-interest to Improve Internal Efficiency 
The organisations' drive to adopt FT reform involved two main elements; the first was the 
organisations’ self-interest to improve their operational efficiency and the second was the 
theoretical game-like conformity in response to a coercive pressure (Lowe, 2000).  
Successive governments in the UK had introduced and re-introduced several reforms into the 
NHS to improve efficiency standards within the Healthcare sector; reflecting the pivotal role 
of the NHS as the powerhouse for the health and well-being of the citizens. Following the 
continuous deplorable state of the NHS finance starting from the 2003/04 to the 2005/06 
financial year that witnessed the dearth of financial management within the NHS system, 
thereby creating a dire state of financial challenge in the Healthcare sector (DoH, 2007), the 
institutional response to the problem amongst others, was the introduction of FT status, which 
was  expected  to  foster  organisation  freedom,  drive  efficiency  upwards  and  encourage 
innovation within the NHS. 
The Managements’ keen pursuit of an improved internal efficiency, witnessed in the early 
adopter, reflected the regulator's intention behind introducing the FT reform. There appeared 
to be a seamless transition for the early adopter from the financially challenged regime into 
the FT regime. The early adoption of the FT status showed the pursuit of an efficiency motive 
by trust ‘B’, even though this was in response to an institutional pressure (Modell, 2001). It 
was also a proactive action on the part of the organisation, who was seeking organisational 
efficiency (Oliver, 1991; Powell, 1991).  
The self-interest motive of Managers in Trust ‘B’, especially was found to be positive, as it 
was invested into seeking both the efficiency and the legitimacy of the organisation, through 
the adoption of the FT reform. Trust ‘C showed a similar pattern but not as well evidenced as 
Trust ‘B’, which had the FT status a lot earlier. It was unclear, which of the two concepts 
(efficiency  and  legitimacy)  was  more  active.  On  the  other  hand,  the  evidence  of 
Management’s  self-interest  witnessed  in  the  late  adopting  organisation  was  primarily 
channelled  towards  the  acquisition  of  status.  The  inclusion  of  several  creativities  and 
manoeuvres in the course of FT implementation did not portray a pursuit of organisational 
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Organisational actors in the late adopting trust proactively sought legitimacy for the purpose 
of  survival,  without  any  clear  evidence  tied  to  their  interest  in  driving  organisational 
efficiency. It was also clear that this was as a result of the trust’s desperation to achieve the 
necessary criteria for authorisation and their inability to perceive the benefits offered by FT 
status in support of the organisation’s internal efficiency (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). 
8.2.3.2 Management Power to influence organisation direction 
A double layer of power was observed in this study. The first was the regulator's power to 
impose either a status or a sanction on the NHS organisations as they went through the FT 
authorisation process, thereby satisfying the regulator's self-interest at the macro-level, and 
wielding of its coercive influence. The second was at the micro-level, and referred to the 
organisational  Management’s  pursuit  of  self-interest  under  the  guise  of  adopting  the  FT 
mandate, in order to promote an intra-organisational change (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991). 
The use of power in an organisational setting may result in either a positive or a negative 
effect on organisation’s well-being (Gidden, 1996).    
When  undertaking  a  study  about  institutional  change,  it  is  often  useful  to  establish  the 
relationship between the change in question and the role of organisational actors in terms of 
power possession. Matching the actions of the actors to the FT adoption pathway within the 
change process elaborates the full ramification of the FT reform, especially in this study, 
where the change was no doubt as a result of an external pressure (Tsamenyi et al., 2006). 
Early  meetings  were  held  prior  to  the  implementation  of  the  FT  change  in  each  of  the 
organisations, where Managers explained the basis and intent of the FT reform to staff. It was 
expounded further by using several modes of communications, namely web shots, intranet 
sites, internal memos and circulars. The staff's response to this information varied from one 
trust to the other, but a level of deviation was apparent between the early and the late adopter 
in this case study. 
Some of the staff who witnessed the levels of destabilisation and distrusts in the late adopter 
organisation, as typified in the depletion of staff morale, queried the benefit of the FT reform; 
most of them showed no interest in the change, and were appalled by the level of disruption 
caused by the change, which they found not worthy of the benefits FT offered. In trust A, the 
adoption of the reform was slowed down as a result of the trust’s poor performance against 
the requisite major targets, thereby prolonging the dissatisfaction of the staff, unlike in trusts 
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these  trusts  was  the  centralisation  of  decision  making  power,  which  shifted  the 
implementation  away  from  the  operational  to  the  strategic  level  of  power  within  the 
organisation;  hence,  most  of  the  staff  did  not  fully  understand  the  full  process  of  FT 
authorisation in its detailed form (Modell, 2002), because they operated at the operational 
level.  Notwithstanding  their  power  location  in  the  organisation,  they  found  FT  update 
communicated to them adequate and satisfactory.  
The use of power in these organisations does not logically imply the existence of conflict 
(Giddens,  1976).  Power  can  be  both  enabling  and  conflicting  (Giddens,  1976,  1977). 
Therefore, both powers can co-exist within an organisation (Tsamenyi et al., 2006). The type 
of power exercised to facilitate the FT change was determined by organisation’s climate at 
the time of adopting the change.  
In the early adopter organisations, where the knowledge of FT adoption was shared amongst 
staff with frequent and continuing follow-up updates about the application progress, the staff 
understood what FT meant to them and their working relationships. In addition a number of 
the  Middle  Management  staff  were  actively  involved  in  the  implementation  process. 
Management power was found not to be in conflict with the staff and the adoption of FT 
status, even though it was a coercive influence, it was well communicated. Management's 
self-interest  was  channelled  towards  benefitting  from  the  freedoms  offered  by  FT 
authorisation; these enabled a successful implementation, which was well controlled without 
any major resistance from the staff, therefore, the Management’s strategy was perceived as 
enabling. 
The  experience  at  the  late  adopting  trust  was  in  sharp  contrast,  as  staff  struggled  to 
understand their relevance to the process of FT adoption. Information about the process was 
patchy  and  not  detailed  enough,  so  that  staff  updated  themselves  with  information  from 
multiple sources and no one was sure of the true position of the organisation's FT application. 
Staff were aware of the various change programmes taking place within the organisation - 
they witnessed staff redundancies and reorganisation of departments, which they assumed 
was in relation to trust’s readiness for FT status, but they were not clear, if these changes 
were required for the FT process. The trust Management were neither proactively involving 
the staff in the process nor effectively disseminating adequate information to them. The type 
of power observed in this organisation compromised the organisational efficiency (Scarpen, 
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Conflicting power may result in a ceremonial aspect (Nor-Aziah and Scarpen, 2007), while 
enabling power may result in an instrumental aspect of accounting change (Collier, 2001). 
The power of the Management in the late adopting trust was in conflict with the objective of 
the reform, in addition, it complicated the organisation’s financial and governance states. The 
interest of actors in this organisation was divergent, and thus exhibited the dominance of a 
conflicting power (Gidden, 1996).  
8.2.4  The Institutionalization of Complex/Ambiguous Rules and Loose Coupling 
The continuing adoption of the FT  rules  paved the way  for the establishment  of the FT 
reform,  thus  making  it  a  norm  within  the  NHS.  Within  an  organisational  context,  rules, 
beliefs and norms usually become institutions (an embedded norm, ways of thinking and 
operating with  the social  system) as  a result of the repetitive reproduction  of habits  and 
routines over time (Ribeiro and Scarpens, 2006). The spread of FT reform established the 
institutionalization of the rule within the NHS and reveals loose coupling features within the 
implementation framework. 
8.2.4.1 Institutionalization of Foundation Trust Rules  
When the FT status was introduced, the legislation left all NHS provider organisations in 
England  with  no  alternative  outside  of  active  adoption  of  the  FT  reform;  the  continuing 
uptake of the reform marked the beginning of institutionalization of FT status. Within a few 
years, the regulations became established as a rhetorical part of the social system, which is 
known  as  the  process  of  institutionalisation  as  it  develops  over  time  in  the  life  of  an 
organisation. Zucker (1997, 728) noted that - 
  ‘Institutionalisation is both a process and a property variable’  
Tolbert  and  Zucker  (1996)  noted  that  the  process  of  institutionalization  starts  from  the 
introduction of an innovation (activated either by technology, legislation or market forces). 
When it becomes accepted by actors in the social system, this marks the habitualization stage 
and it later moves to the operationalization phase. when actors develop consensus among 
themselves  for  the  innovation  and  increasing  adoption  on  the  basis  of  this  consensus,  it 
reaches  the  objectification  phase,  from  which  it  reaches  the  last  stage,  of  sedimentation, 
where the innovation settles in the system and spreads over several generations of actors.  It 
is  quite  unclear  at  the  moment  the  stage  at  which  FT  status  has  reached.  However  it  is 
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Events within the NHS organisations since the introduction of the FT reform highlighted the 
importance  of  power  in  institutionalisation  process.  The  level  of  power  also  defines  the 
longevity  of  innovation.  Burns  and  Scapens  (2000)  identified  three  levels  of  power  in 
institutionalization process. The first level of power is the enactment of rules and routines, at 
this level the powerful forces in the system may introduce an innovation such as a new 
accounting system, and this powerful force may also be an internal or external component of 
the organisation, such as in the case of FT status, where innovation was activated by an 
external force.  
In instances where new rules have been misunderstood or misconstrued, there is often a need 
for an amendment of those rules to incorporate a modification that would re-align the actors 
with  the  motive  of  the  innovation  (Burns  and  Scapens,  2000).  As  part  of  the 
institutionalisation process in the NHS, over the period of FT uptake, there has been a need to 
make changes to the implementation framework, a need to align the change with its purpose. 
This  brought  a  number  of  modifications  to  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  NHS 
regulatory bodies. The modification involved the setting up of a new body known as the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC), which was set up to take charge of clinical regulation of the 
NHS,  while  Monitor  continued  to  manage  as  the  financial  regulator.  This  describes  the 
second  level  of  power  as  argued  by  (Burns  and  Scapens,  2000),  the  re-enactment  and 
reproduction of rules and routines.  At this  level  of power, during the implementation of 
established rules, an innovation may be seen as merely ceremonial for legitimacy reasons, or 
instrumental as a tool for efficiency, or even strategic as a result of the actors’ self-interest 
motive. This depends upon the way rule it is perceived by the individual actors and their 
contexts.  A  varied  reaction  was  observed  from  the  case  studies,  ranging  from  actors’ 
manoeuvres  and  games  to  a  well-articulated  implementation  process  targeted  at 
organisational efficiency, which separated the early from the late adopters in a marked way.  
As the FT uptake progressed, the NHS network became saturated with the diffusion of what 
was known as the Financial Risk Rating metric, a product of the FT’s way of working; this 
became a language that pervaded the entire system as the assessment benchmark for projects 
and services developed within the organisations. This explains the third level of power (Burns 
and Scarpen, 2000). This level of power involved the encoding of rules and routines and their 
re-enactment as the universal and unquestioned ways of thinking and doing. At this level of 
power, the ceremonial, instrumental and strategic deterioration aspects become unquestioned 
ways  of  thinking  and  performing  in  the  organisation  (Burns  and  Scarpens,  2000).  The   179 
progressive  entrenchment  of  this  power  into  the  NHS  facilitated  the  process  of 
institutionalisation,  thereby  enhancing  the  continued  permeation  of  FT  reform  into  the 
system. 
The timing of adoption was also noted in the institutionalisation process as a major driver of 
adoption uptake, which was similar to the findings of an empirical study (Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983), which unveiled that the first municipalities to adopt Civil Service reforms were driven 
to engage in the process for competitive reasons. Later adoption was driven by Municipalities 
trying to conform to what had become accepted practices. This finding fits well with the 
inference  noticed  in  the  early  adopter  of  the  FT  reform,  who  made  a  strategic  choice 
associated with their internal characteristics. The late adopter instead responded to pressure in 
order to  be seen  as  progressive and to  maintain legitimacy  as  the reforms became more 
popular. 
8.2.4.2 Loose Coupling 
The motive behind an organisation’s decision to adopt a change is often the main determinant 
of how such innovation is implemented, and the nature of the motive is also influenced by the 
prevailing circumstances of that organisation at the time of adoption. An efficiency motive 
may exist as the main reason for innovation uptake, as observed in the early adopter of the FT 
reform. However, the efficiency motive may be dropped or replaced with other prevailing 
motives. It is also possible for the focus of the motive to be diverted to other areas of the 
organisation’s operations. This study identified that the early adopter of the FT reform took 
on board the motive for which the FT innovation was created, while in the case of the late 
adopting organisation, the underlying motive for adoption was for a ceremonial reason. It was 
no  surprise,  therefore,  that  the  implementation  of  the  rules  and  regulations  were  loosely 
coupled  to  the  core  services  of  the  organisation  (Lukka,  1997;  Modell  2002).  This  was 
evident in the perceptions of the actors, who declared that the adoption of FT had no effect on 
their organisation’s services and that patient care remained the same as it was prior to the FT 
change. 
This study found four areas of loose coupling, especially from trust ‘A’ case study, testing the 
same phenomenon in Trusts ‘B’ and ‘C’ was not possible as the trusts unlike trust ‘A’ are full 
licensed FTs. Firstly, the use of the LTFM was found to be loosely coupled from the actual 
practices in the hospitals wards; secondly the performance monitoring mechanism did not 
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motive, even when it was efficiency driven, neglected the core area of service as part of its 
consideration, which was more relevant to the delivery of an efficient and effective service. 
Instead they were driven by management efficiency and were focused on delivering a year-
end  profit  rather  than  delivering  a  top  notch  patient  care.  Lastly,  the  five-year  service 
projections  incorporated  in  the  LTFM  were  arguably  often  uncertain,  given  the  vagaries 
surrounding  changes  in  the  economy  and  the  NHS  environment,  especially  amidst  the 
changing political system. As a result, it was difficult to monitor or evaluate the quality of the 
financial forecasts.  
Loose coupling was not only a mediating tool between efficiency and legitimacy, but also a 
mediating tool within a system characterised by complex rules, disconnected environments 
and multifaceted intra-organisational power relations. The term loose coupling has also been 
referred to as decoupling in some of the literature. Loose coupling is a common way by 
which  organisations  deal  with  conflicting  institutional  pressures  in  public  sector 
organisations, by de-coupling the control systems in use at different levels of the organisation 
(Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983; Ansari and Euske, 1987; Pettersen, 1995; Abernethy and 
Chua, 1996). In organisations, de-coupling refers to the separation of the causal connection 
between two organisational elements. It indicates a blurring of the lines of interdependence 
and control between groups (Weick, 1976). De-coupled elements relate to each other in a 
very loose manner as they share few activities. One de-coupled element can be eliminated or 
replaced without severely affecting the other. De-coupling can also be defined as the process 
of disintegrating the structural elements of different parts of an organisation in response to 
institutional pressures to comply with inconsistent norms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
Various circumstances, such as the adoption of innovation, the establishment of complex 
rules,  and  the  maintenance  of  legitimacy  explained  in  this  study,  were  in  line  with  the 
empirical reasoning of loose coupling within an institutional context. Organisations within an 
institutional environment, such as the NHS, have often been noticed to de-couple formal 
structures from their technical core in order to maintain external legitimacy, that of their 
regulators and the public, while retaining organisational effectiveness (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977).  In  situations  where  legitimacy  co-exists  with  efficiency  without  a  contradiction 
between the two pressures, loose coupling may play a more significant role than merely being 
a  point  of  mediation  between  the  two  pressures.  This  NHS  case  study  highlighted  loose 
coupling in the contexts of formal rules, the rules, which facilitated changes in the accounting 
and governance system of the organisations, without necessarily making the desired change   181 
in the practices experienced in the medical divisions and wards of the organisations (Burns 
and Scarpens, 2000).  
8.3  Full Account: Struggling for Compliance 
The analysis of data obtained from this study presents a rich theme of organisations’ struggle 
for compliance in the course of FT implementation. This became the central phenomenon of 
this  study.  The  analysis  identified  the  main  sources  of  the  struggle  and  drew  on  extant 
literature to explain the various behaviours highlighted in the process of the struggle within 
the organisations.   
The full account of this study presented firstly, the central phenomenon of the organisations’ 
struggle, secondly, the organisational practices in the process of struggling for compliance, 
and finally, the outcome and consequences of the process of struggling for compliance. 
8.3.1  Struggling for Compliance: The Core Phenomenon 
The core phenomenon of struggling for compliance described the experience and outcome of 
the FT process in NHS organisations, presenting the resolve of the organisational actors to 
implement the required accounting changes in order to qualify for a new status, in spite of the 
complexity involved in the process. The key reasons behind actors’ adoption of the FT rules, 
was  firstly,  to  acquire  legitimacy  and  benefit  from  the  FT  freedoms,  secondly  to  gain 
efficiency within its system and finally to actualise Management's self-interests within the 
organisation (Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Collier, 2001; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 1991; 
Oliver, 1991; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). 
The  organisations’  struggle  for  compliance  consisted  of  three  main  phases,  firstly,  the 
introduction  of  the  FT  rules  into  the  NHS,  secondly  the  organisations’  desires,  which 
explained  their  motivation  behind  seeking  FT  status  and  finally,  the  process  of 
implementation of the change, which explained the establishment of the rules. The individual 
organisational motives for the adoption of the FT rules informed other aspects of this study in 
major ways: In the course of the study, organisations’ motive for adopting FT were found to 
become apparent during the establishment of the rules, and the establishment of the FT rule 
represents the activation of accounting changes within the organisation. Rhetorical rules and 
regulation were established through various legitimating tools such as manuals, guidelines 
and  acts  of  parliament.  The  establishment  of  the  rhetorical  rules  was  necessary  for  the 
achievement of efficiency and the acquisition of legitimacy; it was also an equitable basis 
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Some  studies  (Uddin  and  Tsamenyi,  2005;  Williamson  and  Canagarajah,  2003)  have 
suggested that the actual practice within  an organisation may not have changed or be in 
existence long after changes were assumed to have evolved in a tangible way, resulting in 
organisational practice lagging behind the change rhetoric.  
The mandatory call, for all NHS trusts to implement the FT innovation without any other 
choice if they were to survive as an  organisation, was a coercive pressure from the NIS 
perspective. This force was engaged by the government to steer organisations into adopting 
the  rules.  Also  attached  to  this  pressure  were  the  benefits  or  freedoms  offered  by  the 
government to all organisations that successfully implemented the rules. The attachment of 
benefits to compliance was the primary motivational factor noted in the early adopter of the 
change.  
It is also reasonable to note that the early adopter of the FT innovation was attracted by the 
efficiency motive offered by the change, which, in turn, propelled them to seek legitimacy. 
The assumption that efficiency and legitimacy were fundamentally dichotomous was one of 
the areas that was criticised in the earlier propositions of NIS. This was later addressed by 
several  studies  in  NIS  (DiMaggio  and  Powell,  1983;  Meyer  and  Rowan,  1977),  which 
proposed  that  the  two  are  indeed  independent  factors  in  organisational  behaviour.  The 
intermingling of efficiency and legitimacy is arguably a challenge in the NIS literature (Scott, 
2001). This study supports the view that efficiency and legitimacy are intertwined through a 
proactive mimicking of the organisational actors (Modell, 2001).  
The motivation of these case organisations was not totally void of self-interest. This study 
observed  that  organisational  actors  had  their  own  motives,  which  may  have  supported, 
compromised  or  even  contradicted  the  regulator's  motive.  It  was  unclear,  which  motive 
dominated at any particular point in time; nevertheless some studies have suggested that, 
legitimacy may be a dominant factor during organisational decline and at a relatively early 
stage of the adoption of innovations (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983; Lowe, 2000) and that 
efficiency may also be a dominant factor over legitimacy for the early adopters of innovations 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal et al., 1997).   
It was noted from this study that legitimacy was active in the majority of the time in the late 
adopting organisation. Major changes were made to the FT structure, which reduced the FT 
benefits, and resulted in non-FT organisations enjoying some of the benefits, which were 
hitherto  exclusively  for  FTs.  Thus  all  organisations  were  able  to  access  most  of  the  FT   183 
benefits, except for the change of name and the regulatory adjustment - reporting from the 
TDA to Monitor, which distinguishes the FTs from the rest. In addition, it was observed that 
the  sought  for  legitimacy  in  trust  ‘B’  was  primarily  for  the  organisation  to  be  seen  as 
belonging to the ‘FT group’ and not strictly for the purpose of achieving a better or a more 
efficient organisation. 
The NHS organisations’ struggle to comply with the FT rules depicted in this study, is similar 
to  the  operational  difficulty  noted  in  the  implementation  of  accounting  changes  in 
organisations  (Lukka,  2007),  which  found  that  management  accountants  from  the 
organisations struggled with their everyday activities. This study asserts that the inability of 
the  trusts  to  achieve  their  FT  targets  was  an  operational  difficulty,  triggered  by  the 
introduction of the new financial and governance model, and this formed the basis of the 
organisation’s struggle for compliance.  
8.3.2  Actual Practices in Struggle for Compliance 
A number of other events occurred in NHS organisations during the implementation of the 
FT rules. The implementation of rules in an institutional process is often characterised with 
the emergence of various types of organisational activities and routines, which are neither 
part of the rule nor the implementation plan and not set out explicitly within the rules (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000). One of such events is the spread of uncertainty in the organisations at 
varied  quantum  from  one  trust  to  the  other.  The  emergence  of  uncertainty  within  the 
organisations represents one of the unintended features, which had a spiralling effect on the 
staff and Management, especially at the late adopter case study. Other examples include the 
traumatic  experience  of  staff  as  a  result  of  job  losses  in  the  process  of  structural  re-
organisation. The  FT implementation  also  witnessed enormous managerial  manoeuvrings, 
displayed in actors' attempts and games in the implementation phase of FT.  
The various actors’ motives were revealed in the course of implementation of the reform; 
typified  in  the  occurrence  of  various  attempts  and  games  highlighted  the  existence  of  a 
ceremonial  feature, as  a result of the actor's  rationale for legitimacy.  It also  unveiled an 
instrumental  or  ceremonial  standpoint  where  the  actors'  value  promoted  efficiency  or 
legitimacy in the strictest sense. At the other extreme it portrays a strategic deterioration 
values (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991; Lowe, 2000; Lukka, 2007), 
in instances where the motive of the actor was dominated by self-interest. The organisational 
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on the nature of the innovation concerned, the prevailing intra-organisational power relations 
and  the  organisational  circumstance.  (Burns  and  Scapens,  2000;  Collier,  2001).  This 
behaviour was as a result of social dilemma (Elner, 2005). Organisations may display more 
than one single motive at any point within the process of adoption of an innovation; while 
some may display the ceremonial motive, others may be characterised by both the ceremonial 
and instrumental motive (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991). 
Given the nature of the NHS provider sector, which was fragmented on different fronts (both 
externally  and  internally),  ranging  from  size,  financial  performance  and  speciality,  the 
introduction of a complex rule within this environment resulted in the display of instrumental, 
ceremonial and strategic deterioration values. The occurrence of a ceremonial or strategic 
deterioration value was also dependent on the contextual impact of the mix between three 
factors,  namely,  the  level  of  fragmentation  in  the  environment,  the  complexity  of  the 
innovation and conflicting power relations within the organisation. Organisations have been 
known to devise coping mechanisms to overcome the contradiction initiated by complex rules 
within a fragmented environment (Lowe, 2000; Lukka, 2007).  
Fragmentation within an internal environment influences the way an organisation responds to 
institutional and organisational pressures. This plays a major role in the occurrence of loose 
coupling between organisational practice and the institutional expectations (Orton and Weick, 
1990). On the other hand external fragmentation influences organisational innovation and 
creativity, either negatively or otherwise. This could be as a result of the regulator’s heavy 
handedness  on  the trusts,  which created a sense of loss of power for the actors,  thereby 
causing them to place too much reliance on the regulator. 
Within the context of FT implementation, the completion of the five-year financial model 
was a ceremonial compliance in trust ‘A’, in view of their inability to accurately predict their 
financial performance over the next five years. The analysis of the documents in trust ‘A’ 
revealed  that  the  formulation  of  these  figures  involved  gaming,  where  the  organisations 
attempted  to  reflect  the  required  financial  risk  rating  criteria  expected  by  Monitor,  not 
because they were sure they could achieve such risk ratings. It followed, therefore, that the 
plans shown on the pages of the LTFM and the integrated business plan did not reflect or 
predict the current position of the trust or the five year forecast position accurately (Meyer 
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The presence of ceremonial compliance further strengthened the evidence of loose coupling 
seen in these organisations. The forecast shown in the  LTFM should reflect the level of 
income expected from the services delivered, these services were intrinsically linked to the 
core business of the organisation, but since it was impossible to accurately estimate or predict 
the type of service required or the quantum of care needed in the Local Health Economy in 
the next few years, the actors manoeuvred the requirements by inventing financial estimates 
without  any  reference  to  future  service  demand.  Instead  they  used  parameters.  Such  as 
inflation uplift and estimated demographic changes, which were not certain. This meant that 
the forecasts were totally detached from the Care Delivery Plan. This is a proof that their 
compliance  to  FT  reform  was  only  enacted  to  fulfil  the  ceremonial  or  even  strategic 
deterioration  values,  notwithstanding  the  convergence  between  efficiency  and  legitimacy 
motive. 
Adoption  of  the  FT  rules  witnessed  an  active  uptake  of  Monitor's  workforce  hierarchy 
template  without  any  scientific  knowledge  to  assess  its  suitability  for  individual 
organisations. The adoption, however, facilitated the loss of jobs for some employees, heavy 
investment on the part of the trust to hire consultants to conduct recruitment interviews, and a 
general depletion of staff morale in the organisation.  
Strategic deterioration values became dominant in the organisation during the implementation 
of rules in instances where compliance with an accounting change (within the framework of 
complex  rules  and  fragmented  environment  with  conflicting  powers)  deposed  the 
organisation's objectives in order to serve the interests of the regulators. This was mainly 
found in the late adopter case study, who adopted the change as an opportunity to obtain a 
status symbol. This value created a thriving atmosphere for games, as Managers necessarily 
strived to satisfy the desires of the regulator. The reign of games and attempts was made 
possible by the presence of power within the organisational Manager’s value. In addition, the 
process  of  seeking  legitimacy,  therefore,  aligned  with  the  self-interest  motives  of  the 
Managers to the detriment of the wider organisational objective. (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1991). 
Intra-organisational power relations played a substantial role in organisation's’ Struggle for 
Compliance. The interaction between legitimacy and efficiency are both internal features of 
the organisation, and are also located within the framework of power relations (Collier, 2001) 
The activation of these powers can be both enabling and conflicting (Giddens, 1976; 1997) 
and both aspects may occur simultaneously in the process of struggling for compliance as   186 
observed  in  this  study.  These  powers  operated  differently  amongst  the  groups  of 
organisational  actors;  it  was  noted  that  the  introduction  of  FT  reform  was  within  the 
atmosphere of an enabling power given to Monitor by the NHS Act (2006), with which it 
exerted pressure on individual organisations. On the other hand, some of the organisations 
using  the  conflicting  aspect  of  the  power  excluded  staff  from  knowledge  of  the 
implementation and even used the same power to activate job losses within the organisation, 
in order to acquire ceremonial legitimacy. This reflected the self-interest motive of actors in  
both  ceremonial  and  strategic  deterioration  value.  It  must  be  mentioned  that  trust  ‘C’, 
experienced the same job losses as seen in trust ‘A’, however the difference was that the trust 
‘C’ experience was a product of an enabling power that was activated to achieve the required 
efficiency, which reflected the organisation's instrumental and ceremonial values.  
Both powers may occur at the same time, where one dominates the other (Tsamenyi et al, 
2006).  The power and interests of organisational actors are often in alliance to determine 
whether  an  accounting  innovation  is  adopted  for  a  ceremonial,  instrumental  or  strategic 
deterioration  purpose  (Burns  and  Scarpens,  2000;  Collier,  2001).  The  Struggle  for 
Compliance occurred in a fragmented environment, where rules were complex, and there was 
the co-existence of enabling and conflicting power. This phenomenon was wholly dependent 
on the individual organisational context at the time of implementation of the change. From 
this  study,  it  is  clear  that  accounting  change  in  organisations  reflects  the  organisation's 
behaviour  and  value  systems,  ranging  from  instrumental,  ceremonial  to  strategic 
deterioration. 
8.3.3  Practical Implication of Struggle for Compliance 
The outcome of struggling for compliance describes the state of the organisation at the post 
implementation phase, after the adoption of the FT rules. This involved the evaluation of the 
organisations against the intent of the rhetorical rule. The FT change was aimed at boosting 
efficiency in the NHS, with power being devolved away from central government's control, 
to foster local accountability and to enhance financial freedom within the NHS. The valid 
outcome  measurement  must  take  into  consideration,  the  extent  to  which  efficiency  was 
achieved, accountability established and organisational legitimacy acquired (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
The struggle for compliance resulted in changes within the organisations; however, it was not 
as envisaged (Dean, 1986; Ter Bogt, 2008; Van Nispen and Posseth, 2009; Wynne, 2005).   187 
The process was successful to the point that rules were established. The establishment of the 
rules was a major developmental phase that preceded the acquisition of legitimacy with or 
without the achievement of efficiency and accountability. A critical phase of the process was 
the implementation of the rules. This was the point where the display of organisational power 
and value emerged.  
The presence of a variety of motives amongst the organisations determined the sharp and 
distinguishing differences between the early and the late adopter. The instrumental aspects 
presented a satisfactory progress within a bounded rational sense of efficiency motive (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000) in the early adopter, while the ceremonial aspects sufficed for legitimacy 
in its bounded sense. The ceremonial and sometimes strategic deterioration value exhibited in 
the  late  adopter  manipulated  legitimacy  while  compromising  efficiency  (Nor-Aziah  and 
Scapens, 2007) 
On a general note, the government’s aim to establish accountability in the Foundation Trust 
sector  was  not  particularly  a  success.  The  principle  of  accountability  was  discussed 
extensively  in  chapter  two,  this  case  study  suggested  that  FT  organisations  were  not 
painstakingly aware of their required accountability role, even though this role was enshrined 
in the FT framework, first at public consultation stage, it was only observed in a ceremonial 
compliance mode, to obtain the support of the public in the consultation process. The second 
point was the election of members into the board of governors, this phase was routinely 
implemented,  without  any  major  accountability  notion  for  the  elected  Governors. 
Theoretically,  there  were  processes  in  place  for  governors  to  demand  accountability, 
however, it was yet unclear if the governors do understand their role (Day and Klein, 2005). 
This was not completely surprising, as a number of studies (Dixon et al, 2010; Exworthy et 
al., 2011) have found that FTs continues to look up to the TDA and the DH in order to 
exercise the freedom and other powers conferred on them by the FT status. This explains in 
part, why their accountability tangent remained pointed to their TDA and DH to the neglect 
of the local communities. 
The integration of the macro- and micro-levels of analysis of this study presented a dialectic 
framework for understanding innovation uptake as a process of purposive transformation in a 
large  organisation,  where  the  environment  maintains  the  control  to  establish  and  impose 
structures on the organisation at a macro-level. Organisations within the Healthcare sector 
endured different levels of struggle in order to comply with the imposed structures. It is 
hoped that as these macro-influences beds down within the sector, individual organisations   188 
will actively strive to differentiate themselves within the last wave of trusts currently seeking 
legitimacy  for  survival.  There  are  other  issues  outside  the  scope  of  the  FT  reform  that 
contributed to the process of organisational struggle, which could not be investigated within 
the focus of this research, especially at the post-implementation phase of the trust's operation. 
8.4  Summary 
This chapter drew from the data analysis and resulting themes in chapters six and seven and 
immersed it within the NIS theory and findings from other substantive areas. The objective 
was to seat the resulting struggle for compliance in the NHS within a multi-area theory. The 
study proposed that organisational actors are often resolute to adopt accounting changes, in 
the face of difficulties and challenges, in order to achieve efficiency, legitimacy and promote 
their self-interests.  
The establishment of complex and rhetorical rules, coupled with the implementation of the 
rules,  gave  rise  to  organisations’  need  for  compliance,  with  which  they  struggled.  The 
implementation  of  accounting  and  governance  changes  was  illustrated  by  attempts  and 
games, which reflected the co-existence of instrumental, ceremonial (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1991) and strategic deterioration aspects, as a tool to satisfy the interests of the organisational 
actors in manipulating legitimacy to the compromise of organisational efficiency (Nor-Aziah 
and Scarpens, 2007). 
This study proposed that the implementation of complex accounting and governance rules in 
a  fragmented  internal  and  external  environment  results  in  struggling  for  compliance  for 
organisations  for  variety  of  reasons,  ranging  from  efficiency  motive  noticeable  in  early 
adopter to ceremonial legitimacy motive in the late adopter. The next chapter highlights the 
contributions made by this study to  existing literature and also suggests likely issues for 
future research.   189 
Chapter 9 
Research Contribution and Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter commenced with a brief summary of the research, by explaining the rapport 
between the new institutional sociology theory, thematic analysis and the FT reform and how 
the blend resulted in the theory of struggling for Compliance. In section 9.3, it highlights the 
key  research  contributions  made  by  this  study  to  the  theory  in  accounting  research  and 
practice in the healthcare field. Section 9.4 enumerated the limitations of this study while 
Section 9.5 dealt with the implication of this study for future research and at the same time 
suggesting a number of relevant areas for further research, finally section 9.6 gave a brief 
synopsis of the entire research journey. 
9.2 Summary of the research 
The overarching aim of this study was to explore the adoption of FT status in the NHS, to 
explain the behaviour of actors undergoing an accounting and governance change within an 
institutional  structure.  The  research  design  was  that  of  an  interpretive  paradigm,  while 
employing the thematic synthesis approach for the collection and analysis of data. The study 
illustrated how the UK government engaged accounting as a tool to change the course of 
organisational structure in the NHS.   
The  research  suggested  that  the  Foundation  Trust  phenomenon  is  predominantly  an 
interaction between the institutional and organisational actors, where the NHS institutional 
environment exercised control over organisations within the sector, by using an accounting 
base reform known as the Foundation Trust Status to steer the accountability focus of the 
organisations to their desired direction. In order to fully appreciate the influence of the FT 
reform, the research investigated the participants’ perceptions of their roles in the run up to 
the adoption and implementation of the FT status.  
In this analysis, the perceptions of the NHS staff, the views held by them and the nature of 
the relationships between the groups of participants were crucial to the outcome of the FT 
adoption. The analysis of actor’s perception and observation of the organisations illustrated 
the various struggles experienced by them as they journeyed through the adoption of a new 
status. While the adoption of FT implied a drive towards efficiency in some organisations,   190 
other organisations aligned with the FT adoption strictly for survival and in some cases as a 
result of a mimetic influence.  
A coherent thematic analysis was developed from the theoretical insights drawn from both 
the study data and the NIS theory, which proposed that the adoption of FT in the NHS is 
characterised  by  institutional  pressure,  management’s  interest/power  and  organisational 
legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy referred to the considerations and social processes 
through which the NHS participants made sense of the routines associated with the adoption 
of FT status. This study suggests that the context or circumstance of organisations at the time 
of adopting an innovation influences the way and extent to which they apply the change, 
which may be either positive or negative.  
Firstly, this study explained the complex nature of the FT reform and its implementation 
process.  The  detailed  analysis  of  these  complexities  provided  the  reasons  for  the 
organisations’  struggle  to  comply  with  the  FT  rule.  The  presence  of  varied  perception, 
information  gap  and  understanding  within  the  organisations  regarding  the  subject  of  FT, 
coupled with the existence of games and other ceremonial practices provided evidences that 
illustrated the outcome of FT complexity. 
Secondly, this study described the phenomenon as a theory of Struggle for Compliance. This 
trend was equally observed in other areas of accounting, such as budgeting (Mkasiwa, 2011; 
Van Nispen and Posseth, 2009; Wynne, 2005), NPM literature (Vakurri, 2010) and in NIS 
literature (Lowe, 2000; Lukka, 2007). In addition to the previous studies, this study explained 
why  organisations  adopt  innovation,  stating  the  reasons  behind  various  organisational 
struggles in the process of adopting changes and the eventual consequence of such changes.  
9.3 Contributions of the research 
This research achieved a major milestone in its coverage of the FT phenomenon as witnessed 
in  the NHS, thereby making  contributions,  which broadly address  the  way accounting is 
perceived  within  the  accounting  research  field,  thereby  arguing  for  the  extension  of 
accounting beyond the economic model. Likewise, it extended the social theory used in this 
study  into the FT setting as an introduction, for further research dialogue to follow, in order 
to create more evidence as a way of advancing the theory in the field  and putting forward 
practical knowledge based on empirical findings of the studies, especially to practitioners, 
such as in the accounting fields, policy makers in the NHS and organisational personnel 
responsible for the adoption of the FT status.   191 
9.3.1  Contribution to the New Institutional Theory of Sociology (NIS) 
The first contribution identified was the extension of the NIS theory to a new setting. The 
application of the theory to the Foundation Trust contexts further advanced the consistency of 
the  NIS  concept,  especially  as  the  theory  was  tested  on  multiple  features  of  the  FT 
implementation process. For instance, majority of empirical NIS research focused more on 
the macro-level organisational processes, involving the process of institutionalization, rather 
than on how both individual organisations, as well as organisational actors, contribute in 
shaping institutions (Modell, 2005; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005). This study suggests that 
the relationship between accounting innovations and the institutionalisation of the innovation 
is often shaped by the participants’ perceptions of their roles and the nature of the association 
between groups of participants. It also argued that the other factors that contributed to this 
interrelationship were organisational arrangement, the knowledge possessed by the different 
groups of participants, and the general external environment. This presented a vivid empirical 
illustration of rules and the process of institutionalisation of those rule as a model of the 
theoretical concept within accounting research and specifically in the healthcare sector. 
Secondly, in order to unveil the phenomenon of Struggling for Compliance (Lukka, 2007; 
Modell, 2001), the thematic synthesis approach was adopted in an attempt to theorize the 
phenomenon, the process of explaining why and how organisations struggle and the strategies 
they  adopt  in  seeking  compliance  within  an  institutional  framework,  this  was  mainly 
illustrated by the diffusion of uncertainty in the case study organisations. Uncertainty may be 
induced  by  the  promotion  of  a  complex  accounting  rule,  this  is  because  accounting 
innovation is capable of creating a non-existent role to a constitutive role in management 
decision-making process (Scarpens, 2007) as observed in this case study. This study gave an 
incremental  evidence  proposing  that  the  attendance  of  instrumental  (Lukka,  2007), 
ceremonial  (Covaleski  and  Dirsmith,  1983;  Meyer  and  Rowan  1977)  and  strategic 
deterioration (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Scarpens,  2007) aspects  generally results  in 
efficiency, legitimacy, and self-interest  motives respectively,  with  much emphasis  on the 
influence of management self-interest, as an area requiring much attention in organisational 
research.  
Thirdly, this study presented an incremental evidence for the integration of efficiency and 
legitimacy through the proactive mimicking of organisational actors (Modell 2001). Earlier 
NIS formulations assumed efficiency and legitimacy as dichotomous elements (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977), this was a subject of criticism to NIS over the   192 
years (Oliver, 1991; Powell 1991). The outcome of this study gave further credence within 
the  body  of  knowledge  to  the  fact  that  market  and  legitimacy  pressures  proved  not 
dichotomous  but  intertwined.  The  struggle  for  compliance  in  the  NHS  reflected  the  co-
existence of efficiency and legitimacy motives, it also depicts the varying nature of their 
outworking, in terms of the mix between legitimacy and efficiency, where one may dominate 
the  other  depending  on  the  organisational  circumstance  at  the  time  of  introducing  the 
innovation (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). The FT case study identified the efficiency motive as 
the dominant factor in the early adopter of the FT change, while the need for survival was 
proposed as the dominant force operating in the late adopter. (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983; 
Lowe, 2000).  
Lastly, this study shed more light on the interplay between rules and the prevailing practice 
within  an  organisation.  It  presented  a  range  of  evidence  to  suggest  the  effect  of  loose 
coupling within the organisations. It confirmed that organisations adopt loose coupling as a 
strategy to shield their practice, as a technique to mediate conflicting rules in a fragmented 
environment, with dominating intra organisation power relations (Nor-Aziah and Scarpens, 
2007).  
The study implied that the diffusion of accounting innovation can evolve from interaction 
between participants in organisations, where they are able to direct the implementation of the 
innovation in the way they prefer within their organisation, rather than adopting it based on 
the dictates of an external institutional forces (Seal, 1999; Lawton et al., 2000; Carpenter and 
Feroz, 2001). For example, the implementation of FT status had no influence on the core 
business of the late adopting organisation, because it was decoupled from the change process 
entirely. This shows that reforms initiated in the absence of practitioner’s consent are likely 
to fail as organisational involvement in reform discussions and decisions may influence the 
implementation.  
9.3.2  Contribution to Interpretive Paradigm in an unexplored social setting 
In the light of these research findings, the arguments of this study may be of interest for 
several reasons, like stimulating more discussion and further research in the NHS, thereby 
responding to urgent calls to contribute concrete examples of accountability reform in the 
public sector, which may usefully complement the more theoretical and abstract discussion 
that have appeared in literature (Young and Oakes, 2009).    193 
Firstly, on a general level, this research focussed on accounting in a new light, which is quite 
uncommon, rather than presenting accounting as a techniques, it portrayed accounting as a 
formal  basis  for  economic  action  and  business  decision  within  the  NHS.  This  assertion 
represents an under-researched aspect of accounting, especially where it is linked with the 
influence of NPM and NPFM, which has continually been on the spread since the 1990s. 
Secondly, this study contributes to the on-going debate in the literature around the complex 
interrelationship between accounting and organisational changes within specific contexts (see 
Lapsley and Pallot, 2000; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; Gomes, 2008). It argues that the 
development and implementation of an accounting reform, to shape organisational practices 
in Foundation Hospitals cannot be reduced to an economic argument alone. In addition to the 
economic argument, it must be recognised that accounting practices emerged and developed 
through the convergence of multifaceted interests combined with the exertion of power in an 
attempt  to  achieve  a  working  organisational  balance.  It  is  recognised  in  the  case  of 
Foundation Hospitals that the full scale of the role of FT status would not be fully understood 
if  a  mere  economic  and  rationalist  perspective  was  adopted.  In  this  sense,  this  study  
promotes and contributes to the on-going debate for a better understanding of accounting in 
its social and institutional context (Gomes, 2008:494). This may also stimulate more study in 
this area.  
Thirdly, It is acknowledged that accounting literature has shown the crucial role played by 
accounting in legitimating organisations (Covaleski et al., 1993; Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 
Goddard and Assad, 2006), this study contributed to the understanding of the central role 
played  by  accounting  in  the  process  involving  exchanges  between  the  organisations, 
regulators and organisational participants. As was argued in theoretical discussions presented 
in Chapters 2 and 3, recent organisational change research in the healthcare sector, has not 
given enough attention to the essence of the FT regime in the NHS. Although the Foundation 
Status reform constitutes the core underlying issue discussed in prior organisational change 
research, the meaning of the concept was not sufficiently elaborated. Instead, a variety of 
meanings were attributed to the performance and structural form at the organisational level 
without a deep consideration for the interpersonal events involved in FT change. This thesis 
provided an in-depth investigation of the FT process and the organisational motive, thereby, 
presenting the actors’ role in a more organised view of individual meanings attached to FT 
innovation within the organisations.   194 
Lastly, this study highlighted the importance of the time of innovation uptake as a factor, 
which could explain actor’s intentions, by emphasizing that the timing of a reform uptake 
amongst  NHS  organisations  was  a  crucial  piece  of  event,  which  indicates  organisation’s 
motive, as the early adoption of the FT reform was found to be linked with the organisation's 
strategic motive. This study proposed that early adoption of innovation is often a strategic 
decision, which benefits the organisation (Oliver 1991, Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), where the 
organisation perceives the innovation as instrumental and supportive of its strategic direction. 
conversely, late adoption was found to be an active strategy of seeking legitimacy for the 
purpose of survival without clear evidence of an active pursuit of efficiency (Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983). 
9.3.3   Practical contributions 
The  result  of  this  research  has  several  policy  implications  for  future  implementation  of 
reform in the UK public sector, especially within the NHS. In the roll out of FT reform, lesser 
consideration  was  given  to  the  uniqueness  of  the  individual  organisations  who  were  the 
recipients of the status. This study provides an invaluable insight to the scope of interests 
addressed by the NIS. Most importantly, the theme addressed in this study, has added to our 
knowledge  of  the  importance  of  appreciating  the  uniqueness  of  individual  organisations 
within the NHS. Essentially, what works in each organisation differs from one organisation to 
the other. The study proposes that the challenges faced by individual organisations differs, so 
did their size, locality and financial strength. The idea of fitting all organisations into the 
same implementation framework would only result in struggle for some organisations. 
Secondly,  by    studying  changes  in  the  accounting  and  structural  fibre  of  the  healthcare 
organisations in the emerging Foundation Trust environment, this study provided a better 
understanding of the attribute of the NHS as a fragmented setting, therefore, incompatible 
with a generic reform. The idea of a ‘one size fit all’ reform has been shown to induce varied 
organisational response. This provides some extension not only for researchers studying a 
reform in a single organisation, as has been the case in traditional research, but also for 
research focusing on the effect of an  innovation on multiple organisations.  
Thirdly, the FT reform was aimed at improving the accounting process, and fostering local 
accountability in the NHS; it addressed institutional structures as well as changed the ways of 
thinking  within  the  structure.  The  study  showed  that  some  members  of  the  board  of 
Governors in some of the organisations did not really understand what their role involved.   195 
Also some of the staff do not fully understand the purport of the change. The establishment of 
rules alone was found not adequate for the successful implementation of an innovation. The 
active  participation  of  the  staff  was  a  key  component  of  the  adoption;  some  of  the 
organisational actors at the management level used the FT rules as a cover to promote their 
self-interest. This affected the implementation of the FT reform negatively. 
The regulators of healthcare in England must engage with  organisations and, indeed, the 
various stakeholders to ensure that they take ownership of the change as a precursor to the 
establishment  of  rules,  as  well  as  the  implementation.  As  a  result,  the  design,  adoption, 
implementation  and  evaluation  of  the  FT  reform  should  have  involved  a  comprehensive 
assessment of the state of the internal organisational environments (cultural, social, political, 
economic) of each trust, the external environment (external influences), and the technical 
aspects of the reforms (complex/simple, ambiguous, conflicting). The involvement of staff 
members may also clarify point of challenges ahead of time.  
The knowledge gap between the few members within the FT implementation team and the 
rest  of  the  organisation  was  a  major  influence  on  the  level  of  success  achieved  in  the 
implementation  process.  While  the  implementation  team,  which  comprised  of  the  board 
Executive and a few other appointees, understood the purport of the FT process, all the other 
staff showed a lack of understanding, leaving much gaps unfilled. Thus, highlighting the need 
for  deliberate  measures  to  improve  the  working  relationship  between  staff  and 
implementation teams; such measures may include basic staff training on their new role in the 
FT  regime.  Additionally,  the  trust  could  be  assessed,  as  part  of  their  FT  authorisation, 
regarding the level of success achieved in the diffusion of the change through communication 
within their organisation. 
Strong group interests appeared to have a significant influence on the implementation of the 
FT agenda, thus affecting organisational interaction, whereby concerns of other members of 
the organisation were ignored. Engagement with organisations and the various stakeholders at 
the reform design phase to focus their minds on accountability, governance and accounting 
systems  might  contribute  towards  harmonising  group  interests  and  their  perceptions  of 
accountability and governance. This may contribute towards improving accountability and 
the  organisational  structure  as  well  as  the  position  of  accounting  within  organisations 
(Goddard and Powell, 1994).   196 
9.4.0  Limitations of the Study 
This research was limited in a number of ways, either as a result of the various potential 
research avenues identified in the empirical setting, which might either have been pursued 
with greater emphasis but were not, or those pursued and not included in this work, in order to 
prioritise the research effort. For instance, the pre-FT regime features of the NHS, which 
would have placed emphasis and allowed a comparative analysis of two periods (Pre and Post 
FT) was not elaborated in this study, this might have relegated to the background, a robust 
view of the pre-FT organisational dynamics and its regime shift, however this would not have 
answered the central question of the study.  
The effect of the limitations, however, was kept to a minimum through various mitigation 
strategies assumed in the research design. There were three main limitations identified in this 
research.   
9.4.1  Research Design for the Study 
The first acknowledged limitation relates to the set of data gathered for this research, this 
refers to the fact that only one NHS trust (Non-FT) was used in this research. The first set of 
data collected between 2009 and 2010, represented the majority of the interviews, these data 
composed  of  interviews  from  two  organisations,  where  one  of  them  was  the  Non-FT 
organisation and the other is a fully licensed FT organisation. Featuring of only one Non-FT 
may have limited the extraction of a deeper understanding of the experience in the non-FT 
context, on reflection, it was considered that a comparative analysis of traits shown by more 
than one non-FT going through the FT assessment framework might have presented a broader 
view of the organisation’s reaction to the reform.  
Secondly, in the two FT organisations, there was a concern for inherent distortion in the 
quality of interview gathered, especially in the early adopter organisation, because the trust 
achieved its FT authorisation a few years back in the first wave of FT licensure (five years 
before the research). The researcher’s concern was that some of the respondents interviewed, 
although they had worked in the trust when it was a Non-FT organisation, they may not be 
able  to  accurately  recollect  or  describe  the  events  of  the  process  leading  to  the  time  of 
organisation’s FT implementation. In order to reduce the effect  of this limitation, not only did 
the research specifically nominated interviewees who had worked at the organisation both 
before  and  after  the  FT  authorisation,  in  addition,  documentary  evidences  were  gathered,   197 
including Minutes of meetings, Management reports and financial accounts relating to the 
time of authorisation, which were analysed to complement the interviews. 
9.4.2  Limitation in Theoretical Development  
It is acknowledged that this thesis only covered those aspects of interactions that existed 
between organisational structures, practices, behaviours, and the wider social environment in 
which  organisations  operated.  As  noted  in  section  3.1.2,  there  were  limited  insights 
concerning the process of organisational change within NIS, as the theory contributes little or 
nothing to intra-organisational change. This was affirmed by Tolbert and Zucker (1996), that 
NIS lacks a detailed knowledge of how the process of institutionalisation occurs within an 
organisation.  This  theoretical  limitation  is  not  unrelated  to  the  above  research  design 
limitations.  It  must  also  be  mentioned  that  the  theory  has  proved  to  be  strong  in  other 
important areas of the research, thereby thrusting a trade off with the strength of NIS to 
elaborate on structures and practices, which was key to this study. The proposed framework 
depicts  how changes  build up from  within an  organisational  setting, addressing all other 
interrelated factors, which are instrumental to the behaviour of actors within the organisation. 
9.4.3  In-depth Investigation of other Provider Trusts 
At the time of this research, the FT reform was in the process of being extended to other type 
of providers, such as the Mental Health Trusts, Community Trusts and the Ambulance Trusts. 
This study would have undertaken a more in-depth investigation of FT adoption in the other 
streams outside the Acute Trust setting, but this was not feasible within the context of this 
study as a result of time constraints. A subsequent in-depth investigation of FT adoption in 
these  organisations  could  provide  a  broader  spectrum  and  a  deeper  understanding  of  the 
reform  to  the  extent  of  a  generalisable  phenomenon.  Nevertheless,  the  research  findings 
highlighted in this thesis provide an adequate response to the object of the research questions.    
9.5  Implications for future research 
This  study  has  several  implications  for  future  accounting  change  research  within 
organisations, and accountability in the public sector, especially within the NHS.  The case 
studies explained the phenomenon of accounting innovation uptake and the strategies adopted 
by organisations going through a change process; this was also mirrored within accounting 
theories. The extent to which the theory can be generalized to public sector entities and to 
other organisations is limited, but in spite of this, the study identified a set of conditions   198 
under which theoretical explanations about the phenomenon are applicable. This is likely to 
exist  in  most  organisations  and    should  be  seen  as  an  opportunity  to  refine  and  further 
develop the application of the theory to similar innovations in organisations. 
In term of implication for future research, firstly, the findings of this research may provide 
theoretical  insights  for  the  study  of  accounting  reforms  and  accountability  in  Healthcare 
sector  generally.  It  must  also  be  noted  that  the  difference  in  political  and  administrative 
regimes  influences  the  interaction  between  accounting  and  the  reforms  introduced  by 
governments (Bourmistrov and Mellemvik, 2002). In a way, comparative contextual studies 
incorporating  different  political  and  administrative  regimes  will  be  of  benefit  to  the 
development of this theoretical base.  
Secondly, in view of the discussions stimulated by this research around accounting reform 
and organisational accountability using the NIS, further development of this area would be of 
immense benefit to practitioners and regulators in this sector, studies seeking to understand 
the  position  of  Monitor  as  FT  regulators  and  the  UK  political  class  on  the  process  of 
generating reform programmes and the purport of reforms introduced in the NHS, especially 
since several reforms are continually launched in the sector. Further research into the extent 
of programme evaluation undertaken by the government departments will also uncover the 
intent and commitment of the government to the effectiveness of the reforms, especially on 
how lessons learnt from specific change implementation have been used to promote future 
reforms. 
Thirdly,  struggling  for  compliance  in  the  NHS  exposed  the  mismatch  between  the 
organisations’ practice and organisational rhetoric; this explains the phenomenon of loose 
coupling, where rules are loosely coupled to the actual practices. Loose coupling is both a 
mediating tool for events between legitimacy and efficiency (Nor-Aziah and Scarpen, 2007), 
and also a mediating tool for conflicting rules and fragmented environments (internal and 
external). Further research in this area may establish more evidence of this phenomenon in 
the organisations. 
Fourthly,  new  research  to  investigate  the  conditions  necessary  to  create  a  thriving 
environment  for strategic innovation,  as well  as strategic deterioration,  may  be useful to 
provide incremental evidence of NIS claims that strategic innovation is one of the responses 
in  NIS  literature  (Abernathy  and  Chua,  1996).  This  study  argued  for  the  other  extreme   199 
portrayed as strategic deterioration, which depicts adoption or response to innovation rooted 
in the fulfilment of the interests of the  organisational actors or management’s preference 
rather than for the organisational interests. Understanding of the role of accounting changes 
and the enabling powers that facilitates behaviour in this perspective may therefore, be useful 
for organisational development. 
Fifthly,  as  an  extension  of  the  above,  this  study  highlighted  the  subsistence  and  inter-
relationships  between  the  ceremonial,  instrumental  and  strategic  deterioration  roles  in 
organisations. The manifestation of these roles in organisations could be displayed in varying 
dimensions, especially where organisational legitimacy is displayed with varied motives. The 
co-existence of the efficiency and survival motives for seeking legitimacy unveils actors’ role 
in the adoption of a change. Further research may provide incremental evidence of the co-
existence of these roles in organisations.  
Finally, as mentioned above, conducting similar research in a slightly different organisational 
setting, but still within the provider arm of the NHS, to understand the behavioural traits 
presented in other types of trusts, such as the Mental Health, Ambulance and Community 
trusts could provide a basis for comparison and could also give grounds for a generalizable 
finding. 
9.6  Research Conclusion 
The aim of this research is not to demonstrate methods and means to eliminate conflicts and 
challenges  inherent  in  the  implementation  of  accounting  reforms  in  public  sector 
organisations. It was also not within our intention to comprehensively document the kind of 
issues that NHS organisations are likely to face as they adopt the FT reform. Rather, this 
research sets the first in a set of stepping stones that will enhance our understanding of the 
issues unique to the adoption of accounting changes in the public sector from the actor’s 
perspective, especially in the UK healthcare sector. 
On the overall, this study emphasised the events involved in the adoption of Foundation Trust 
status in the NHS with a view to answering the important question of how an accounting 
change has affected the organisations. This has a greater implication for future reforms in the 
NHS and other public sector entities and beyond. It also teased out the extent to which groups 
of  participants,  which  are  largely  a  mix  of  professional,  were  capable  of  influencing  an   200 
innovation for their individual self-interest rather than for the benefit of the organisation and 
the resultant outcome of their actions or inactions as the case may be.  
This  FT  study  has  drawn  various  contributions  from  the  empirical  stance  to  identify  a 
comprehensive  background,  which  can  be  used  as  a  basis  for  understanding  the  cross-
organisational challenges being faced by actors adopting a new innovation. This framework 
helps to explain the co-existence of accounting reform and organisational legitimacy, with 
issues surrounding the level of uncertainty diffused within the organisations as they adopt the 
change, the use of power in different shades, occurrence of loose coupling and the eventual 
institutionalisation of the accounting reform.  
As more researches are drawn into this discussion, with the quest to determine the salient 
institutions  that  governs  implementation  of  innovations,  and  understanding  public  sector 
reform programmes in the light of the organisational participants, we may likely be able to 
predict  those  areas  of  a  reform,  where  struggle  is  likely  to  occur  by  looking  for  the 
institutional  mismatches.  Also,  based on the theoretical  insights  achieved on how parties 
behave under various institutional struggles, the means of resolving these struggles, and so 
on, the prospective regulators may be able to design interventions, thereby mitigating the 
element  of  struggles  from  the  onset  of  reform  design.  These  interventions  will  not  only 
resolve the institutional conflicts, it would also  ensure that the organisations are kept on 
course with the innovation, which ultimately results in the achievement of the institutional 
aim for setting out the innovation.  
Using  the  evidence  from  the  FT  case  studies,  we  have  shown  that  each  instance  of  the 
organisational  struggles  observed  were  as  a  result  of  the  uniqueness  of  individual 
organisations  existing  within  a  fragmented  sector  and  the  varying  level  of  knowledge 
available to each actors. We have also demonstrated how NIS’s extant findings such as the 
theory of legitimacy, created a better understanding of the main drivers behind organisational 
struggle. This in turn helped us develop a richer taxonomy and a more accurate formulation 
of the issues arising due to organisational uptake of an innovation. 
It  must  be  noted  that  NIS  does  not  provide  all  the  answers  in  terms  of  resolving 
organisational struggle, however it provided a good ground to understanding the problem. 
Organisation’s struggle for compliance has not been studied enough for us to predict the 
specific kinds of issues that will occur on any given reform and to design specific strategies   201 
to mitigate them. Our primary purpose in undertaking this research was thus to stimulate 
discussion in the NHS environment, which has been proliferated with a series of reform in the 
last two decades, by setting out an intensive framework that allows us to conceptualize and 
analyse the role of accounting reform in NHS organisations.  
In this study we have also progressed a step further by identifying the limitations of this 
framework,  as  well  as  the  intellectual  gaps  in  current  knowledge,  and  have  laid  out  the 
groundwork for future research, as a basis to call on researchers to undertake studies looking 
into the evaluation of accounting reform in the NHS, so as to build a better understanding of 
the nature of organisational struggle and foster a more successful trail of innovation in the 
sector. 
The problem of organisational struggle have not been adequately addressed thus far in the FT 
sector,  hence,  the  issue  of  transparency  in  its  local  accountability  is  still  very  elusive. 
Accountability issues remain a major conflict, which highly impacts of the effectiveness of 
the twenty first century public sector organisation, especially within the UK healthcare sector. 
The resolution requires a dedicated and calculated attention of the regulators. 
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Appendices  
Appendix (i) – List of Interview Questions 
The impact of FT status in financial management in the NHS - Interview questions 
FT Introduction and Staff Acceptance 
  Why do you think your organisation applied to become a Foundation Trust Hospital? 
  Do you consider the FT route as the most appropriate turn for your Trust?  
  What is the Trust’s motivation for applying for the FT status? 
  What do you hope to achieve from it? 
  Would it have been possible to delay your application? 
  Would it be an option to not apply at all, if it was not the best option? 
  What is your opinion about the FT model, what do you think the government is trying to do by 
introducing the FT status?  
  The government has left no option to the organisations therefore pressurised them to apply for 
FT status. 
  The government has used the FT status as a control tool to seek the legitimacy of the public 
  The trust applied for FT status in order to show their efficiency motive to improve its services 
and created an efficient organisation. 
  The trust applied for FT status in order to benefit from the autonomy and independence offered 
under the FT model 
  Other reasons 
  What is the level of acceptance of the FT model by staff? 
  Were there resistance, concerns, scepticism etc? 
  Are you involved at all in the FT plan? 
  How is information flow affected? 
  What does facilitate this? 
  What is the communication of this change like between the top and bottom level, both vertically and 
horizontally? 
  Do you think as an FT organisation, there is more competition for contracts in the present environment? 
Changes to Business priorities 
  How much stretched (in resource terms) is the Trust in trying to comply with the FT qualification 
standard?  
  Has FT status delivered any real change (As a result of FT Status) to your organisation’s financial 
management and indeed quality of service? How? 
  Do you think there was a change in the Trust’s core business priorities and strategic direction after 
acquiring FT status? 
  In what ways has the FT status changed the organisation’s operating environment? The norms, rules 
etc? 
  Has the FT status affected the way you work at all? How? 
  Was there a re-organisation of the teams and services as a result of FT status? 
  Were there new requirements for job specification in reorganisation process 
  Were there introduction of new rules, requirement for specific roles under the FT structure e.g. 
emphasis on specific qualifications, work experience etc?  
  Has there been any change to the Trust’s day to day activity that could be directly linked to the FT 
status? 
  Has the FT status has any impact on your financial practise, accounting practise? 
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Payment by Result 
  How has PBR affected your financial performance in the Trust 
  How has it impact on your service delivery, are the service well remunerated compared to the time of 
block contracts? 
  Would it have been any different if you were an FT or Non-FT i.e.  is the impact different between FT 
and Non-FT? 
  Is it any likely that the better result in FTs is as a result of PBR gains? 
Financial freedom and Regulatory Measures 
  How has the financial freedom and reduced incursion from the regulatory authority helped your financial 
performance?  
  What is your perception of the role of MONITOR, CQC?  
  Do you think Monitor control is any effective or unique for the success of FTs? 
  Is it that of power, support or task orientation? 
  Have you had to take advantage of the prudential benefits accorded you as an FT -e.g borrowing from 
the commercial sources? 
  What role do you think the political system has played in the FT model? 
  Do you think the FT model (the introduction) is politically motivated? 
  Can we assume that the new reporting line of FTs to Monitor has created a better organisations in FT 
thereby enhanced performance? 
Alternative to FT model 
  Do you think there is any other choice or alternative plan that is better than the FT model for the 
enhancement of your Trust’s performance? 
Board Composition and Governance 
  What is your perception of the new board…Do you think there is a marked change in the board 
composition especially with the inclusion of the public? 
  What about the board’s skill mix, knowledge? How much of challenge is received on financial decisions 
(e.g. budget approval)? 
  What is the outlook of the board meeting now, compared to the old regime, are there more challenges 
and contribution from the Non executive members? 
  Can we assume the change in board membership has created dynamism in governance and enhanced 
performance in FTs? 
Service Change and Staffing Structure 
  How would you rate the service of your Trust to the community compared to before? 
  What is the trend of your financial position as an FT? Are you better financially? Is there better income 
etc compared to your pre FT days? 
  Is the good/bad/average financial position in your organisation as a result of the FT status or PBR or 
any other systemic change? 
  How much of the success of this organisation is dependent on the new internal structure?  
  Have you noticed any impact of the change in your organisation? Does it matter at all if there was 
change in status, introduction of new freedom etc or not? 
  Under the new regime, has there been any reduction in your cost of providing service or an improved 
Reference Cost Indices? 
  Have you experienced any staff loss to other FT organisations? 
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Appendix (ii) – List of Codes and Data Constructs 
Template Schedule   
Concept  Code  Variables  Indicator  Operationalization 
              
WHAT 
INSTITUTIONAL 
FORCES  EXERTED 
PRESSURE             
   A1 
What Options were available 
to NHS Trust as alternative to 
FT  Choiceless/Coercion  Coercive Pressure 
   A2 
The basis of organisational 
choice, is there a reason for 
FT 
It is a 'must 
do'/conform attitutde  Legitimacy 
   A3 
Any understanding behind 
why and what FT is about? 
Limited/None/Skewed 
knowledge  Taken for granted 
        
Political Motive 
identified 
Government's use of 
power 
HOW  DID  THE 
PRESSUREAFFECT/S
TEERED  THE 
ORGANISATION             
   B1 
The general observable 
impact of FT on 
organisational goal/Public 
FT reform aligns with 
early FT's goal  Legitimacy 
        
Late adopters complied 
for legitimacy  Gaming/Legitimacy 
   B2 
Comparism of Pre FT and 
Post FT - Board Composition 
Changes are made to 
membership  Compliance/Gaming 
   B3 
Comparism of Pre FT and 
Post FT - Organisational 
stability 
Slight destablisation 
among FT  Uncertainty 
        




   B4 
Comparism of Pre FT and 
Post FT - are there FT related 
changes 
Major structural 
changes  Conforming 
   B5 
Level of Staff involvement in 
FT implementation  Limited  Power 
   B6 
Information dissemination 
about FT at vertical level  
Active in FTs and none 
in Non-FT  Power 
   B7 
Information dissemination 
about FT at horizontal/board 
level   Good quality  Power/Gaming 
   B8 
Organisational influence and 
staff morale 
Slightly impacted in 
FT, worse in NFT  Uncertainty 
   B9 
The attractiveness/complexity/ 
of FT concept - Quality of FT 
Highly complicated 
and rigorous  Complex rules   205 
   B10 
FT tool attractiveness - 
Adoption of Risk Rating, 
planning etc 
Organisations 
Conforming  Institutionalisation 
   B11 
Benefits of FT: Has FT 
created a better organisation? 
Cut in bureaucracy for 
Early adopters  
Org. Value - 
Legitimacy 
        
Indifference in late 
adopters & Non FT 
Org. Value - Mimetic 
action 
HOW  DID  THE 
ORGANISATION 
REACT  TO  THE 
PRESSURE             
   C1 
Staff Interactions with the 
Governors and Non-executive 
Board members  Vague to none  Power gap 
   C2 
Interactions at Board level 
and FT activated Board 
changes    Robust  Conformity/Gaming 
   C3 
impact of FT change on 
services and the financial state 
of Trust 
No FT impact on 
service quality  Loosely coupled 
   C4  Merge       
   C5 
The quality of FT rigour and 
its drive in Trusts 




   C6  Merge       
   C7 
Board adoption of managerial 
manouvering  Robust in NFT 
Gaming/Conniving 
values 
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Appendix (iii) – List of Documents Analysed 
List of Documents Analysed 
DOCUMENT  Period Covered  Number of 
Documents 
Source 











Audit Committee Monthly 
meeting minutes 
2008  7 Meeting 
Minutes 
Trust A 
Board Development meeting 
papers 
2008  6 
Presentations 
Trust A 







Trust Annual Budget 
Statement 
2008/09  1 version  Trust A 
Integrated Business Plan  2008/09  1 version  Trust A 




2 Versions  Trust A 
Long Term Strategic Model  2008/09  1 Version  Trust A 
Trust’s Service Performance 
Model 
2008/09  1 Version  Trust A 
Long Term Financial Model  2004/05  1 Version  Trust B   207 
Integrated Business plan  2004/05  1 Version  Trust B 
Long Term Financial Model  2008/09  1 Version  Trust C 
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